Background
On 1 October 1960, Nigeria gained independence from Britain, with Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the prime minister and the British monarch, Elizabeth II, as the constitutional head of state. On 1 October 1963, Nigeria became a republic, with Nnamdi Azikiwe as the first independent president. Since its independence, the country has struggled with persistent political crises, including military coups, secessionism, ethnoreligious violence, terrorism, and ongoing instability from banditry and herder-farmer conflicts.
On 15 January 1966, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, a young military officer of the Igbo ethnic group in South-Eastern Nigeria, led other young officers in a bloody revolution against the government. The military coup killed 22 prominent Nigerians, including Balewa, other ministers and officers, and their wives, mainly of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group of Northern Nigeria. Following the backlash of the coup, Nzeogwu did not assume control of the country. Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, became the first military head of state. Ironsi removed the federal system of governance and refused to prosecute the coup plotters for the murders.
In July 1966, several military officers from the North staged a “rematch coup”.[1] Ironsi was assassinated, and within three days, “every Igbo soldier serving in the army outside the East was dead, imprisoned or fleeing eastward for his life.”[2] The attack polarised the country’s armed forces along ethnic and religious lines, shaping the country’s future political trajectory. In August 1966, General Yakubu Gowon became head of state and immediately returned the country to a regional administrative system, with the federal military government at the centre. Massacres of mainly Igbos took place in northern and north-western states, especially in Kaduna. An estimated 30,000 Igbos and other Easterners were killed during the anti-Igbo pogrom.[3]
On 30 May 1967, military officer Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, of the Igbo ethnic group, declared the secession of the eastern region of Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra. The Nigerian federal government saw this as an act of rebellion and declared war. An estimated 100,000 soldiers to 2 million civilians were killed during the Nigerian-Biafran civil war, primarily a consequence of enforced starvation by the state.[4] On 12 January 1970, the civil war ended with soldiers surrendering to federal forces, and Biafra returned to Nigeria.
In 1975, a coup overthrew Gowon. On 29 July 1975, General Murtala Muhammed became head of state, but he was assassinated on 13 February 1976.[5] Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo became the head of state and, in 1979, handed over power to a democratically elected government, with Shehu Shagari as president. On 31 December 1983, Shagari was overthrown in a bloodless coup by Major General Muhammadu Buhari. On 27 August 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew Buhari. Human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention, targeting of the press, and the banning of political activities, characterised the different military regime transitions.[6]
In 1993, Babangida annulled the presidential elections, citing civil unrest.[7] In August 1993, Babangida stepped down as president and an interim civilian government was set up, but it was overthrown by General Sani Abacha later that same year. Abacha’s junta was a repressive military regime, suppressing all opposition, banning political activities and committing severe human rights violations, including forced disappearances, political assassinations and imprisonment without trial. On 8 June 1998, Abacha died of a heart attack, paving the way for Nigeria’s return to democracy.
On 27 February 1999, presidential elections were held, and the People’s Democratic Party won, with Obasanjo elected president again. Less than a year into Obasanjo’s administration, agitation over oil rights in the Niger Delta led to violence. On 4 November 1999, 12 police officers were murdered in Odi, a small community in Bayelsa state. In response, soldiers invaded the community, firing on civilians. This fuelled continued state violence, instability, and displacement.
In October 2001, during ethnic clashes between Tiv and Jukun communities in Benue and Taraba states, about 19 soldiers were abducted by Tiv militia groups and later found dead. In a coordinated attack, soldiers descended several communities, most notably Zaki and Biam, killing more than 300 civilians. Between 2001 and 2004, Plateau State in the north-central region experienced a series of ethnoreligious crises between Christians and Muslim neighbours. An estimated 53,000 people were killed in Jos City. On 18 May 2004, the federal government declared a State of Emergency.[8]
The ongoing crackdowns on lawful agitators and the invasion of indigenous communities led to reprisals against government forces by militarised groups, including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MSOP). In 2006, the situation resulted in another war, with armed groups instigating guerrilla warfare against government forces. The government launched large-scale attacks on suspected hideouts in local communities, with serious fatalities. An estimated 1,000 people were killed each year of the crisis, with many more displaced or forced to flee their communities.[9]
In 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency grew exponentially, spreading from northeast Nigeria to the rest of the country. The movement ideologically opposes Western education and governance systems, demanding the establishment of an Islamic state. Boko Haram militants have carried out deadly attacks on local communities, killing people, abducting and raping women and girls and forcing them into marriage. An estimated 36,000 people have died in the war, causing a humanitarian crisis in the region.
