Introduction
The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was created to promote national reconciliation among Ghanaians by establishing a record of past violations and making recommendations for redress of victims and institutional reforms (NRCA, 2002, p. 2). Established by the National Reconciliation Commission Act of 2002, the commission operated from 14 January 2003 to 14 October 2004 with a mandate to investigate abuses of human rights that occurred during unconstitutional periods of government, particularly those arising from activities of public institutions or public office holders (USIP, 2003). The mandate period was from 6 March 1957 to 6 January 1993 and emphasised three periods of unconstitutional rule brought about by military coups (NRCA, 2002, p. 3).
While the mandate largely ignored conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), the commission’s final report includes accounts of sexual abuse in its overall findings, as well as a few narrative summaries of such abuses. In addition, the final report includes recommendations relating to CRSV. Overall, the final report documents 58 accounts of sexual abuse, including adult male, adult female and child victims (NRC, 2004, p. 166).
Conflict and Prevalence of Sexual Violence
The NRC investigated a period of over 30 years, with a particular focus on three periods of unconstitutional rule, which resulted in 302 reported killings (NRC, 2004). The first period, beginning with a military coup in 1966 and continuing until 1969, is widely believed to be the point in Ghana’s history when cycles of military interventionism began. It included “profound and indiscriminate violence” during and after regime change (Asare, 2018, p. 54). The second period began with a military coup in 1972, led by Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, based on the idea that the previous government allowed “excessive international influence” (p. 59). Acheampong instituted policies of self-reliance and nationalism.
The third period began in June 1979, when a group of soldiers led by Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings initiated another coup. From 1981 to 1993, the regime “suspended the national constitution, banned political parties, detained party leaders, [and] created public tribunals” (p. 62). The years under Rawlings saw the highest percentage of all violations recorded by the NRC. Overall, “the Military, the Police Service and the Prisons Service were found to be the main perpetrators of the violations over the period,” with 66.3% of the violations attributed to the military (NRC, 2004, p. 157).
The prevalence of CRSV during these three periods remains underexplored. While the NRC final report documents sexual abuses such as rape, “interference with genitalia,” extortion of sexual favours, men forced to simulate sexual intercourse with the ground, and women forced to perform oral sex, investigating how pervasive CRSV was or its causes was not a priority for the commission (p. 177).
While the commission documents 58 cases of sexual violence, other sources suggest that this number is low due to underreporting and, in part, the male-dominated frontline of the commission staff. For example, an NRC statement-taker noted that it was common knowledge in Ghana that “soldiers and others used the cover of the nation-wide curfew during the 1980s to perpetuate an untold number of rapes. Yet few if any of these cases were captured in the Commission’s work” (Valji, 2006, p. 20).
Contributing Factors around Sexual Violence
The NRC’s final report notes a “general lack of knowledge and consciousness and respect for human rights in the country” (NRC, 2004, p. 204), which also applied to sexual violence during and outside periods of military rule. A factor that contributed to the prevalence of sexual violence, at least for female victims, was that women were targeted based on who their male relatives were. According to research, “Wives and female relatives of suspected coup plotters were especially targeted. Security service personnel invaded their homes, beat them, raped them, destroyed their property, and stole valuables” (Baiden, 2019, p. 25). Military culture and inequitable power dynamics between civilians and soldiers appeared to be part of the societal norms that enabled a high number of CRSV incidents with soldiers as perpetrators.
Beyond the prevalence of military culture, Ghana is considered a patriarchal and paternalistic society (Gyimah, 2009). The unequal power dynamics and traditional gender roles that stem from patriarchy are associated with the pervasive nature of violence against women in Ghana. While men are also victims of sexual violence, the literature is focused on the experiences of women. One study found that “33% of women experienced physical violence at the hands of their current or previous partners, 29% of women had their first experience of sexual intercourse by force, whilst 33% of the women had been touched inappropriately against their will” (Sikweyiya et al., 2020, p. 2).
Cultural understandings of religion and marriage also contribute to perceptions regarding the inferiority of women in Ghana (Gyimah, 2009). Social roles enforce a gender hierarchy, including through authoritarian rule in the home. For example, male participants in a study on intimate partner violence in Ghana suggested it was “their culturally sanctioned responsibility to control and discipline their female partners, as part of fulfilling their gender roles” (Sikweyiya et al., 2020, p. 9).
Transition and Establishment of the Truth Commission
The NRC was created at the urging of then President John Agyekum Kufour, whose election in 2001 was considered the first peaceful, democratic transition of power in Ghana since independence (USIP, 2003). Debates concerning the commission’s mandate were politically heated.
The New Patriotic Party (NPP) had a majority in parliament as the National Reconciliation Commission Act was being passed and advocated for human rights goals they wished to accomplish through the commission. They may also have strategically focused the NRC’s attention on periods that would uncover human rights violations committed when their political challengers were in power, thus weakening their opposition. Meanwhile, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), a powerful minority party led by Rawlings and John Atta Mills and the civilian successor to previous authoritarian governments, argued that the NRC was motivated by the NPP’s political agenda. The NDC also stood to lose the most political capital if the commission’s investigations revealed human rights violations perpetrated by their predecessors (Odartey-Wellington & Alhassan, 2016).
Beyond its involvement in pushing for the NRC’s mandate to pass in parliament, there is little information on the role of civil society in the commission’s establishment and operations. There was not much involvement from women’s and feminist groups specifically (Alidu & Ame, 2013, pp. 131-132). The commission’s final report, however, states that it intentionally “cultivated and enlisted the support of a wide network of civil society groups and individuals. It benefited considerably from the support of a dynamic coalition of civil society groups put together by the CDD-Ghana [Ghana Centre for Democratic Development]” (NRC, 2004, pp. 21-22). The final report also notes the CDD-Civil Society Coalition on National Reconciliation in its acknowledgements section.
Mandate and Scope in Respect of CRSV
The NRC Act, which was passed in December 2001 and came into force in January 2002, tasked the NRC with establishing an “accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses of human rights inflicted on persons by public institutions and holders of public office during periods of unconstitutional government” (NRCA, 2002, p. 3).
The mandate did not explicitly mention gender, sexual violence or women. It also did not provide instructions on how the commission should handle claims of sexual violence. The violations that the commission was tasked with investigating were abuses of human rights relating to “killings, abductions, disappearances, detentions, torture, ill-treatment and seizure of properties” (p. 3). The commission later chose to use broad operational definitions of such violations in order to be inclusive of a larger group of abuses (NRC, 2004, p. 11). This expansion allowed the commission to investigate claims of sexual violence.
Truth Commission Operations
Initially, the NRC was given one year from the first hearing to complete its mandate. A six-month extension was given to the original timeline and the commission concluded hearings in July 2004. The projected budget of the commission was USD 5 million, but this was ultimately reduced to USD 3 million due to lower financial support from international sources than expected (Hayner, 2010).
The operations of the commission involved statement taking, investigating each viable claim, establishing context for violations, identifying victims and perpetrators, holding hearings and making recommendations. Only one step of the process allowed for accommodations when dealing with victims of CRSV. This was a procedural adjustment, available upon request pending discretionary approval by the commission, allowing a private rather than a public hearing.
In deciding what constituted “good cause” for a private hearing, the NRC was guided by cases “where public decency or morality may be gravely offended by the nature of the testimony (e.g., the potentially detailed and graphic testimony of a victim of sexual assault or rape, where such evidence is warranted)” (NRC, 2004, p. 20). While this was the only procedural adjustment listed in the final report that directly corresponds to CRSV, the commission did offer counselling to victims, including victims of sexual violence, due to the burden that recounting their painful experiences could cause (p. 13).
Overall, the NRC aimed for a gender mainstreaming approach that did not isolate CRSV but intended to incorporate it as a cross-cutting theme in the final report (p. 3). The NRC report states that gender was seamlessly incorporated into its work through its hiring practices – for example the commissioners were three women and six men – but critics of the gender mainstreaming approach argue that without intentional focus and a designated staff devoted to issues of gender and CRSV, those issues ultimately become invisible (Nesiah et al., 2006, p. 3).
An analysis of the NRC’s final report indeed shows no focus on gender or CRSV beyond what were intended to be inclusive hiring practices. No specific task force or individual were assigned to focus on gender or CRSV. There is not a section of the final report dedicated to CRSV, gender or women’s experiences, and accounts of sexual violence are placed throughout the roughly 1,600-page report in various categories. Thus, the NRC’s gender mainstreaming approach ultimately made it appear as if gender and CRSV were not a priority for the commission.
Truth Commission Final Report
There was no dissemination plan for the commission’s final report (USIP, 2003). Thus, there was no mechanism to ensure that dissemination was successful. There was significant media attention around the report, but ultimately very limited distribution and no translation into local languages (Odartey-Wellington & Alhassan, 2016).
The final report operationalises the definition of sexual abuses to include rape and gang rape, interference with genitalia, extortion of sexual favours in exchange for visitation rights, men forced to simulate sexual intercourse with the ground/forced to push their genital into holes, and women forced to perform oral sex. The commission noted that these types of violations “deserv[e] special mention because of the loss of self-worth and the emotional and psychological trauma that victims, especially women have to deal with” (NRC, 2004, p. 177). Despite noting the extreme severity of these types of violations, without a section specifically dedicated to exploring the causes and nature of CRSV in Ghana, the accounts of sexual violence scattered across the report largely fade into the background.
In the data summary of the final report, the commission categorises sexual abuse under mistreatment. However, in other parts of the report sexual abuse falls under torture as well as its own category. Of the 58 cases of sexual violation included in the statistics, 25 (43.1%) were categorised as female victims and 33 (56.9%) were categorised as male victims, while 4% of the victims of sexual abuse were children (p. 166). Gender is entirely discussed in a binary manner. When referencing sexual violence, the commission final report focuses on the special impact it has on women.
Of the narrative accounts shared in the final report, nearly all, if not every, identified perpetrator was a soldier. Some were identified by rank, others by name, and most just as a soldier.
Truth Commission Recommendations
The NRC focused a few recommendations on addressing the needs of victims of sexual violence. Most prominently, the commission recommended monetary compensation as a form of reparations and listed suggested amounts that correlate with each type of violation. It suggested multiple sources of funding, such as the national budget, a provision as part of poverty alleviation, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) funds, perpetrators’ contribution when willing, corporate tax-deductible donations, voluntary public donations, and proceeds from the sale of the commission’s report and other memorabilia. The commission tried to strike a balance between Ghana’s economic capacity and assuaging the pain of victims/survivors in setting the recommended amounts (ibid).
In addition to creating the Reparation and Rehabilitation Fund, the commission final report recommends, as a form of institutional reform, redesigning police service training to include modules on topics such as domestic violence.
While no other recommendations directly address sexual or gender-based violence, there are two other recommendations that are inclusive of some victims of sexual violence: that the president of Ghana give a special apology to “Ghanaian woman for the indignities and the atrocities she has endured” and that that a monument be created in honour of the Ghanaian woman (pp. 172-173). Women were not the only victims of sexual violence during the period investigated, and women were victims of numerous non-sexual violations. However, the commission itself notes in the final report that sexual violence deserves special mention because it has such a specific and severe impact on women, including loss of self-worth (p. 177).
Implementation of the Truth Commission Recommendations
The NRC offers no plan of implementation in its final report and many of the recommendations are vague as to which actors would need to implement them. At the time the NRC report came out, the ruling NPP published a statement of acceptance of the report. In that statement, it suggested that implementing the commission’s recommendations was necessary for reconciliation, but there is little evidence of actions taken (Odartey-Wellington & Alhassan, 2016, p. 39).
The one recommendation the NPP seemingly prioritised was creating the Reparation and Rehabilitation Fund. After the final report was finished, it took multiple years to secure the funds and create the structures necessary to make the payments recommended by the commission (Valji, 2006). Ultimately, Ghana’s government allocated USD 1.5 million to compensate over 2,500 victims through the Reparation and Rehabilitation Fund (Hayner, 2010, p. 57). While the reparations programme was completed, it did not appear to involve civil society organisations or directly work with victims in order to develop implementation plans. Regarding the lack of direct victim involvement, one scholar notes that the “fact that these women were not directly consulted in the design of the reparations programme places them in a position of passive recipients of reparations. … Therefore, the fact that beneficiaries were not consulted in the design of the reparations programme minimised their autonomy over the process” (Baiden, 2019, p. 30).
Overall, there was a noticeable absence of an organisation representing victims/survivors working with the commission (Alidu & Ame, 2013). This created numerous oversights in the implementation process. In terms of victims of CRSV, the extent of violations that fell into that category for compensation were quite limited. One woman shared that although sexual violence was a category covered by the reparations programme, she “did not receive any extra compensation for the loss of her pregnancy, which could constitute reproductive violence, a category that was not covered by the reparations programme” (Baiden, 2019, p. 28). Overall, due to limited funding, the amount of each payment merely provided immediate relief but was not enough to provide any sense of long-term recovery (p. 29).
Beyond reparations, there is little information citing progress on the other recommendations. Sources suggest that most non-compensatory recommendations were not implemented (Hayner, 2010, p. 57). One possible reason for a lack of focus on implementation is the shift in political leadership during the NRC process. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, a human rights activist who strongly supported the NRC as the first attorney general and minister of justice of the NPP, was reassigned to the Foreign Ministry not even a year into the NRC’s operation, and his successors did not prioritise the NRC in the same way. Even though he was elected president of Ghana in 2017, the political and public interest behind the NRC had largely dissipated by that time (Odartey-Wellington & Alhassan, 2016, p. 40).
Another, previous contributing factor to the reduced political appetite for implementing the NRC’s recommendations was the election of Mills as president of Ghana in 2008. Mills served as vice president under Rawlings during one of the periods of military rule covered by the NRC. One of the commission’s recommendations was a national referendum on the indemnity provision in the Ghanaian Constitution that protects members of former military regimes from any sort of prosecution, including the large number of human rights violations the NRC uncovered (NRC, 2004, p. 184). Measures towards implementing such reforms (and the recommendations in general) seemed to halt with Mills’ election (Hayner, 2010, p. 58).
References
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Gyimah, A. 2009. “Gender and Transitional Justice in West Africa: The Cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone.” African Leadership Centre Research Report No. 4. http://africanleadershipcentre.org/attachments/article/43/ALC%20Report%20No.%204%20Gyimah.pdf
Hayner, P. 2010. “Ghana: National Reconciliation Commission, 2002-2004.” In Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. Routledge.
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Sikweyiya, Y., et al. 2020. “Patriarchy and Gender-Inequitable Attitudes as Drivers of Intimate Partner Violence against Women in the Central Region of Ghana.” BMC Public Health, 20(682): 1-11.
United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 2003. “Truth Commission: Ghana.” https://www.usip.org/publications/2003/01/truth-commission-ghana
Valji, N. 2006. “Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission: A Comparative Assessment.” International Center for Transitional Justice. https://www.ictj.org/publication/ghanas-national-reconciliation-commission-comparative-assessment