Introduction
The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire lasted from 2002 to 2011. During this period, the country essentially became divided in two: a largely Muslim north that supported one presidential candidate, Alassane Ouattara, and a largely Christian south in support of another, Laurent Gbagbo (Gumede, 2020). After over a decade of violence, with significant loss of life and widespread sexual violence, the conflict reached its peak in 2010 to 2011, during the political transition from Gbagbo to Ouattara (Sendín, 2013).
By presidential decree, Ouattara in 2011 established the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation, or CDVR) to shed light on past human rights abuses and to aid in the development of social cohesion.
Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) played a significant role throughout the conflict. To address this, the CDVR gave attention to the gendered impact of the conflict on women as well as to gender-based violence (GBV). The CDVR final report, released in 2014, provides statistics on diverse forms of CRSV and accounts for specific considerations around the topic through its sub-commission on gender.
Conflict and Prevalence of Sexual Violence
Côte d’Ivoire was relatively peaceful and prosperous throughout the mid-20th century. As the economic situation in the country began to unravel later in the century, however, political tensions and divisions increased around the country. Following unrest during the 1995 presidential election, a 1999 coup forced then President Henri Konan Bédié into exile, with General Robert Guéi assuming power (CDVR, 2014).
Outright conflict was sparked by a 2000 law that excluded Ouattara, a prominent candidate from the north of Côte d’Ivoire, from presidential eligibility based on ethnicity (Salihu, 2016). The exclusionary policies of the Bédié administration, which exacerbated ethnic and religious divisions, were adopted by Gbagbo, who won the subsequent election and was in power from 2000 to 2011 (Kirwin, 2006).
The First Ivorian Civil War, from 2002 to 2007, ignited a crisis characterised by complex alliances and intentional ethnic polarisation. Marginalisation of ‘étrangère’ communities in the north and empowerment of the ‘pure-blooded’ Ivoiritè mainly in the south deepened divisions among the country’s 60 ethnic groups (Kirwin, 2006; Salihu, 2016).
The Ivorian military, state security forces and state-supported militias, supported by the United Nations, controlled the south. The rebel groups Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), Mouvement Pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) and Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) fought on the basis of opposition to the government’s ethnicity-based policies, later joining forces under a new name, Forces Nouvelles (FN). Both the government and rebel groups formed alliances with Liberian mercenaries such as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) (Asal & Nagel, 2021; GSF, n.d.). Women’s political organisations existed on both sides of the conflict (Hudson, 2009).
International actors, including the United Nations, African Union, France, Angola and South Africa, played an active role in mediating peace agreements in Côte d’Ivoire due to the country’s economic significance and importance for regional security. However, their interventions tended to heighten ethnic divisions (Salihu, 2016, pp. 77-78).
Various peace efforts during 2007 and 2008 culminated in the 2010 election of current President Alassane Ouattara, which sparked what is referred to as the Second Ivorian Civil War (Blay-Tofey & Lee, 2015). Between 2010 and 2011, both sides of the conflict committed unprecedented levels of violence, causing hundreds of thousands of people to flee the country (Sendín, 2013, p. 190). Only after facing mounting international pressure did Gbagbo concede the presidency in 2011.
During the conflict, sexual violence was rampant and pervasive, affecting women and girls extensively, as well as men and boys (Hossain et al., 2014). Perpetrators included government forces, rebel groups, foreign mercenaries, and even some peacekeepers (Salihu, 2016). Foreign mercenaries were directly implicated as a contributing factor to higher rates of CRSV, due to group dynamics and a sense of impunity (Reeder & Dicke, 2023, p. 250).
Widespread sexual violence was used both indiscriminately and systematically as a terror tactic, fuelled by factors such as desire for territorial control, ethnic divisions and political affiliations (Asal & Nagel, 2021). The population is said to have become desensitised to horrific sexual violence, which was normalised during the conflict, with such acts occurring regularly and witnessed by the population (HRW, 2003). Rape in particular was used as a method of humiliation for the victim/survivor, regardless of gender (Roth, 2013).