The history of unresolved violence and political mismanagement has resulted in continued crises, including the 2020 #EndSARS protests and persistent farmer-herder violence, making transitional justice and reintegration efforts a key focus of national policy.[10]
National Youth Service Corps
The end of the Nigerian-Biafran civil war marked the beginning of post-war efforts, including a nine-point transitional programme focused on reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. In 1973, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was established as part of the efforts to foster national unity by requiring university graduates to serve outside their regions.[11] However, controversial policies such as the ‘abandoned property’ policy, which involved the sale of Igbo-owned properties outside Igboland, and the ‘twenty-pound policy,’ which limited Igbo bank account holders to just £20 to rebuild after the war, undermined all reconciliation efforts. This contributed to long-standing grievances and doubt over Nigeria’s transitional justice commitments.
Judicial Commission for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations
In 1999, Obasanjo established the Judicial Commission for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations to examine the causes, nature, and extent of human rights violations committed between the first military coup in January 1966 and the return to civil rule in May 1999. The commission was mandated to identify perpetrators, determine the state’s role in the committed violations, and make recommendations on achieving justice and preventing future human rights abuses. The eight-member commission, known as the Oputa Panel, was led by retired Supreme Court Justice Chukwudifu Oputa. The Oputa Panel received over 10,000 statements, but only 150 were heard.
The Oputa panel experienced significant challenges, including a lack of subpoena power, the absence of a legal framework to support its mandate, inadequate funding and the inability to conduct independent investigations into allegations. In June 2002, the Oputa panel submitted a report to Obasanjo. The commission found the Nigerian military responsible for gross human rights violations, with assistance from State Counsels in the Ministries of Justice and affiliates.[12] It recommended compensation for victims of human rights violations, human rights reforms, environmental monitoring in the Niger Delta, combating corruption, downsizing of the armed forces, a review of the internal disciplinary procedures, and reform of police and academic institutions.
The commission’s final report was never made public, and no recommendations were implemented.
Rivers State Truth and Reconciliation Commission
On 29 November 2007, Governor Chibuike Amaechi established the Rivers State Truth and Reconciliation Commission (RSTRC) to investigate the conflict in the Niger Delta region and the human rights violations committed in Rivers between 2000 and 2004. The commission was mandated to produce an authoritative record of the causes and effects of cult-related atrocities and other violence, identify perpetrators and victims to pursue prosecution and compensation, and make recommendations for reconciliation in areas affected by communal clashes and kidnappings.[13]
The commission had nine commissioners, including retired Supreme Court Justice Kayode Eso. Public hearings were conducted in Port Harcourt, the capital city of Rivers State. On 24 March 2009, the commission submitted its final report to Amaechi, but it was never made public. The commission found the former Governor Peter Odili administration and the Obasanjo-led federal government responsible for their role in the breakdown of law and order in the state. Odili was accused of being responsible for the insurrection of cult gangs and aiding the proliferation of arms in the state.[14] The commission’s recommendations included symbolic and material reparations for victims and prison and police reforms.
Osun State Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In February 2011, Governor Rauf Aregbesola established the Osun State Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate human rights violations committed from 1 June 1993 until the commission’s establishment. The commission was mandated to determine the causes of human rights violations and the promotion of reconciliation in the affected areas. In February 2014, the commission submitted its final report, but the findings were not made public.
Ogun State Truth and Reconciliation Commission
On 14 September 2011, Governor Ibikunle Amosun established the Ogun State Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The commission was mandated to investigate and address gross human rights violations, including enforced disappearances, assassinations, kidnappings, torture, property destruction and murder committed during former Governor Gbenga Daniel’s administration.[15] Commission members included Honourable Justice Abdullahi Mustapha, Honourable Justice Dolapo Akinsanya, Barrister Bamidele Aturu, Barrister Tunji Onabanwo, and Lanre Suraj. Daniel contested the commission’s legality and prohibited its continued operations.
Amnesty
In 2008, during the RSTRC operations, Amaechi led amnesty initiatives in Rivers State designed to rehabilitate ex-militants who surrendered their arms, aiming to reintegrate them into society.[16] Although the details of the programme’s timeline remain unclear, its purpose was to bring about peace by providing incentives for militants to end hostilities and return to civilian life.
On 25 June 2009, the federal government established the Federal Amnesty Program to address the protracted Niger Delta crisis. The Federal Amnesty Program involved a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) initiative, encouraging militants to voluntarily surrender their arms in exchange for a state pardon for their crimes.[17] It also involved training for the demobilised militants in various vocations, including scholarships up to PhD level at foreign universities.
