Background
During Alegria’s war of independence against France (1954–1962), a number of revolutionary groups emerged, with the most prominent being the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale, or FLN). As part of the agreement ending colonial occupation, the FLN banned political opposition, making Algeria a one-party state for 27 years.
The reforms in the 1989 Constitution enabled Algeria to host its first multi-party local elections in 1991. The Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS) won these elections and was expected to overtake the ruling party, the FLN, in the national elections. However, a military coup took place, cancelling the elections. The new military government banned FIS, with many members arrested and some disappeared, claiming that it was curbing a rising Islamist influence in the country. [1]
In January 1992, the military government created the Higher State Council as an interim governing body, headed by FLN founder Mohamed Boudiaf.[2] In February 1992, the new government imposed a national state of emergency as well as economic and political measures to settle public unrest about the political situation.[3] In June of the same year, Boudiaf was assassinated by an FIS affiliate.[4] Ali Kafi succeeded as president of Algeria in July. The mobilisation of Islamist rebels and guerrillas increased, leading to the creation of the political organisation the Islamic Armed Movement (Mouvement Islamique Armée, or MIA), which launched an insurgency against the government, the military and their supporters.[5]
The MIA declared jihad, which led to a decade-long civil war between the Algerian government and various Islamist rebel groups. This armed conflict, known as the Black Decade and a ‘dirty war,’ was marked by repression and detentions of civilians by both government agents and the rebels. The civil war was characterised by gross human rights violations, including forced disappearances, kidnapping, mass killings, bombings of public spaces, torture and mass rape.
From 1992 to 1993, rebels targeted civilians accused of being government officials or supporters. This included journalists, academics and others believed to be threats to the Islamist agenda. Between 1994 and 1995, the violence increased, with attacks by rebel groups on military and economic targets. The Algerian government, meanwhile, targeted members of MIA as well as FIS and their affiliates through a “make fear change sides” campaign that spread terror in the rebel groups and the larger public.[6]
Despite the bilateral nature of the conflict, there were political, tactical and ideological tensions among the insurgents. The divides were among three camps, the first led by the FIS’ armed wing the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut, or AIS), the second by the Movement for an Islamic State (Mouvement pour un Etat Islamique, or MEI) and affiliate groups, and the third by Islamist extremists in the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Arme, or GIA). GIA provided the most radical ideological opposition to AIS and sought the implementation of sharia law according to strict Salafi principles. The government exploited these divisions and often played members against each other.
Between 1995 and 1996, GIA embarked on public bomb attacks as well as abductions and killings of foreigners. Algerian security forces also attacked civilians. Massacres from July to September 1997 and from December 1997 to January 1998 resulted in hundreds of civilians killed. GIA’s attacks increased tensions among insurgents and in some cases led to the disbandment of rebel groups, including AIS. Both AIS and FIS at the time were in ceasefire negotiations with the government.
By 1999, attacks by state forces and Islamist groups had left about 200,000 civilians dead. Authorities have estimated that approximately 7,000 persons were disappeared in the war. NGOs have estimated that the number of disappeared is higher, between 10,000 and 20,000 persons, and that 1.5 million people were displaced.[7] The election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as president in 1999 slowed the violence, but the conflict only ended officially in 2002.
The main mechanisms of transitional justice for the civil war in Algeria have been clemency, amnesties, prosecutions and reparations in the form of limited compensation to families of the disappeared and victims of terrorist attacks. Many of these measures have been critiqued as political instruments intended to pacify the government’s critics.
Rahma Law
In 1995, President General Liamine Zeroual passed the Rahma Law (Mercy Law), which stated that Islamist fighters who surrendered to the government would be given clemency as long as they were no longer involved in blood crimes, permanent injuries or destruction of public property and assets.[8] The law originates from traditional tribal customs.[9] Rebels found guilty of the above-mentioned crimes would have their sentences halved. In some cases, death sentences were reduced to between 15 and 20 years of imprisonment. Those who were not involved in blood crimes, permanent injuries or the destruction of public assets avoided prosecution by turning in their arms.
