Background
For a long time after its independence from France in August 1960, the West African country of Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed relative political and economic stability. Félix Houphouët-Boigny became the country’s first prime minister and, when his party won all the parliamentary seats, he became president. Houphouët-Boigny would go on to win the presidential election for a record seventh term in 1990, and would leave office only upon his death in December 1993.
The struggle for political control after Houphouët-Boigny’s death led to political tensions in the country, and in October 1995, five people were killed in Abidjan, the nation’s capital, as a result. Despite questions as to the legality of his assumption of office as president, Henri Konan Bédié proceeded to consolidate his grip on power by conducting parliamentary elections in 1995, in which his Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire won 95 percent in a vote that was boycotted by some opposition political parties.[1]
In September 1998, the killing of a taxi driver by police in Abidjan led to serious unrest and the deaths of even more people primarily at the hands of police.[2] Most of the killings were not necessarily politically motivated, but due to the use of excessive, and sometimes lethal, force by police against the citizenry. In December 1999, however, Bédié was deposed in a military coup that brought General Robert Guéï to power. The military incursion into Ivorian politics effectively ingrained a culture of impunity, characterised by extrajudicial killings and several mutinies.[3] In 2000, after losing popular support and facing an imminent defeat in the presidential elections, Guéï fled the country, paving the way for the emergence of Laurent Gbagbo as the president.
Gbagbo’s administration legitimised the Ivoirité (‘true’ Ivorianness) ideology that promotes certain Ivorian ethnicities as ‘indigenous’ over others, which it considers immigrant. Apart from being xenophobic and repressive of ethnic minorities, the ideology emboldened Gbagbo to try to disqualify former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, his main opponent in the 2000 presidential elections, on the basis that he was not ‘Ivorian’ enough.[4]
The ethnic tensions that arose from those elections resulted in the first Ivorian civil war, between September 2002 and March 2007, with factions of the armed forces and rebel groups taking control of different part of the country. An estimated 3,000 people were killed in the war, with many others displaced. At the end of the conflict, the warring factions signed the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) in Burkina Faso, part of which called for free general elections that guaranteed the participation of all segments of the country.[5]
Following the OPA, a general election was held in 2010 and Gbagbo lost to Ouattara, who was the candidate of the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace party. Ouattara’s victory was recognised by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations. Gbagbo refused to concede defeat and instead appealed to the Constitutional Council, the highest court in the country. The Council ruled that there was violence and fraud in regions where Ouattara enjoyed popular support and cancelled more than 660,000 votes, representing 16 percent of total votes cast. This meant that Gbagbo was declared the winner of the elections.
This development resulted in the second Ivorian civil war, in 2010–2011, between forces in the largely Muslim-held north and the largely Christian-dominated south of the country.[6] Gbagbo solidified his grip on power with a campaign of violence and terror against Ouattara’s supporters. Pro-Gbagbo forces also targeted Dioulas, an Ivorian ethnic group located in the north of the country, as they tended to support Ouattara. These attacks triggered months of clashes between the army, loyal to Gbagbo, and an insurgency group known as the Forces Nouvelles (FN), loyal to Ouattara.
On 28 March 2011, United Nations and French troops descended on Gbagbo’s home and arrested him, leaving the Ivorian government in Ouattara’s control. Ouattara’s rise to power inspired the FN and other pro-Ouattara forces to seek revenge against ethnic groups in the south, including the Bété, the Didas and the Guérés, who were generally supporters of the Gbagbo regime.
During the second Ivorian civil war, approximately 3,000 people died, 35,000 people were internally displaced, and 200,000 people, mainly Gbagbo supporters, fled across the border into neighbouring Liberia and Ghana. Amnesty International reported that both sides to the conflict committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, including unlawful killings and sexual violence.[7]
Less than two years after the election, Côte d’Ivoire started implementing transitional justice mechanisms to help the country deal with the legacies of these conflicts and put an end to growing ethnic tensions and corruption in government institutions. Transitional justice included accountability processes, institutional reforms, disarmament programmes and justice efforts for victims of human rights violations. Some of these processes are discussed below.
Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court and in Domestic Courts
Even before its formal ratification of the Rome Statute in February 2013, Côte d’Ivoire submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005.[8] In 2011, Ouattara formally requested that the ICC investigate allegations of crimes committed during the 2010 post-election crisis. The ICC issued three indictments. The first was in November 2011, against Gbagbo for crimes against humanity, including extrajudicial killings, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts. He surrendered to the court on 30 November of that year. The second was against his wife, Simone Gbagbo, in November 2012. The Ivorian government requested to try Simone Gbagbo before domestic courts for genocide and economic crimes and placed her under house arrest in northern Côte d’Ivoire. In September 2013, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Charles Blé Goudé, the militia leader of the Young Patriots, a pro-Gbagbo militia, for crimes against humanity. The government extradited him to The Hague in 2014.[9]
In addition to the ICC prosecutions, several domestic prosecutions occurred for national and international crimes committed during the conflicts. Although atrocities committed during the post-election violence went unpunished for almost a year, Abidjan Prosecutor Simplice Kouadio Koffi began conducting investigations in late 2011. In addition, the Abidjan military court announced charges against 77 military personnel for post-election crimes, including kidnappings, murder, illegal arrests and dealing in weapons.
As of 2013, the United Nations estimated that at least 55 Gbagbo supporters had been charged with serious crimes in Côte d’Ivoire, including genocide. These include the ex-commander of the Republican Guard, General Brunot Dogbo Blé, who was found guilty of sequestration of goods and complicity in the assassination of retired Colonel-Major Adama Dosso, believed to be an Ouattara supporter;[10] eight close associates of Gbagbo, who were charged with genocide; and Secretary General Laurent Akoun of Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front party, who was found guilty of making comments that “threatened the public order.”[11] Although these prosecutions represented positive steps towards addressing impunity, they have been criticised for only targeting Gbagbo supporters.
In January 2019, the ICC dismissed its charges against Gbagbo due to insufficient evidence. The prosecutor appealed the decision and Gbagbo was prevented from returning to Côte d’Ivoire. In April 2021, the ICC Appeals Chamber upheld Gbagbo’s acquittal and he was released, as was Goudé. Simone Gbagbo was convicted by a domestic court and sentenced to 20 years in prison. After she served three years, Ouattara granted an amnesty to her and other convicts in August 2018.[12]
National Commission of Inquiry
In June 2011, Ouattara authorised the establishment of the National Commission of Inquiry to investigate crimes committed in the country between 31 October 2010 and 15 May 2011. After interviewing 15,875 victims and witnesses, the commission submitted its final report in August 2012. It reported that 3,248 killings occurred during the crisis, including 1,452 deaths attributed to pro-Gbagbo forces, 727 deaths attributed to the military, 200 deaths attributed to the Dozo ethnic group, and 52 deaths attributed to non-conventional forces.[13] It also recorded 8,141 cases of ill-treatment, 345 cases of torture, 194 cases of rape, 265 cases of enforced disappearance, and 260 cases of arbitrary detention.
Ouattara submitted the commission’s report to the prime minister to pursue further measures, but progress was slow and biased. Only three of the 207 investigations opened following the commission’s report related to pro-Ouattara forces.
Ouattara created the Special Investigative Cell in June 2011 to compensate for the inadequacies of the judicial system following the post-election crisis. The Special Investigative Cell is a group of prosecutors, investigative judges and judicial police who are responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes committed during the crisis. The cell has jurisdiction over attacks on state security, economic crimes and violent crimes. As of 2013, the group had succeeded in charging more than 150 individuals, none of whom belonged to pro-Ouattara forces. With its main office in Abidjan, the cell advertised its services on the radio and in newspapers across the country to encourage witnesses to give evidence. Because there were no witness protection measures, however, very few people came forward.[14]
Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In addition to the National Commission of Inquiry, the government established the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) in July 2011 to promote reconciliation among the political and ethnic factions in Côte d’Ivoire. Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, the commission was composed of three vice presidents and seven commissioners from all regions of the country. They were tasked with investigating the causes of the conflicts between 1990 and 2011, and creating solutions to promote reconciliation and social cohesion in the future. In December 2014, the CDVR submitted its final report to the government.
There were two serious concerns with the CDVR: it lacked proper funding and there were insufficient safeguards to ensure its independence from the government. The commission was criticised for its lack of transparency and media coverage of the proceedings. Civil society groups complained that the 80 public testimonies heard represented only a fraction of the approximately 70,000 witness statements received by the commission. The CDVR was also criticised for having as its head a politician, Konan Banny.