During the post-election crisis of 2011-2012 alone, there were over 500 reported incidents of sexual violence. Although the perpetrators were mainly armed men, there are examples of women supporting sexual violence as a tactic, such as former first lady Simone Gbagbo and groups like the Coordination of Patriotic Women of Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI, 2015).
Despite well-documented instances of sexual misconduct by United Nations peacekeepers in various missions, including the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, reports suggest that the deployment of UN police alongside troops during the UNOCI mission contributed to a decrease in CRSV by rebel groups. UN police helped mitigate rebels’ incentives for CRSV, despite resistance and the escalation of violence during disarmament efforts (Reeder & Dicke, 2023).
While acknowledging the challenges of underreporting and limited clarity regarding the identity and status of perpetrators, one study found that higher rates of partner-perpetrated sexual violence were observed both during and after the crisis (Hossain et al., 2014).
Contributing Factors around Sexual Violence
Although CRSV has been attributed to a range of perpetrators, Ivorian rebel fighters and Liberian mercenaries in particular are often cited as driving the high rates of CRSV throughout Côte d’Ivoire’s history (Asal & Nagel, 2021; Blay-Tofey & Lee, 2015). The structure of rebel groups is thought to have been a main contributing factor, particularly with regards to MPCI and MPIGO, which experienced low levels of social cohesion resulting from forced recruitment and the involvement of foreign mercenaries (Reeder & Dicke, 2023, p. 250).
Although gender equality is enshrined in the constitution, widespread discrimination subordinates women and affects their education, employment and health (Hudson, 2009, pp. 304, 311-312). In Ivorian society, sexual violence has been normalised, particularly towards women, who face a significant likelihood of experiencing such violence from the age of 15 onwards. A 2014 study found that nearly one in three women in Côte d’Ivoire have experienced sexual violence in their lifetime (Hossain et al., 2014, p. 5). While there are no official statistics, a study by the Association Ivoirienne pour la Défense de la Femme (AIDF) suggests that as many as 70% of women have experienced sexual violence in the country (REFELA-UCLG Africa, 2018, p. 16).
While there have been certain advancements in addressing GBV, the persistent stigma surrounding victims/survivors and societal taboos about the topic contribute to substantial underreporting of cases (Hudson, 2009). Consequently, survivors face challenges in reintegrating into their communities and accessing the necessary support and assistance (UNOCI, 2015). Additionally, there is an absence of resources addressing the needs of men victims/survivors, despite evidence of their experiences of sexual violence (Salihu, 2016). A UN report claims that the extensive duration of conflict led to a culture of violence which has facilitated CRSV, particularly due to lack of prosecution (OHCHR, 2016).
Transition and Establishment of the Truth Commission
Despite democratic elections being held in 2010, Côte d’Ivoire’s political transition did not occur until 2011, when Gbagbo was removed from the presidency. This enabled Ouattara to take up his position of president and initiate a transitional justice process, including enabling an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and transferring Gbagbo to The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity.
With the stated aim of addressing the widespread violence of the transition period, as well as the legacies of earlier conflict, Ouattara established the CDVR in 2011. The commission preformed an extensive series of national consultations, covering violations between 1990 and 2011. It engaged in dialogue with representatives of all facets of Ivorian civil society, including women’s organisations, and maintained this engagement throughout the CDVR process. In order to promote social cohesion, the CDVR also facilitated symbolic gestures to engage the Ivorian public, such as purification rituals and ceremonies to build the public’s trust in the commission and heal communities in the spiritual and social realms.
A national colloquium was established to gather contributions from different parts of civil society, international organs, traditional chiefs and experts in various fields. The CDVR states that through organisations, the contributions of women were centred. International consultations also played a role, including training sessions with UN Women Côte d’Ivoire and transitional justice actors in South Africa (CDVR, 2014).
Mandate and Scope in Respect of CRSV
According to its mandate, the CDVR aimed to repair the social fabric of Côte d’Ivoire after years of conflict. The CDVR was tasked to address the extensive loss of human life, significant material damage and massive displacement in the conflict. The commission addressed a wider time period in order to understand what led to the post-election violence in 2010-2011, covering the period from 1990 to 2011.
