Introduction
For nearly five decades, Togo experienced an internal conflict that was characterised by clashes between political factions, state security forces and various other organisations. From 1958 to 2005, there were continuous attacks by these armed groups on civilians, communities, chiefs and other leaders (CVJR, 2012, p. 227), beginning with the rule of Sylvanus Olympio and concluding after the tenure of Gnassingbé Eyadéma. The majority of the violence occurred under Eyadéma’s military dictatorship, which governed the country from 1967 to 2005.
After Eyadéma’s death in 2005 and the transfer of leadership to his son, Faure Gnassingbé, there was a heightened period of political unrest. The 2005 presidential elections were punctuated by violence and allegations of vote-rigging as Gnassingbé again achieved leadership (Tachiwou, 2013). After this shaky establishment of a new democracy, followed by several investigations by the United Nations, a national inquiry, and calls from domestic and international civil society groups for human rights violations from the past to be addressed, the government called for an official inquiry into abuses that occurred from 1958 to 2005 (Sarkin & Davi, 2017, pp. 6-7).
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Vérité, Justice et Reconciliation, or CVJR) was established in 2005 by presidential decree to investigate political violence, human rights abuses and a range of other crimes and to make recommendations for reconciliation and reparations. It started operations in 2009 and published the first volume of its 300-page final report in 2012. The CVJR investigated the context, causes and circumstances of murders, abductions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, attacks, mistreatment, politically motivated property damage, exile and assassinations. It also investigated rape and other sexual violations (CVJR, 2012, pp. 97-102).
Conflict and Prevalence of Sexual Violence
The temporal scope of Togo’s CVJR represents one of the longest periods of violence to be addressed by a truth commission. Beginning with the fight for independence and ending with the Togolese presidential elections of 2005, the commission investigated multiple coups, assassinations and military violence, which resulted in an unquantifiable number of deaths and instances of sexual violence.
Togo’s colonial history began with German rule from 1884 to 1914, followed by French rule from 1914 to 1960, when the country achieved independence as a result of growing anti-colonial sentiment and mounting violence (Kohnert, 2018; Sarkin & Davi, 2017). After independence, France maintained a close relationship with Togo, providing substantial military and economic support to the government, and thereby facilitating violence and contributing to impunity (European Union, 2005). During Togo’s first democratic elections in 1961, Olympio was elected president. His election and presidency were marked by violent clashes between different ethnic groups and political factions, causing many casualties (Sarkin & Davi, 2017). Olympio was assassinated in a coup led by Eyadéma in 1963, after which an interim government was installed.
Eyadéma seized power in 1967 and implemented an authoritarian government, marked by suppression of political freedom, violence against civilians and the exile, imprisonment and deaths of many political opponents, leading to waves of mass emigration from Togo (Kohnert, 2018). Eyadéma’s control was enforced by security forces, including military and paramilitary groups, which perpetrated gross human rights abuses (CVJR, 2012). Eyadéma won the 1993 and 1998 elections, and then changed the constitution to run for a third term in 2003 (Tachiwou, 2013). He remained in power as Africa’s longest-serving ruler until his death in office in 2005.
In the 1990s the abuses committed by Eyadéma’s government were increasingly condemned by the international community, resulting in economic sanctions (Kohnert, 2018). The combination of political repression, economic decline and widespread human rights violations contributed to a climate of instability and hardship in Togo. Violations were perpetrated by many actors, in particular the army, political parties and militia groups (CVJR, 2012).
While there are no specific figures on the extent of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Togo’s conflict, there are reports of women and girls being raped, sexually assaulted and subjected to other forms of sexual violence by security forces, militias, armed groups and civilians. These acts appear to have been committed as a means of intimidation, punishment and control. Some of the victims/survivors were targeted based on their perceived political affiliations, while others were atacked indiscriminately, and often in a group context (Okpar, 2020).
Contributing Factors around Sexual Violence
There is a dearth of research specifically on CRSV in Togo. The information that does exist tends to subsume sexual violence under the categories of gender-based violence or intimate partner violence (Burges-Soto et al., 2014; Moore, 2008). With this in mind, the information provided on sexual violence here must be situated within the socio-cultural context.
The long duration of the conflict in Togo resulted in social and economic conditions that contributed to high rates of CRSV. Factors such as “poverty, low socioeconomic status, unemployment, and isolation of women and families” increase women’s vulnerability to violence (Reid-Cunningham, 2008, p. 283). Additionally, the dictatorship and conflict exacerbated unequal power dynamics and led to the normalisation of violence, which enabled CRSV (Moore, 2008). The absence of rule of law and the prevalence of impunity for violence have been linked to increased rates of CRSV (Farah, 2015; Quadri, 2021).
During the conflict, Togolese society became increasingly militarised. Regardless of the form or political affiliation of the actors involved, militarisation is widely linked to patriarchal power relations that affect the prevalence of CRSV (Jokela-Pansini, 2020; Clarke, 2014). Additionally, forced displacement – a factor documented by the CVJR – increases the vulnerability of people, particularly women, to CRSV (CVJR, 2012, p. 114).
More broadly, domestic violence, including sexual violence, is reported to be a serious issue in Togo. In 2002, during Eyadéma‘s dictatorship, 52% of women were subjected to domestic violence and 22% to sexual violence in the context of domestic violence (Benninger-Budel & Bourke-Martignoni, 2003, pp. 266-267). Marital rape is not recognised as rape in Togolese law, and as such this type of sexual violence is widely accepted. High rates of domestic violence have continued post-conflict, with husbands, ex-husbands, strangers and friends reported as the top contributors to sexual violence against women (MPDAT et al., 2015).