According to a report on the Ivorian government website, Ouattara ordered his government to examine the commission’s report and implement the recommendations deemed pertinent. He also announced the allocation of 10 billion West African CFA francs for reparations.[15]
The prospects for realising the commission’s mandate of national reconciling were bleak for several reasons. For one, the CDVR was unable to bring supporters from Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front party to its dialogue sessions because they were unwilling to cooperate with the new government until Gbagbo was released – a discretion that lay with the ICC and not the Ivorian government. The party’s position led to the failure of political dialogue that endangered Côte d’Ivoire’s peacebuilding efforts.
Institutional Reforms
The Ivorian government achieved some progress in security sector reform for its military and police. After his rise to power, Ouattara created the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), a new military composed of former members of Gbagbo’s Defence and Security Forces (FDS) and the pro-Ouattara FN forces. However, since the majority of FRCI personnel were ex-FN rebels, the task of creating a centralised, legitimate military force continued to be a challenge.[16]
As an organisation, the FN functioned with zone commanders who operated as warlords, exercising absolute control over their respective regions. In late 2011, the FRCI simply extended this structure to all regions of the country, creating a loose confederacy of security forces with no centralised management. Many FRCI members were untrained and some even lacked uniforms. This mentality of absolute domination resulted in massive corruption and executions, unlawful and arbitrary arrests, and torture. The FRCI was particularly notorious for illegal road checkpoints in the western region, where extortion and theft were widely reported.[17] The government took steps to prevent these abuses by arresting some soldiers and dismantling unauthorised checkpoints in July 2013. The majority of FRCI soldiers, however, enjoyed complete impunity.
The reform of the gendarmerie and police force has been a slow process. Following Ouattara’s assumption of office as president, many Gbagbo supporters in the police were arrested, removed or, in some instances, killed. This led security forces to flee across the border, leaving police stations understaffed. Although police staff in big cities like Abidjan and Bouaké obtained weapons and slowly became operational, others had limited access to basic resources, including desks and vehicles. As such, many police relied on the FRCI for assistance in criminal investigations, even though the FRCI is not trained to perform such duties.
In August 2013, Ouattara established institutions to better organise Côte d’Ivoire’s security sector. These included the National Security Council to coordinate “security issues” and the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Authority to oversee disarmament initiatives.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
During the first Ivorian civil war, between 2002 and 2007, international actors supplied Ivorians with weapons, including small arms, ammunition, armoured vehicles and military aviation supplies. Although the United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo in November 2004, it had little impact because there were already massive stockpiles of weapons in the country. Many of the weapons acquired during the war were also deployed during the 2010 post-electoral crisis. Former National Assembly President Mamadou Koulibaly estimated that there were more than 97,000 armed men in the country who should be demobilised, including about 32,000 ex-FN soldiers, 36,000 recruits during the post-electoral crisis, and 38,000 members of militias and other self-defence groups.[18]
As of June 2013, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Authority had demobilised approximately 6,000 former combatants. There are still tens of thousands of people requiring demobilisation, while the proliferation of arms remains a serious issue in the country, posing an existential threat to the peace and stability of the country.
Gender
Sexual and other gender-based violence was a prominent part of the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire. It was deployed as weapon of war. Sexual violence against women and girls was particularly prominent during the second civil war and took the form of abduction of displaced women fleeing to neighbouring countries, brutal gang rapes, sexual slavery, torture and killings.[19] After the conflicts, women who experienced sexual violence faced discrimination and further physical and sexual violence.
As in most parts of Africa, women in Côte d’Ivoire were excluded from peace and transitional justice processes and their experiences in the conflicts have never been adequately addressed. Perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence were largely granted amnesty.[20] Gender inequality has remained a major challenge. It is entrenched by poverty and lack of access to quality education, land and employment opportunities.[21]
Justice
While Ouattara promised to end impunity for all crimes, regardless of political affiliation, Côte d’Ivoire’s criminal justice system continues to reflect the political divisions that exist in the country. Although there have been widespread reports of human rights abuses and criminal conduct by the FRCI and Dozo forces loyal to Ouattara, there have not been investigations of them.
A key example of impunity is the 2012 FRCI and Dozo attack on the Nahibly Camp for internally displaced Ivorians. The forces killed at least 14 people and injured, raped and arbitrarily arrested many others. Investigations started in October 2012, when authorities found six bodies in a well in Duékoué. There were 11 other wells suspected of containing bodies, and although the United Nations offered assistance to excavate the wells, the Ivorian government delayed the investigations. In addition, Minister of Justice Coulibaly Gnénéma publicly rejected the suggestion of an international commission of inquiry on the Nahibly Camp attack.