The amnesty programme marked a significant step in Nigeria’s post-conflict efforts, reflecting a pragmatic approach to conflict resolution in the Niger Delta. Over 30,000 militants participated in the program, surrendering an array of weapons, including gunboats, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns. The impact on militant youth and the gradual return to stability in the region represent the programme’s successes. However, the programme’s broader success is questioned as the systemic grievances that fuelled the Niger Delta conflict, such as environmental degradation, poor governance, and the marginalisation of local communities, have yet to be fully addressed.
National Conference (Dialogue)
In 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan held a national dialogue in Abuja to discuss solutions for the ongoing ethnoreligious crises and other issues threatening the country’s unity.[18] The dialogue involved 500 delegates representing diverse ethnic, religious, linguistic and other groups discussing contentious issues facing the country, including revenue sharing and political structures. At the end of its five-month deliberations, the conference submitted its report to the president recommending the restructuring of the current local government system, the return of the country to a parliamentary system, the rotation of presidential and other elected positions among the geopolitical zones and the creation of 18 additional states.[19]
The lack of legal backing severely undermined the impact of the conference outcomes. The report failed to meet the expectations of those advocating for systemic reform in Nigeria. None of the recommendations were implemented, and the issues discussed, including government restructuring and fairer resource distribution, remain unresolved.
Operation Safe Corridor
In 2016, the federal government established the Operation Safe Corridor to respond to the Boko Haram insurgency.[20] The programme was created to rehabilitate and reintegrate Boko Haram militants into their communities. Many insurgents have undergone the programme and are currently deployed to various vocational trainings, including service in the Nigerian army. Although the government intended to end the insurgency, the initiative has not yielded the desired result.[21]
A significant flaw of Operation Safe Corridor is the lack of ownership and trust among locals, insisting that the government’s priority should be addressing the suffering of the victims of the insurgency and not the rehabilitation of the militants.[22] Also, government forces have failed to contain the insurgency and Boko Haram’s continued attacks and abductions.
In February 2025, Governor Dauda Lawa of Zamfara State in Northwest Nigeria issued a press statement announcing the establishment of a regional Operation Safe Corridor office. The statement urged rebels to surrender their weapons unconditionally and emphasised the programme’s expansion to tackle broader security challenges in the region, extending beyond Boko Haram militants.
Gender
Before the civil war, Nigerian women’s roles were specific to domestic duties and motherhood, often confined to the private sphere. The missionary education system, which focused on preparing girls for Christian marriage and motherhood, reinforced this narrow view of femininity. [23] Women’s social roles were tied to submission and respect for their husbands, who were responsible for providing for and protecting the family. However, the civil war drastically altered this dynamic, forcing many women to assume leadership roles within the household. Many women became the primary breadwinners and caregivers for their families.
During the war, women were not passive observers. Despite being socially restricted to the domestic space, where they often faced severe threats to their lives and well-being, women played critical roles in ensuring the survival of their communities. They formed voluntary associations to provide essential services such as handcrafts, health care, education, clothing and food supplies to soldiers and civilians alike to reduce the detrimental effects of the conflict on their families and communities.[24] Women’s contributions were instrumental to the soldiers’ morale and success.[25]
Women’s roles in the conflict initiated broader reflections on the contradictions of their gender roles. The war forced women to confront the limited options available to them and to redefine their identities outside the confines of marriage and motherhood. In post-war Nigeria, perceptions of women’s agency shifted, as traditional expectations of submission or marriage no longer constrained women. Increased access to education has also given women the agency to assert their independence and establish themselves financially, socially, and politically outside of traditional societal expectations.
Contemporarily, women and girls continue to be targeted by armed groups. In 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency targeted women and girls, with many abducted, raped, and forced into marriage. In 2013, women and girls were continually abducted, and many who were rescued from previous abductions were found pregnant or with children. In 2014, 276 schoolgirls were kidnapped from their school in the Chibok community. By the fourth anniversary of the Chibok abduction, an estimated 1,000 women and girls were abducted. In 2018, another 110 schoolgirls aged 11 to 19 were taken from their school in Dapchi, Yobe State.
International Actors
International actors, including the United Nations (UN) and its human rights bodies, have offered recommendations for accountability and reparations for victims of human rights violations committed during the various civil wars.[26] Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have encouraged the peaceful resolution of conflicts and reforms within the justice system.[27]
International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and donor agencies, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Crisis Group (ICG), Doctors Without Borders (MSF), Save the Children, and Oxfam, among others, have provided technical assistance, funding, and advocacy support. These global partners have aided Nigeria’s transitional justice process by supporting local efforts to address historical injustices, raise awareness of human rights violations, and facilitated post-conflict recovery programmes.