The CDVR’s mandate, as outlined in Ordinance No. 2014-32, encompassed several key tasks, including categorising human rights violations, uncovering truth and assigning responsibility for past and recent national socio-political events. The ordinance dictates that to this end, the CDVR must conduct public sessions to hear from victims/survivors, perpetrators and witnesses, and propose reparations and other measures to contribute to the healing of the traumas suffered by the victims/survivors (CDVR, 2014, p. 19; Ordonnance No. 2014-32, 2014).
The mandate for the CDVR has faced criticism for being “vague, broad, and overly ambitious” (Piccolino, 2018, p. 500; Lopes, 2015). There is no mention of gender or CRSV.
Truth Commission Operations
According to the CDVR’s final report (2014), its ten commissioners represented the different geographical regions in Côte d’Ivoire to account for social and cultural differences. Four of the commissioners were women.
The CDVR was composed of four commissions that specialised in different subjects. The CDVR established a Special Commission for Hearings and Investigations (CSAE) to inform its operations, including setting up the inquiry process, establishing a typology of human rights violations, and determining the extent of harm suffered and possible perpetrators (CDVR, 2014, pp. 47, 54). Of the seven members of that commission, three were women, including the president.
To identify the variety of causes and effects of the conflict, the CDVR also created a Heuristic Commission. It was composed of several sub-committees, including one on gender, demonstrating an explicit intention to integrate gender into the understanding of the conflict and operations of the commission. One member of the Heuristic Commission was a woman – the commissioner in charge of the gender sub-committee.
The CDVR also formed a Reparations Commission and a Memorial Commission, which oversaw these respective topics, including developing recommendations on costs, forms and recipients of reparations; ensuring that these recommendations promoted non-repetition; and arranging a national memory programme to determine which memorialisation efforts were needed and how to connect them with individuals and communities (pp. 46, 109, 123).
The CDVR commissioners participated in training workshops, including on the integration of gender throughout the CDVR’s work (p. 34).
The CDVR’s process for hearings and investigations was dictated by a handbook created in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice, which set out the methodology of the actions and approaches of those gathering statements in order to be sensitive to the socio-cultural situation in the country and the specific needs and experiences of victims/survivors. The CDVR required statement-takers to follow a list of eight rules of conduct, including considering the vulnerability of women and their heightened risk of human rights violations, particularly related to GBV during times of conflict.
Additionally, the CDVR developed a code of conduct which governs the approaches of statement-takers, specifically during interviews. The document covers various issues, such as interview procedures, psychological preparation, interaction with deponents, break management, emotional support and post-deposition protocols. In reference to the interactions between those gathering and providing statements, the CDVR final report notes that there was specific advice given to those interviewing women and victims/survivors of GBV (pp. 54-56).
The protection of victims/survivors was prioritised throughout the CDVR process and mediated through a protection programme that promoted confidentiality, provided security and supplied psychological, medical and logistical assistance (p. 92).
Of the over 70,000 statements received, nearly 40% of them were from women (p. 73). The hearings also included a significant awareness-raising phase which was dedicated to increasing the participation of women, a campaign which resulted in contributions from over 3,000 additional women (p. 68).
Many surveys and reports produced by nongovernmental organisations and the UN informed the work of the CDVR. These studies demonstrated widespread instances of rape and GBV (p. 64).
Truth Commission Final Report
The 2014 CDVR final report notes that women seemed reluctant to denounce the violence they experienced during commission interviews and hearings. In order to fully address the extent of GBV and involve women, the CDVR states that it implemented a specific process during the hearing process, but does not extrapolate on what this involved.
The CDVR’s summary of violations includes GBV as a separate category, dividing it further into different types: rape, attempted rape, sexual slavery, forced abortion, forced sterilisation, forced incest, and forced marriage. It lists a total of 1,359 such cases. The CDVR found that sexual violence was common throughout the country and committed by both sides to the conflict (p. 16).
Despite releasing statistics on GBV with details on types of CRSV, other mentions of CRSV are largely absent from the report.
The sub-commission on gender identified four main issues in regards to gender and the conflict. These include: gender inequity between women and men of all ages, discrimination and violence towards women and children, the responsibility of women in conflicts, and the political and socioeconomic inequality between women and men (p. 44). There is no extrapolation on these findings.