International Actors
United Nations peacekeeping forces were stationed in Côte d’Ivoire from 2002, during the first civil war. The United Nations also helped supervise the disputed 2010 election. After the March 2011 offensives, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), comprising 2,400 troops, with an extended mandate until July 2012. Pro-Gbagbo forces systematically targeted UNOCI personnel following Ouattara’s assumption of the presidency. Sometimes the offenses were minor, such as blocking UNOCI vehicles to provoke a reaction. In a June 2013 attack, however, pro-Gbagbo Liberian militias killed seven UNOCI peacekeepers.
The French military was also on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire from 2002. In 2004, when the Ivorian government killed nine French military personnel, the French government responded by destroying the Ivorian government’s air assets, which led to widespread protests in Abidjan. The United Nations Security Council sided with the French and passed Resolution 1572, imposing an arms embargo on the country. Despite earlier tensions, the French military continues to be an important ally for Ouattara.
Endnotes
[1] Associated Press, “Ivory Coast President Wins Election,” October 24, 1995, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-10-24-mn-60675-story.html
[2] United States Department of State, Cote d’Ivoire Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 (1998), https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/cotedivo.html
[3] Francis Akindès, The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d’Ivoire (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/95521/128.pdf
[4] Francis Akindès, “Côte d’Ivoire: Socio-Political Crises, ‘Ivoirité’ and the Course of History,” African Sociological Review 7, no. 2 (2003): 11-28.
[5] International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?” ReliefWeb, 27 June, 2007, https://reliefweb.int/report/c%C3%B4te-divoire/c%C3%B4te-divoire-can-ouagadougou-agreement-bring-peace
[6] Lisa Davis and Sabina Vigani, “Three Years after Bloody Election Violence in Ivory Coast, Tension Simmers,” Christian Science Monitor, August 6, 2013, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2013/0806/Three-years-after-bloody-election-violence-in-Ivory-Coast-tension-simmers
[7] “Côte d’Ivoire: Both Sides Responsible for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,” Amnesty International Press Release, May 25, 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2011/05/cc3b4te-de28099ivoire-both-sides-responsible-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/
[8] International Criminal Court, “Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire,” https://www.icccpi.int/cdi
[9] International Criminal Court Warrant of Arrest for Charles Blé Goudé, https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-02/11-02/11-1-0
[10] Loucoumane Coulibaly, “Ousted Gbagbo General Jailed in Ivory Coast,” Reuters, October 11, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ivorycoast-conflict-trial-idUKBRE89A1MB20121011
[11] Loucoumane Coulibaly, “Ivorian Opposition Figure Gets 6-Month Jail Term,” Reuters, August 31, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-opposition-trial-idUSBRE87U0X520120831
[12] Loucoumane Coulibaly, “Ivory Coast’s Ouattara Grants Amnesty to Wife of Ex-Leader Gbagbo,” Reuters, August 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-idUSKBN1KR29O
[13] Julia Crawford, “Transitional Justice in Cote d’Ivoire in Brief,” Justice Info, May 31, 2015, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/406-transitional-justice-in-cote-divoire-in-brief.html
[14] Ibid.
[15] “Reparations Underway for War Victims but Many Still Awaiting,” Voice of America, October 17, 2015, https://www.voanews.com/a/reparations-underway-for-war-victims-but-many-still-awaiting/3011997.html
[16] Arthur Boutellis, “State Security Versus Security Sector Reform,” ReliefWeb, November 1, 2012, https://reliefweb.int/report/c%C3%B4te-divoire/state-security-versus-security-sector-reform
[17] Center for Security Studies ETH Zürich, “Côte d’Ivoire: Extortion by Security Forces,” ReliefWeb, July 29, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/29/cote-divoire-extortion-security-forces
[18] International Crisis Group, Internal Tension, External Threats: Diffusing Tensions (2012), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep32202.5.pdf
[19] Elizabeth Pender, “In Ivory Coast, When Conflict Starts Women Become Targets,” The Guardian, April 13, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/apr/13/ivory-coast-women-targets-of-rape
[20] “ICTJ Experts Reflect on Côte d’Ivoire’s Transitional Justice Process and the Legacy of Their Work,” International Center for Transitional Justice, https://www.ictj.org/news/ictj-experts-reflect-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire%E2%80%99s-transitional-justice-process-and-legacy-their-work
[21] Maurice Mboula and Jean-Claude Didier Enguelegue, “Women’s Political Participation and Representation in Côte d’Ivoire,” International IDEA, June 27, 2017, https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/women%E2%80%99s-political-participation-and-representation-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire