Background
In the context of competition over scarce resources, ethnic tensions and armed conflict, Somalia has been consumed by violence and gross human rights violations for the last five decades. On 1 July 1960, following a merger between the British Somaliland protectorate and the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia, Somalia was created in the Horn of Africa.[1] For its first nine years of independence, the country enjoyed a parliamentary democracy under President Aden Abdullah Osman Daar (1960-1967) and his successor President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (1967-1969), until Shermarke’s assassination on 15 October 1969.[2] President of the National Assembly Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein was meant to be Shermarke’s successor.[3] However, on 21 October 1969, the transition of power was abruptly terminated by a military coup d’etat.[4] The leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, became president of Somalia and led a military government for the next 22 years.
At the beginning of his presidency, Barre was popular, making it easy for the military government to be accepted by the Somali population and for him to consolidate a loyal following amongst civilians. Barre established a one-party authoritarian regime characterised by socialist ideals that were popular amongst the population. Despite his popularity, Barre’s presidency was marked by pervasive human rights abuses targeting clan-based opposition groups. With military backing, he used excessive force and collective punishment to suppress the opposition.[5]
After he pursued a brief but ultimately unsuccessful campaign to capture Ethiopian-held land in 1977, Barre’s support dwindled, and he soon faced resistance from clan-based coalitions. The Majerteen clan were the main opposition. Others included members of the Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye, and Digil and Mirifle groups. In late 1978, rogue military officers attempted a coup, which failed. Barre responded by using the national army and police to punish civilian members of the clan groups, particularly those of the Majerteen group.
Organised resistance against the Barre government ensued for the next 13 years, involving clan-led groups and civilian uprisings. The most prominent opposition groups included the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the Isaaq clan group and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) of the Majerteen clan group.[6] The government punished civilians from these clan groups, and this back-and-forth between the government and clan groups lasted until 1991. To maintain control of the national narrative, Barre denied journalists, representatives of human rights groups and representatives of humanitarian organisations access to war-affected areas.
In January 1991, a clan-based coalition overthrew the military government.[7] Following the ousting of Barre, the rebel leaders and other faction chiefs were unable to decide on a power-sharing model, leading to the country being divided into fiefdoms.[8] The country became embroiled in a civil war that led to gross human rights violations and many internally displaced Somali civilians. By November 1991, an estimated 500,000 inhabitants were left destitute.
Following the breakdown of the coalition, northern clans established an independent Republic of Somaliland that included the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool. Clans from Bari, Nugaal and northern Mudug formed part of Puntland, a self-governing regional government in southern Somaliland. Other self-governing regional governments included Jubaland, South West and Galguduud.[9] Since the end of the Barre government, Somalia has struggled to regain unity and stability.
From 1992, the dire situation in Somalia spurred international and regional interventions. In 1992, the United States launched a multinational peace enforcement operation in Somalia aimed at protecting humanitarian aid delivery.[10] The United Nations launched its Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-I), intended to alleviate local regional tensions and the famine, which was particularly plaguing south-central Somaliland. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a US-led and UN-sanctioned multinational force, was also established with the mandate to protect humanitarian operations. However, UNOSOM-I and UNITAF were unsuccessful, resulting in both missions withdrawing by 1993. Subsequently, UNOSOM-II was introduced with the mandate to establish a secure environment for humanitarian aid and undertake a national disarmament campaign, restore peace and encourage reconciliation.[11] UNOSOM-II troops were accused of perpetrating human rights violations, leading to them being withdrawn in 1995.
Also, in the mid-1990s, in response to regional and international interference, sharia courts emerged following rising interest in “radical localism.” With the intention of restoring traditional rule of law, sharia courts served as a “sub-clan” and operated alongside Somali customs instead of in opposition to them. [12] They gained significant popularity across Somalia. Although initially moderate in their intentions, many courts served the needs of more radical Islamist movements starting in 2004.
In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference was held in Djibouti. It led to the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic and the establishment of an interim government known as the Transitional National Government (TNG). Despite its potential as one of the first successful transitional governments in the country, the TNG was met with military and political opposition by the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council under faction leaders Hussein Mohamed, Farrah Aidid and Mohamed Dhere. The project collapsed and was replaced by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004, with Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as its first president.