The law did not end the civil war; instead, it intensified the conflict as it created divisions among the insurgent groups, which the Algerian government and military exploited.[10]
Law of Civil Concord
The de-radicalisation process and peace negotiations among warring parties begun to gather momentum in 1997, with a peace agreement between the Algerian Intelligence and Security Department and the AIS leadership, with support from FIS.[11] AIS also initiated a unilateral ceasefire as a step towards stopping the conflict.[12]
During his 1999 election campaign, Bouteflika promoted national reconciliation, promising peace and stability in Algeria.[13] Once elected, Bouteflika approved the Law of Civil Concord, granting amnesty to members of armed groups who were not guilty of rape or murder, under the condition that they turned themselves in. Those granted amnesty were placed under probation for a period of three to five years and could participate in the fight against active terrorist groups. In June 1999, the Algerian parliament approved the law, which was only valid for six months.[14]
The purpose of the law was to end the civil war and provide a legal framework to implement the 1997 peace agreement. However, this law is considered unsuccessful because it had many restrictive conditions around eligibility for amnesty that deterred insurgents from turning themselves in, with very few wanting to confess to crimes.
Civil Harmony Law
In 1999, the National Assembly passed the Civil Harmony Law. After the Bouteflika-led government approved the law, it was put to a national referendum, where it garnered public support. This law was an extension of the Rahma Law. It granted amnesty, reduced sentences, and ensured leniency and immunity from prosecution for former rebels who surrendered to the authorities.
Under the Civil Harmony Law, those who had not killed, raped or placed bombs in public places were exempt from prosecution.[15] Applicants benefited from the law’s clemency measures regardless of whether they had committed such crimes. A flaw of the Civil Harmony Law was the state’s failure to conduct thorough investigations to establish which crimes surrendering rebel group members were responsible for.
While some perpetrators received clemency in the form of lenient sentencing, others were granted amnesty, meaning they were fully pardoned by the state and released. The first amnesty measure came through a presidential decree in 2000, under which members of rebel groups who declared a ceasefire in 1997 were pardoned regardless of whether they had committed human rights violations.
Presidential Decree No. 2000-03 on Amnesty
Using Article 41 of the Civil Harmony Law, Bouteflika in 2000 passed Presidential Decree No. 2000-03, granting amnesty to the members of AIS and the Islamic League for Preaching and Holy War (Ligue Islamique pour la da’wa et le djihad, or LIDD), which declared a ceasefire in October 1997. This decree granted blanket immunity from prosecutions. To date, none of the names of the amnesty decree’s beneficiaries have been published.
Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission in Charge of the Question of Disappearances
In March 2001, Bouteflika signed Presidential Decree No. 01-71 establishing the National Consultative Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the country’s permanent national human rights institution. It replaced the long-standing National Observatory for Human Rights, which had little political power and often minimised the brutality of forced disappearance.[16]
In September 2003, according to Presidential Decree 03-299, the government established the Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission in Charge of the Question of Disappearances (Commission d’Enquête Ad Hoc Charge de la Question des Disparus), as a supplementary organ of the National Consultative Commission. The Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission was mandated to identify, investigate and determine the whereabouts of those who were disappeared between 1992 and 1999. Also, it was expected to draft a reparations plan for the families of the disappeared. Its mandate did not extend to identifying perpetrators.
The commission ran from March 2003 to March 2005 and submitted a confidential report to Bouteflika, which was never made public. The commission’s chairperson Farouk Ksentini publicly commented, however, that an estimated 7,000 to 12,000 disappearances occurred during the conflict. The commission found the Algerian security forces responsible for more than 6,000 deaths and noted that it likely committed more killings. As a consequence of the country’s amnesty measures, no army official was prosecuted.
Presidential Decree No. 05-278 on Reparations
Following the Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission, Presidential Decree No. 05-278 provided for reparations for aggrieved families. Since 2006, approximately 2,640 families have received compensation totalling up to 37 million USD.
Reparations were only provided to families who could present a death certificate. This was a problem as many families either did not have such documentation or, if they did, had to say that the deceased was an Islamist insurgent, which implicated them in terrorist activities. Presenting a death certificate also inhibited investigations into the disappearance.[17]
Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation
In August 2005, Bouteflika proposed the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which was approved by a national referendum in September 2005. The charter’s primary aim was to provide amnesty to parties who committed or participated in violations perpetrated between January 1992 and March 2006. For the law to apply, Islamist rebels were expected to turn themselves in to the authorities before September 2006.[18]
The Algerian authorities claimed the charter as a model to promote “a culture of peace, national reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence” after the civil war.[19] The charter denied amnesty to those involved in mass killings, rape, torture, attempts to set off bombs in public places, and other serious crimes. However, those found guilty of such acts could benefit from a reduction in their sentence. Approximately 2,200 Islamists accused of acts of violence were released under the charter and banned from participating in political life.
The charter has been criticised as one-sided, in that it granted blanket amnesty for human rights violations committed by state forces during the conflict. In addition, the 2006 Decree for the Implementation of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation criminalised any speech suggesting or alleging past human rights violations by state forces.[20] Another criticism is that the charter blocked the possibility of a truth-seeking mechanism, such as a truth commission, because at the time this did not fulfil Bouteflika’s vision of reconciliation.[21]
The charter provided for compensation to the families of the disappeared, provided they certified the death of their relative and announced them to have belonged to a “terrorist” group. Since 2006, an estimated 6,400 persons have benefited from compensation packages of 6,000 euros each. While some families of victims of terrorist attacks have received compensation, their demands for truth and justice have been ignored.
Prosecutions
Trials of “terrorists” multiplied after 2007, with eight suspected terrorists put on trial in June 2012 and two GIA members sentenced to death in 2015 for committing violent acts against the public. State agents have not faced the same consequences, with none put on trial or sentenced for crimes committed.
Gender
Many Algerian women participated in the war of independence as active combatants, nurses and in other roles. By 1962, women obtained their full civil and political rights, including the right to vote and be elected to office. In the country’s first National Assembly, 10 out of the 194 elected members were women, which at the time was uncommon. Algeria’s first Constitution, adopted in 1963, guaranteed equal rights and duties to men and women. However, support for women’s enfranchisement dwindled by the second National Assembly elections, which saw women members fall from 10 to two.[22]
After the liberation war, Algeria experienced heightened religious fundamentalism. FLN held a post-war congress in April 1964, where delegates called for institutions and policies in line with Islamist traditions.[23] Women activists mobilised against these changes, citing them as a means to control women and “return” them to the gendered domesticity that was made fragile by the war.[24] Because of this criticism, which resulted in large demonstrations across Algeria, the FLN government agreed to guarantee the emancipation of women and their freedom of movement in the 1976 Constitution.[25]
In 1984, the Family Code was passed, which identified women as legal minors. Under the law, Algerian women were not allowed to negotiate their marriage contracts unless represented by a matrimonial guardian, and they were not allowed to divorce unless they submitted to the practice of kho’a, meaning that they would leave without financial compensation. The law also institutionalised polygamy. Despite protests against the law and failed attempts at legal reform, the law continues to dictate the lives of Algerian women. It was modified in 2005, raising the minimum age of marriage for women and men to 19 and abolishing a wife’s duty of obedience to her husband.[26]
Under colonialism and in the independence war and the civil war, rape was used as a weapon of war by all the parties. Due to the social stigma associated with rape and the threat of societal rejection, official recorded accounts of sexual violence are limited. Therefore, the exact number of persons affected is unknown.[27]
After a long period of advocacy for investigations into the gendered nature of past violence, women victims of sexual crimes were offered reparations in 2014. They were eligible for only 297 USD in compensation.[28]
International Actors
Following the civil war, Algeria was side-lined by international actors because of the atrocities committed during the conflict. The Algerian government excluded civil society from its peace processes, meaning civil society had little influence during the political transition. Subsequently, the government also often surveiled, harassed and regulated local and international civil society organisations, blocking their efforts to improve transitional justice processes in the country.[29]
United Nations agencies, Human Rights Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and the International Federation of Human Rights, among others, acted as advocates for disappeared persons and the relatives of the disappeared seeking justice. Many organisations rejected the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, stating it maintained a culture of impunity for serious crimes. Many also rejected the government’s amnesty measures.[30]
Sources
[1] Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, ‘Goals and processes: The Arab world and the transitional justice impact literature,’ International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2015); Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The failed liberalisation of Algeria and the international context: Legacy of stable authoritarianism,’ Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002).
