CSVR | CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION
Introduction

On 30 June 1974, President Idi Amin passed Presidential Legal Notice No. 2., the Commission of Inquiry Act (Charter, 1974), to establish the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda since January 25, 1971. It was alleged that a number of Ugandan citizens had disappeared in Uganda after the military coup that marked Amin’s presidency. The commission ran from July 1974 to June 1975 with the mandate to investigate and report on the disappearances that happened during the first three years of his presidency, from January 1971 until 1974. It did not include any provisions for addressing conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)

The commission conducted public hearings, investigating up to 308 cases and receiving up to 595 testimonies. However, its more than 800-page final report was never made public, with Amin receiving a single confidential copy. The commission did not identify Amin as directly responsible for any of the crimes committed and instead held security forces as the primary suspect of the disappearances, kidnappings and abuse of force. It presented recommendations to reform the police and armed forces as well as give them training in human rights and standards for law enforcement officials. None of the recommendations was implemented, and the four commissioners were later targeted by the state for their work (USIP, 2009)

Conflict and Prevalence of Sexual Violence

Following the independence of Uganda in 1962 from British colonial rule, Edward Muteesa II, the king of Buganda, became the first president of Uganda, with Milton Obote as the country’s prime minister. However, Obote overthrew Muteesa II in 1966 and declared himself president of Uganda. Obote’s regime was characterised by widespread violence and armed resistance to the government. Many political opponents were detained without trial and there were numerous accounts of enforced disappearances. The country was divided by ethnic and inter-regional tensions that had been fomented during British rule.

In 1971, Obote was overthrown by a military coup led by Amin, a military officer and former ally. In the beginning of Idi Amin’s regime, he freed all political prisoners and attempted to establish national unity across all the regions and ethnicities in Uganda. His presidency was however marked by atrocities and human rights violations. Idi Amin proceeded to close down parliament, ban political parties, scrap elections, create a secret police that exercised absolute power over civilians, and imposed personal censorship over the courts and press.

Additionally, systematic killings, torture and the assassination of Ugandan civilians, particularly the political opposition, and enforced disappearances were common during the period of 1972 to 1979. While the exact number people killed during Amin’s presidency is unknown, estimates range from 80,000 to 500,000 (Keatley, 2003). Sexual violence was not well-documented but is believed to have been widespread.

Contributing Factors around Sexual Violence

The nature and extent of sexual violence from 1971 to 1974 is not well documented. Scholars have however commented on the particular militaristic environment that produced a sexualised hyper-masculinity. Amin’s sexual exploits are documented. He has been portrayed as the “epitome of masculinity, defined in terms of both violence (warrior ethos) and a charismatic heterosexuality,” with reference to his athletic physique (Leopold, 2009, p. 324).

Amin’s former Minister for Health Henry Kyemba recounted that Amin dominated through violence and sex. Kyemba details that “no ministry or department has been left untouched. … Amin’s sex life and his working life are two sides of the same coin” (p. 324). Many of his sexual interactions involved coercion through fear.

The female-male binary determined the rigid societal gendered expectations of men and women in Uganda (Decker, 2013). Men were expected to be dominant, authoritative leaders. Men held positions of authority as policemen, armed soldiers and officials of law and order. Therefore, they often structured the rule of law according to their will. This was seen in the acts of kidnappings and disappearances that were conducted with impunity, with women testifying to being witnesses to these acts. Men who did not exercise such authority were ‘feminised’ socially as they were considered ‘weaker’ in comparison to their male peers. This is exemplified by the authority of soldiers over policemen – soldiers were dominant aggressors who often abused their power by detaining and violating civilians whereas policemen were seen as simply the administration who logged in criminals. This resulted in police officers being known as a “force of women,” as they did not possess the same qualities as armed soldiers (Decker, 2013, p. 137).

Gender roles also affected the lives of the wives of the disappeared. In the event of abductions and disappearances of their husbands, wives would often be expected to marry a male in-law to keep the property, and sometimes her children. In most cases, the woman would lose the marital property to her brother-in-law and be forced out of her household if she refused to marry him. After the disappearance of their husbands, some women could also not access the money in the husband’s bank account. This demonstrates women’s lack of ownership and authority over their estate and property, despite the fact that women had legal rights , for example through the Estates of Missing Persons (Management) Decree, which allowed relatives to apply to courts to administer the estate to anyone who had not been heard from for over six months (Decker, 2013).

While the direct targets of enforced disappearances were mostly men, these actions were accompanied by violence against women and children. In her testimony to the commission, Constance Apunyo stated that she was ‘assaulted’ but was not explicit on the how. She explained that she was assaulted multiple times and that, at some point, she was dragged to her bedroom by the men who were meant to collect her husband. She said that she crawled “to the bush naked where she stayed until morning” (p. 126).

From some of the testimonies to the commission, it was briefly mentioned that women were also victims of abductions and disappearances. However, these cases were not investigated further. Additionally, it is reported that women faced many obstacles in their search for the disappeared, with some experiencing sexual exploitation and sexual harassment during it (Decker, 2013).

Transition and Establishment of the Truth Commission

Wives of the men who were killed or disappeared by state security forces spoke up and demanded answers from the state. In late November 1972, Amin established a national women’s summit to discuss the role of women in nation-building activities. This summit was derailed as women raised concerns regarding the prevalence of disappearances. In 1973, Amin established an ad hoc committee to investigate the disappearances of 85 prominent Ugandan citizens. The identity of the committee members was not disclosed, nor were their methods revealed. Their findings were published on 9 January 1973, placing blame on exiled Obote and his associates (Decker, 2013).

Later in 1973, Amin announced that new investigations were to be carried into the disappearances and kidnappings. On 4 June 1974, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) released a condemnatory report on violations of human rights in Uganda. Following the report, Amin announced again that he would establish his own Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of kidnappings and disappearances in Uganda.

Following strong pressure from both national and international actors, Amin established the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda with a presidential legal notice, according to the Commission of Inquiry Act. The commission was tasked with examining cases of disappearance from the beginning of Amin’s presidency (Hayner, 1994; USIP, 2009).

Amin appointed Justice Mohamed Saied to serve as chair. He also appointed Captain Haruna Salim, a military officer and agent of the State Research Centre, and two police superintendents, Stephen M. Kyfulumya and A. Esau (USIP, 2009; Decker, 2013). No women were included in the commission.

The commission were given the power to compel witnesses to testify and call for records from official sources. Its role was to investigate and report on disappearances, rather than to serve a judicial criminal function (Hayner, 1994).

Despite this, it is acknowledged that the passing of the act and the establishment of the commission did little to stop the brutality and human rights violations (Acirokop, 2012).

Mandate and Scope in Respect of CRSV

The commission’s mandate did not mention nor provide scope for the inclusion of sexual and gender-based violence in the portfolio of crimes under investigation. The commission was specific and limited to investigating alleged disappearances in Uganda from the military takeover of Idi Amin on 25 January 1971.

Truth Commission Operations

The terms of Legal Notice No. 2 were that if anyone wanted to give evidence before the commission, they had to do so in person. The commission conducted public hearings; however on request, some were done privately. Amin encouraged Ugandans to testify before the commission, warning that anyone who interfered with the proceedings would face consequences like being reported to the Security Forces or Amin directly (Decker, 2013).

The commission investigated up to 308 cases of disappearances and heard between 529 and 545 testimonies, mostly from relatives of the disappeared (Hayner, 1994). Noticeably, more than 30% of the witnesses who provided testimony to the commission were women. Many of the men who testified were summoned to testify, unlike the women who were more willing participants (Decker, 2013).

Much of the testimony by women had three recurring themes: first, the physical and psychological trauma of witnessing the abduction of a loved one; second, challenges related to searching for someone who disappeared; and third, the hardships and loss that resulted from the disappearance. Despite the focus on male victims, it is important to acknowledge that women were also abducted and disappeared, even though there was not much testimony that highlighted women’s direct experiences of violence during Amin’s regime (p. 129).

The commission was limited in its access to information as it was blocked by Amin himself. It was unable to engage with either the military police or military intelligence, who feared that they would implicate themselves and the government (Hayner, 1994). Additionally, there was a two-week delay of the commission’s proceedings as it initially struggled to find people who wanted to testify. Many were afraid to testify and provide evidence against a sitting military government. Newspapers and radio stations continued to advertise the importance of the commission and the need for people to testify. The commission travelled across different regions, including to Kampala, Lira, Kitgum, Gulu, Mbarara and Fort Portal, conducting interviews and collecting evidence (Decker, 2013).

Truth Commission Final Report

After 11 months, the commission completed its work on 13 June 1975. It gave only one confidential copy of the more than 800-page final report to Amin. Amin never made the report and its findings and recommendations public. Few people have had access to the document, with photocopy copies of the sections of the document found online (Decker, 2013).

The commission concluded that the Public Safety Unit (also known as the Public Security Unit) and the State Research Bureau (also known as the National Investigation Bureau) – special security forces established by Amin – were responsible for most of the disappearances (USIP, 2009). The final report accused army officers of abuse of power and criticised the military police and intelligence for their activities and involvement in violations (Hayner, 1994). The Armed Forces Decree (also known as Powers of Arrest), which gave soldiers and prison officers the power to arrest, was abused and misinterpreted.