Despite progress towards transitional justice efforts, conflict continued and heightened between 2005 and 2007. A growing network of Islamist militias demanding control arose across the country. Between 2004 and 2006, mass violence was perpetrated by Somali jihadists across the country, who killed civilians, prominent Somali leaders, aid workers and journalists.[13] There have been continuous efforts to stop al-Shabaab, with many regional actors, including Kenyan and Ethiopian forces, involved in pushing them back. Violence has been perpetrated by all armed actors.
In response to the Islamist insurgency, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 under the guise of training transitional government soldiers and providing protection against the insurgency. The US and Ethiopia provided financial and military support to counterinsurgency groups as well as client warlords.[14] Ethiopian soldiers are accused of committing violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a consequence, the Ethiopian government withdrew its soldiers in 2009.
In 2007, the UN Security Council authorised the African Union (AU) to establish the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), a multinational peacekeeping force. With regional and international interference, new groups emerged that engaged in warfare, including the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism and the Islamic Courts Union.
The TFG mandate came to an end in 2012, and the National Constituent Assembly adopted a provisional Constitution. By September 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected president in the first Somali presidential elections since 1967. Mohamud served as president of Somalia until 2017 and was re-elected in May 2022. Notwithstanding, internal conflict, violent extremism and ethnic tensions persist, undermining peace and reconciliation in the country.
Transitional National Government
After the Transitional National Charter, the TNG was established in August 2000 at the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti. The Charter enabled the creation of an interim central government with the power of regional autonomy as well as the establishment of new political entities in northern Somalia. The TNG was voted in by representatives from all clan families across the Somali regions.[15] Internationally recognised and supported, the TNG positioned Somalia globally, with seats at the UN, AU, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and League of Arab States.
By 2002, the TNG had established organs of a national government, including executive, parliamentary and judicial institutions and a police force and standing army. Despite these developments, the TNG was not locally supported and had little territorial control beyond the capital, Mogadishu. Strong opposition to the TNG came from militia leaders, including Hussein Farrah Aidid, Osman Ali Atto and Muse Sudi Yalahow, regional administrators of the newly formed Somaliland and Puntland, and sharia court leaders.[16] In addition, the government failed to fulfil basic service delivery because of underfunding, serving more as a symbolical institution. Suffering a loss of territorial control, continued internal tensions and lack of leadership, the TNG collapsed in 2004.
Transitional Federal Government
After diplomatic efforts by IGAD led to the Kenyan Peace Accords (Mbagathi Accord), the TFG was formed in October 2004.[17] The accord established the foundations for a federal system that allowed political leaders of the major clan families measured control over federal member states.[18] The transitional government was meant to encourage national unity and reconciliation amongst the many factions of the country. Therefore, the TFG was mandated to complete key transitional tasks over a period of five years, culminating in a referendum on a permanent Constitution and universal direct elections giving all citizens and not just representatives the right to vote.
For its first two years, the TFG failed to fully launch. With the 2006 rise of the Islamic Courts Union, clan loyalty and perpetual internal conflict, the TFG struggled for legitimacy.[19] However, given internal strife amongst factions within the Islamic Courts Union, the Ethiopian invasion that provided military and financial support, and support from AMISOM forces, the TFG was able to gain control over Mogadishu by January 2007.[20]
Despite this progress, the Islamist insurgency and the counterinsurgency led by Ethiopia left the country embroiled in armed conflict. By 2008, al-Shabaab gained significant popularity and military strength, enabling it to gain control of southern Somalia and much of Mogadishu. With the expulsion of Ethiopia in 2009, the TFG was left unprotected. Also, with claims of corruption, nepotism, clan favouritism and mass bloodshed as a consequence of internal fighting and al-Shabaab, the TFG could not recover.
In 2011, neighbouring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia and AMISOM intervened with military force to combat the resurgence of al-Shabaab. Importantly, alongside al-Shabaab, the TFG, Ethiopia, Kenya and AMISOM were accused of violating international human and humanitarian rights because of their use of excessive and disproportionate force against the civilian population, targeted killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, rape, and looting of humanitarian aid from refugee camps.[21]
In 2012, the TFG leadership developed a provisional Constitution and held its first elections. Mohamud was elected and stayed president until 2017. His presidency was marred by targeted attacks as well as persisting internal conflict between warring actors, including AMISOM, al-Shabaab and others. Mohamud was succeeded by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo, who was president between 2017 and 2022. Mohamud was re-elected in May 2022, following indirect elections.