[2] ‘Algeria: Civil war,’ World Peace Foundation (2015), https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/72/
[3] ‘Freedom of Assembly,’ Human Rights Watch (1997), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/algeria/Algeria-08.htm
[4] Jonathan C. Randal, ‘Anti-fundamentalist leader of Algeria assassinated at port,’ Washington Post, June 29, 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/06/30/anti-fundamentalist-leader-of-algeria-assassinated-at-port/a11691a2-9061-4a44-b82b-90c184ec2a5d/
[5] Maggie Manson, ‘Will Algeria move toward or further away from transitional justice?’ Pulitzer Center, July 27, 2021, https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/will-algeria-move-toward-or-further-away-transitional-justice
[6] Rachid Tlemçani, ‘Algeria under Bouteflika: Civil strife and national reconciliation,’ Carnegie Papers, No. 7 (2008), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec7_tlemcani_algeria_final.pdf
[7] Ines Osman, ‘There must be truth and justice for Algeria’s disappeared,’ Aljazeera, March 3, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/3/there-must-be-truth-and-justice-for-algerias-disappeared
[8] Djamila Ould Khettab, ‘Comparative study of transitional justice in Africa: Algeria,’ Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2018), https://www.csvr.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Algerian-Case-Djamila-Ould-Khettab.pdf
[9] George Joffe, ‘National reconciliation and general amnesty in Algeria,’ Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2008).
[10] Khettab, 36.
[11] Fouzia Zeraoulia, ‘The national reconciliation process in Algeria during the Bouteflika’s era: The official narrative,’ Contemporary Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2023).
[12] Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, ‘Algeria’s peace process: Spoilers, failures and successes,’ Middle East Political Science (n.d.), https://pomeps.org/algerias-peace-process-spoilers-failures-and-successes
[13] Aram Gasparyan, ‘The “Civil Concord”: Attempt for peace in Algeria,’ International Journal of Eurasian Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2022).
[14] Joffe, 215.
[15] ‘Algeria: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee,’ Amnesty International, October 2007, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/AI-Algeria.pdf
[16] Sonia Cardenas and Andrew Flibbert, ‘National human rights institutions in the Middle East,’ Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2005).
[17] ‘Commission of inquiry,’ United States Institute of Peace, September 21, 2003, https://www.usip.org/publications/2003/09/commission-inquiry-algeria
[18] Youcef Bouandel and Bakeel Al Zandani, ‘Algeria’s national reconciliation: An analytical approach,’ Algerian Review of Human Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2019).
[19] Osman.
[20] ‘World Report 2012: Algeria,’ Human Rights Watch, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/algeria
[21] Suzana Grego, ‘Algerian Charter risks reinforcing impunity and undermining reconciliation,’ International Center for Transitional Justice, September 2005, https://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_en/algeria_sep26.eng.pdf
[22] Karima Bennoune, ‘Between betrayal and betrayal: Fundamentalism, family law, and feminist struggle in Algeria,’ Pluto Journals, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (1995).
[23] Bennoune, 53.
[24] Meredith Tursen, ‘Algerian women in the liberation struggle and the civil war: From active participants to passive victims?’ Social Research, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2002).
[25] Zahia Smail Salhi, ‘Algerian women, citizenship, and the “Family Code,”’ Gender and Development, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2003).
[26] Jyhene Kebsi, ‘Algeria’s sexist Family Code is long overdue for reform,’ Arena Online, October 21, 2022, https://arena.org.au/algerias-sexist-family-code-is-long-overdue-for-reform/
[27] Christa Jones and Anissa Talahite-Moodley, ‘Women from the Maghred: Looking back and moving forward,’ Dalhousie French Studies, Vol. 103, Special Issue (2014).
[28] Khettab, 56.
[29] Ibid., 45.
[30] ‘Algeria: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee,’ Amnesty International, October 1, 2007, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde28/017/2007/en/