The CDVR final report was edited by the Ouattara government, which removed portions deemed critical of the regime (Piccolino, 2018, p. 501). There has been widespread critique of the CDVR, with many noting its close association with Ouattara and accusing the regime and the commission of seeking “victors’ justice” (Gumede, 2020, pp. 201-202).
Truth Commission Recommendations
The recommendations of the CDVR are separated into categories. To address the “root causes” of the conflict, the CDVR developed a set of general recommendations on the following subjects: land; democracy, citizenship and nationality; justice and security; poverty; gender; training, education, and youth; and communication and society (CDVR, 2014, pp. 104-106). Based on the recommendations, the reparations process is split into six components: the recognition and definition of victimhood; the typology of violations; the need for medical expertise; the need for repair, including financial and non-financial reparations, the integration of institutional reforms, and the implementation of a structure to coordinate the implementation of reparations (pp. 107-112).
In reference to individual reparations, the commission recommends the establishment of a reparations programme that addresses the physical and psychological needs of victims/survivors of sexual violence. Among institutional reforms, it recommends provision of medical assistance to all people who experienced sexual violence, regardless of gender or age. It also states that individuals can receive restitution and financial compensation based on an analysis of property damage and by medical experts. Compensation may be extended to family members in the case of loss of life (pp. 109-110).
The section dedicated to gender-based recommendations includes further details, such as promoting gender awareness; achieving gender parity in politics and public debates; revising discriminatory laws; integrating gender equality into development programmes and the security sector; complementarity with international conventions; evaluating the economic value of women’s domestic work; and providing financial, practical and psychological support for women (pp. 105, 117-118). The stated primary goal of these recommendations is to enhance the status of women in Ivorian society and improve their overall living conditions. By doing so, the commission says it hopes to facilitate greater communal support for victims/survivors, including those who experienced CRSV.
The report also includes general recommendations that might affect CRSV victims/survivors. Collective reparations, which involve the rehabilitation of communities, could address CRSV because of the often communal and public nature of the violations. Moral or symbolic reparations, such as commemorative ceremonies, could help to increase visibility around CRSV and reduce public stigma facing victims/survivors (p. 110).
Implementation of the Truth Commission Recommendations
Ethnic tensions and political rivalries remained after the 2011 political transition, despite the transfer of power to the previously marginalised Ouattara faction. Accused of selective justice, Ouattara’s government has undertaken prosecutions of Gbagbo supporters (Piccolino, 2018, p. 497; Salihu, 2016, p. 83). Further acts of violence have been committed by both sides of the conflict, counter to attempts at lasting peace (UNOCI, 2015).
In 2015, to work towards implementing the recommendations of the CDVR, Ouattara’s government established the Commission National pour la Réconciliation et l’Indemnisation des Victimes (CONARIV), or National Commission for Reconciliation and the Compensation of Victims. This commission was intended to establish and provide reparations (Piccolino, 2018). CONARIV collaborated extensively with the International Center for Transitional Justice to develop this reparations programme (Correa & Gbery, 2015). During its mandate, CONARIV recorded a total of 316,954 victims/survivors. However, it did not provide estimates or plans for compensation (Jeune Afrique & AFP, 2017).
Additionally, the government created the Ministère de la Solidarité, Cohésion Sociale, et l’Indemnisation des Victimes (MSCSIV), or Ministry of Solidarity, Social Cohesion and Victims Compensation. It ran from 2015 to 2017, providing compensation and rehabilitation programmes with medical and psychological aid (ICTJ, n.d.; Kouassi & Tiehi, 2021).
In 2018, Minister of Solidarity Maraitou Koné announced that the process had identified 4,500 victims/survivors and distributed 3.8 billion West African CFA francs to them or their families in the form of cheques and vouchers for medical aid (Côte d’Ivoire, 2018).
Despite these structures being in place, there is little evidence of the implementation of other recommendations (Assignon, 2020). A survey of the population found generally negative feelings towards the process and results of the CDVR, whose reconciliation efforts are considered a failure (APDH, 2019; Assignon, 2020).
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