Additionally, the commission concluded that the documented violence and countless disappearances of Ugandan citizens since 1971 were a consequence of the “logical and natural events of the miliary take-over of the [Amin] Government,” with disappearances resulting from the transition of power to deal with “dissenting elements” (Hayner, 1994, p. 612).

The commission did not find Amin directly responsible for the conduct of police officers and state security forces. According to the final report, the commissioners stated that “there was no evidence where there was even the remotest suggestion that your excellency had directed the disappearance of any person or the annihilation of any ethnic group of persons” (Hayner, 1994). However, his involvement is implied, as the violations were conducted by institutions he established and which reported to him.

There was no information on sexual and gender-based violence in the final report.

Truth Commission Recommendations

As a result of the final report never being made public, this section relies on secondary literature to document the recommendations made in the final report. There was no mention of sexual and gender-based violence in the report, but it did make recommendations on issues of gender and women’s rights that could have had implications for the prevention of this type of violence.

In response to police officers being regarded as a “force of women,” the commission recommended structural reforms intended to restore police ‘masculinity.’ These included reducing the size of the Public Safety Unit and the Military Police, with the former focused exclusively on violent crimes and the latter on military offences (Decker, 2013, p. 137). The commission also recommended a review of Decree 8 of 1972, which gave government agents immunity from prosecution for “protecting national security.” This meant that officers were given free rein to act with impunity, which absolved the government of any responsibility.

Regarding the advancement of women’s rights, the commission noted the importance of education of women about their legal rights, particularly in relation to widows’ rights to their husband’s estate and their entitlement to their deceased husband’s pension for those who served as soldiers of the state (Decker, 2013).

Idi Amin rejected the report and its recommendations (Hayner, 1994).

Implementation of the Truth Commission Recommendations

Despite appointing the commission himself, Amin did not act on the recommendations. None of the commission’s recommendations was implemented, including that on the education of women on their rights (ICTJ, 2012).

Following the end of the commission, the commissioners were intimidated and targeted by the state in reprisal for implying Amin’s responsibility for the enforced disappearances (USIP, 2009). The chair of the commission lost his position in the government, another commissioner was allegedly framed on murder charges and sentenced to death, and a third commissioner fled the country to avoid arrest (Hayner, 1994). It is alleged that three of the four commissioners went missing. As a consequence, the commission had little to no impact on the country or how Amin conducted himself until he was overthrown in 1979.

Although the commission has been discredited for its lack of accountability, a small number of senior police and security officers were later tried by a military tribunal, but all were acquitted. Many victims as well as witnesses refused to testify at the tribunal out of fear for their safety (Decker, 2013).

As a consequence of suspicions of disloyalty and resisting Amin’s government, the pensions of many of the men who were abducted and killed were forfeited, which resulted in their widows and family having no claim to them (ibid).

Today, the 1974 commission is often dismissed within the broader debate on truth commissions due to its limited impact (Hayner, 1994). Many Ugandans at the time also rejected the commission, with many refusing to testify. Despite questions about the commission’s legitimacy, Amin was able to use it to depict himself as a concerned leader, which helped him garner political capital. This is evidenced by Amin being elected as chair of the Organisation of African Unity in 1975, following the end of the commission. Uganda was also elected to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in May 1976 (Decker, 2013).

References

Acirokop, P. 2012. “A Truth Commission for Uganda? Opportunities and Challenges.” African Human Rights Law Journal, 12: 417-447.

Charter: Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda since 25 January, 1971. 1974. Kampala: Government of Uganda. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Uganda74-Report/Uganda74-Charter.pdf

Decker, C.A. 2013. “‘Sometime You May Leave Your Husband in Karuma Falls or in the Forest There’: A Gendered History of Disappearance in Idi Amin’s Uganda, 1971–79.” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7(1): 125-142.

Hayner, P.B. 1994. “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.” Human Rights Quarterly, 16(4): 597-655

International Center for Transtional Justice (ICTJ). 2012. Confronting the Past: Truth Telling and Reconciliation in Uganda. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-Uganda-Confronting-Past-2012-English.pd

Keatley, P. 2003. “Idi Amin: Ruthless Dictator Whose Rise to Power Was Facilitated by the British Colonial Authorities.” The Guardian, 18 August.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/18/guardianobituaries

Leopold, M. 2009. “Sex, Violence and History in the Lives of Idi Amin: Postcolonial Masculinity as Masquerade.” Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 45(3): 321-330. 

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 2009. “Truth Commission: Uganda 1974.”
https://www.usip.org/publications/1974/06/truth-commission-uganda-74


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