Gender
Throughout Somalia’s violent recent history, conflict-related sexual violence, particularly rape and forced marriage, has been used as a weapon of war by all parties to the conflict.[22] Members of clan militias and al-Shabaab as well as the government, humanitarian aid workers, and soldiers from Ethiopia, Kenya and AMISOM have been found to have perpetrated international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including rape.[23]
The Barre government’s counterinsurgency campaign against the SNM, the SPM and the United Somali Congress was used to justify the government’s attacks on suspected group members and on civilians associated with the respective clan groups. Some of the brutal counterinsurgency measures used against “anti-government” groups included killings, rape and looting.[24] There is a lack of evidence of sexual violations during Barre’s regime, therefore the exact number of Somali women who experienced sexual violence is unknown. However, it is estimated that thousands of women were raped across the Somali territory.
Some of the compounding issues impacting on the lack of evidence and reporting of sexual violence involve the internal displacement of civilians as a consequence of their houses being looted and burnt down.[25] In many refugee camps, sexual violence has been perpetrated by various armed actors.[26] Fears of reprisal by perpetrators keep many survivors of sexual violence from reporting the crimes. Also, socially, rape is considered a moral crime, rather than a crime violating the person, which does not sufficiently address the crime committed by the perpetrator. In addition, many families seek out traditional mechanisms, including the offering of cattle to affected families, to resolve cases of sexual violence, instead of using formal legal mechanisms. This results in limited accountability and justice for survivors of sexual violence.
Persistent civil war has also resulted in a large number of deaths, particularly amongst men who were combatants. Somalia is framed along traditional and cultural clan customs that privilege men as heads of household, while women are sectioned off into the private space.[27] However, as a consequence of the deaths of many men, women have been expected to take on the financial responsibility of being heads of household while remaining primary caregivers. Therefore, women have been incorporated into the market, contributing financially to their households.
With this transition, a number of feminist groups as well as members of civil society more broadly have lobbied for women’s independence, demanding access to education and the protection of their civil, financial and property rights. Despite these calls, the status of Somali women remains largely the same. Women and girls are also victims of customs such as female genital mutilation and child marriage, which remain barriers to their financial freedom, education, career ambitions and independence.
International Actors
With the tumultuous situation in Somalia, the UN Security Council under Resolution 751 authorised UNOSOM-I in 1992, calling for the establishment of a peacekeeping force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu.[28] However, the mission’s measures proved insufficient as it failed to stop armed factions from obstructing and looting humanitarian aid. Therefore, the Security Council under Resolution 794 supplemented the mission by authorising the UNITAF multinational force, a US-led mission with up to 30,000 US soldiers out of the total 38,000 soldiers.[29] In 1993, the UNOSOM-II was established to relieve UNITAF. The peacekeeping operation was tasked with monitoring a ceasefire, providing protection for UN personnel, and escorting humanitarian supplies. In late 1993, UNOSOM-II secured a ceasefire and a disarmament agreement that initiated the first steps towards the formation of a transitional government. Despite these successes, UNOSOM-II troops were accused of perpetrating human rights violations against the Somali population.[30] By 1995, UNOSOM-II forces withdrew.
Despite international actors officially withdrawing from Somalia in 1995, both regional and international bodies continued to interfere in and affect the internal affairs of the country. Throughout the 1990s, countries including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt and Libya attempted to mediate peace settlements amongst the warring parties. Djibouti hosted the Somalia National Peace Conference in 2000, wherein the TNG was established. In 2002, following lengthy peace negotiations in Kenya, the TFG came to fruition with the support of IGAD.
In 2006, the Ethiopian government invaded Somalia under the guise of providing support to the TFG. With the US providing political, military and financial support, the Ethiopian government led military interventions in the country. Ethiopian soldiers were accused of committing human rights violations, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, against civilians.[31] In 2008, Djibouti was again involved in mediating a peace agreement that resulted in the expulsion of Ethiopian soldiers from the Somali territory in 2009. The Djibouti Agreement also included measures on the need to address impunity for human rights abuses in Somalia.
In 2007, the UN Security Council authorised the AU to establish AMISOM with soldiers from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to protect the TFG.[32] As a consequence of regional involvement, al-Shabaab has enacted targeted attacks on these countries’ civilians. For example, al-Shabaab coordinated suicide bombings in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, and in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, in 2010 and 2013, respectively. In an effort to continue to support and protect the transitional government, the government and AMISOM continue to receive military support from the US, the UN, the European Union, Kenya and Ethiopia.
Sources
[1] Adam Qasim, ‘Federalism for Somalia: Internal and external challenges in the post-transitional period,’ High-Quality Research Support, January 2015, https://www.academia.edu/31320390/Federalism_for_Somalia_Internal_and_external_challenges
[2] Ahmed Ali M. Khayre, ‘Somalia: An overview of the historical and current situation,’ April 27, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2771125
[3] Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, ‘Who assassinated the Somali president in October 1969? The Cold War, the clan connection, or the coup d’état,’ African Security, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2017).
[4] Khayre, 17.
[5] Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdullahi Barise, ‘The Somali conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies,’ African Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2006).
[6] Africa Watch, ‘Somalia: A government at war with its own people: Testimonies about the killings and the conflict,’ January 1990, https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/africa_watch_somalia_a_government_a_war_with_ibook4you.pdf
[7] Afyare Abdi Elmi, Decentralization options for Somalia (Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2014).
[8] Khayre, 1.
[9] Qasim, 4.
[10] Ken Menkhaus, ‘Governance without government in Somalia spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping,’ International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2006/2007).
[11] United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II),’ 2003, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2.htm
[12] Menkhaus, 82.
[13] Ibid., 91.
[14] Khayre, 32.
[15] Andre Le Sage, ‘Somalia: Sovereign disguise for a Mogadishu mafia,’ Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No. 91 (2002).
[16] Ibid., 135.
[17] Kenneth Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: Governance vs. state building,’ in Building states to build peace, ed. Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 187-216.
[18] Kenneth Menkhaus, ‘Elections in the hardest places: The case of Somalia,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2017).
[19] Ibid., 135.
[20] Margherita Zuin, ‘A model of transitional justice for Somalia,’ Fletch Journal of Human Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2008); Claire Klobucista, Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, ‘Backgrounder: al-Shabaab,’ Council on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab#chapter-title-0-7
[21] Amnesty International, ‘Somalia: Rape and sexual violence a constant threat for displaced women,’ August 29, 2013, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2013/08/somalia-rape-and-sexual-violence-constant-threat-displaced-women/; Human Rights Watch, ‘Somalia: Deeply flawed rape inquiry,’ November 10, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/10/somalia-deeply-flawed-rape-inquiry
[22] Ewelina U. Ochab, ‘Somalia: Sexual violence on the rise,’ Forbes, October 9, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2021/10/09/sexual-violence-in-somalia-on-the-rise/?sh=4af3d8e44ed1
[23] Human Rights Watch, ‘“So much to fear”: War crimes and the devastation of Somalia,’ December 8, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/12/08/so-much-fear/war-crimes-and-devastation-somalia
[24] Africa Watch, 2.
[25] Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra, eds., Somalia, the untold story: The war through the eyes of Somali women (London: Pluto Press, 2004).
[26] Fowzia Musse, ‘War crimes against women and girls,’ In Somalia, the untold story: The war through the eyes of Somali women, ed. Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 69-96.
[27] Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, ‘Women in peace and transition processes: Somalia,’ September 2018, https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/case-study-women-somalia-2000-en.pdf; Hiba Ben Kamsal, ‘The Somalia civil war from an identity and feminist perspective,’ Gender Institute in Geopolitics, April 2021, https://igg-geo.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Hiba-The-Somali-Civil-War-EN-translation-2-6.pdf
[28] United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Somalia: UNOSOM-I Mandate,’ 1992, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1mandate.html#:~
[29] Khayre, 29.
[30] Commission of Human Rights, ‘Report by the independent expert, Mr. Fanuel Jariretundu Kozaonguizi, on the conditions in Somalia, prepared in accordance with paragraph 6 of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/86,’ February 9, 1994, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/181897?ln=en&v=pdf
[31] Khayre, 33.
[32] Klobucista et al.