Notes
[1] Chuks Iloegbunam, ‘Counter-coup: Africa’s bloodiest coup d’état,’ July 29, 2016, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/07/july-291966-counter-coup-africas-bloodiest-coup-detat/
[2] Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: The Politics of Coup d’état in Africa (The Penguin Press, 1970), p. 317.
[3] Vincent Ujumadu & Anayo Okoli, ‘Reminder of the 1966 pogrom in the north: to thy tents o’ Igbo,’ June 11, 2017, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/reminder-1966-pogrom-north-thy-tents-o-igbo/
[4] Margery Perham, ‘Reflection on the Nigerian Civil War,’ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No.2 (1970).
[5] World Peace Foundation, ‘Nigeria: Civil War,’ August 7, 2015, https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/nigeria-civil-war/
[6] Ajayi A. Olutayo & Oyedokun M. Oyeunji, ‘Unpacking the legacy of military rule: Human rights violations in Nigeria (1985-2007),’ Wukari International Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 5 (2024).
[7] Emeka Nwokedi, ‘Nigeria’s democratic transition: Explaining the annulled 1993 presidential elections, Commonwealth,’ Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 330 (1994).
[8] BBC News, ‘Nigeria declares state emergency,’ May 18, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3724469.stm
[9] Joan McAlpine, ‘Swamp People’s hell in an oil-rich paradise [Nigeria],’ October 23, 2006, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/swamp-peoples-hell-in-an-oil-rich-paradise-nigeria/
[10] Paul Eric, ‘The Amalgamation of Nigeria: Revisiting 1914 and the Centenary Celebrations,’ Canadian Social Sciences, Vol. 12, No.12, (2016).
[11] Ayobami Egunyomi, ‘The National Youth Service Corps: A Bridge to Nationalism in Nigeria,’ December 8, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/national-youth-service-corps-bridge-nationalism-nigeria
[12] Helen Ware, ‘Not the universal remedy: The diversity and impact of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in Africa,’ November 25-26, 2014, https://afsaap.org.au/assets/Ware-Helen.-Not-the-universal-remedy.-The-diversity-and-impact-of-Truth-and-Reconciliation-commissions-in-Africa.pdf
[13] Henry Omunu, ‘Nigeria: After commission wraps, Rivers waits for truth and reconciliation,’ March 28, 2009, https://allafrica.com/stories/200903300831.html
[14] Daily Independent (Lagos), ‘Nigeria: Eso panel and report and the future of Rivers State,’ March 23, 2009, https://allafrica.com/stories/200903240202.html
[15] Temitope Oluwole, ‘Who is afraid of Ogun’s truth commission?,’ November 25, 2011, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/who-is-afraid-of-ogun%E2%80%99s-truth-commission/
[16] Oluwatoyin O. Oluwaniyi, ‘Post-Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta: Challenges and prospects,’ Conflict Trends, No. 4 (2011).
[17] Oscar Edoror Ubhenin, ‘The Federal Government’s Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta: An Appraisal,’ Journal of Administrative Science, Vol. 11, No. 21 (2013).
[19] BBC News, ‘Analysis: What Did Nigeria’s National Conference achieve?,’ August 26, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28929532
[20] International Crisis Group, ‘An Exit from Boko Haram? Assessing Nigeria’s Operation Safe Corridor,’ March 19, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b170-exit-boko-haram-assessing-nigerias-operation-safe-corridor
[21] Queen Esther Iroanusi, ‘Repentant’ Boko Haram member responsible for Army Colonel’s death – Senator,’ November 11, 2020, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/425712-repentant-boko-haram-member-responsible-for-army-colonels-death-senator.html
[22] Queen Esther Iroanusi, ‘Nigerians oppose commission for ‘repentant’ Boko Haram members,’ March 3, 2020, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/380026-nigerians-oppose-commission-for-repentant-boko-haram-members.html
[23] Judith Van Allen, ’Aba riots or Igbo women’s war? Ideology, stratification and the invisibility of women,‘ In Women in Africa, ed. Nancy Hafkin and Edna Bay (Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 59-85.
[24] Jane Bryce, ‘Conflict and Contradiction in Women’s Writing on the Nigerian Civil War,’ The Literatures of War African Languages and Cultures, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1991).
[25] Enajite E. Ojaruega, ‘Beyond Victimhood: Female Agency in Nigerian Civil War Novels,’ Comparative Literature and Culture, Vol. 23, No.4 (2021).
[26] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights and Transitional Justice in Nigeria,’ 2020, https://www.ohchr.org
[27]African Union, ‘Peace and Security in Africa: Nigeria’s Role in Conflict Resolution,’ 2021, https://www.au.int