Patriarchal attitudes and the normalisation of sexual violence are common in Togolese society. For example, sexual harassment is a regular occurrence (Benninger-Budel & Bourke-Martignoni, 2003, p. 274). Historically, there have been high rates of discrimination and violence against women in Togo (Akinocho, 2019). “Social and cultural taboos regarding sexual relations” also mean that women face obstacles in bringing discrimination and sexual violence cases to court (CEDAW, 2012, p. 6; Okpar, 2020).
Often due to the high levels of poverty in Togo, which have been exacerbated by years of conflict, child labour and trafficking occur at significant rates. A 2007 study found that over 40% of girls and over 10% of boys who experienced trafficking during the conflict were raped or sexually harassed. Furthermore, one in three girls who returned from being trafficked experienced sexual abuse in their home communities. The study points to the prevalence of sexual violence in Togolese society, facing both girls and boys. It also demonstrates how instances of sexual violence, particularly against girls or women, may incite further sexual violence due to social perceptions (Morgan & Behrendt, 2009).
Transition and Establishment of the Truth Commission
The period after Gnassingbé’s election as president in 2005 was characterised by “unprecedented levels of violence,” triggered by allegations of a rigged election and the plummeting of social trust. Within just over a month, 5% of Togolese were affected by the violence. The death toll reached 790 and an estimated 40,000 people fled to bordering countries (Tachiwou, 2013, pp. 1627, 1631-1632). Local and international actors began pressuring the government to address these violations.
The Inter-Togolese Dialogue contributed significantly to the creation of the CVJR. As a political process engaging the government, opposition parties and civil society, it involved negotiations and discussions on supporting Togo’s transition, including the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission (CVJR, 2012).
Two inquiries predated the CVJR, one by the National Independent Special Commissioner and another by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (p. 54). The first inquiry occurred in 2005 but its findings have not officially been made public. It developed a list of victims and suspects, but was criticised internationally for underreporting the number deaths and injuries resulting from the conflict (Kohnert, 2011).
Given allegations of massive human rights violations in Togo, the OHCHR deployed a fact-finding mission in 2005. It found evidence of many violations, including systematic rape and sexual violence against both men and women, mainly by the military and other armed groups (OCHCR, 2005). After national consultations in 2008 to raise public awareness and receive feedback from various stakeholders, OHCHR Togo developed a report “summarizing the findings of the national consultations and outlining recommendations, including the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission” (Lanvin, 2014, p. 234).
After signing the Global Political Agreement with the opposition in 2006, and under pressure from the European Union, the United Nations, international governments and civil society organisations, Gnassingbé established the CVJR in 2009 by presidential decree (CVJR, 2012).
The CVJR notes that many civil society organisations engaged with the process of establishing the commission, including multiple women’s organisations. During its preparatory phase, CVJR personnel met with political parties that were stakeholders in the Inter-Togolese Dialogue, including two women’s groups, the Réseau de Femmes Africaines Ministres et Parlimentaires-Togo and the Groupe de Réflexion et d’Action Femmes Démocratie et Dévemoppement. An expert in truth commissions with experience in gender analysis, Yasmin Sooka, was consulted on the commission’s structure and operations, its definition of victims/survivors and the management of their expectations (ibid).
Mandate and Scope in Respect of CRSV
The CVJR was mandated to investigate all political violence and violations of human rights from 1958 to 2005 (p. 62). According to Decree 2009-046/PR, the objective of the commission’s final report is to uncover the characteristics, scope and factors behind acts of political violence in Togo and victims of politically motivated violence and human rights violations (ibid). The mandate does not explicitly mention gender, gender-based violence or CRSV.
Truth Commission Operations
After delays, the CVJR began operations in 2009. The commissioners came from a variety of backgrounds, including human rights organisations and women’s organisations. Additionally, four out of the 11 commissioners were women, including the vice president (ibid).
Before conducting its investigations, the CVJR used oral and written sources to develop a general understanding of the main events in the period it investigated. CVJR staff then visited victims/survivors, their families and witnesses in order to verify the information they had received and gather evidence, if possible. The process of gathering statements throughout the country lasted for a period of five months, during which the staff underwent a five-day training focused on acquiring the necessary skills and adopting an appropriate attitude reflective of the nature of the investigations (ibid). According to one report, this included training the commissioners and those gathering statements in the appropriate treatment of women, children and victims/survivors of sexual violence (Barrigah & Benissan, 2015, p. 392).
Due to lack of material evidence as a result of the extended timeframe of the commission, testimonies played a particularly important role in establishing when and how human rights violations occurred. Additionally, in the absence of an amnesty process and other legal incentives to compel participation, the commission lacked involvement from perpetrators (ibid). These conditions weakened the results of the CVJR, which was left with “large gaps and inconsistencies” (Sarkin & Davi, 2017, p. 11).
From over 22,000 statements, 523 were retained for hearings, which occurred through public, private and video audiences across the country. Only 23 of the statements were on the subject of rape and sexual violence. This led to eight hearings, two of which resulted in investigations (CVJR, 2012, pp. 97-102). When possible, hearings were broadcast on the radio, without any clear differentiation of hearings on CRSV.
Although the CVJR did not have specific guidelines for addressing victims/survivors of CRSV, its approach to victims/survivors more broadly accommodated some of their needs. The vulnerability criteria developed by the CVJR, which include victims/survivors of sexual violence, involved employing medical experts and social workers to perform evaluations of victims’/survivors’ bodily injuries and vulnerability (CVJR, 2012, p. 128). Additionally, the commission prioritised confidentiality and gave special consideration to the vulnerability of victims/survivors (pp. 90-93, 117).
To account for threats victims/survivors could face, the CVJR developed a protection programme to keep anonymous the identities of those involved (pp. 115-117). Such measures can be particularly beneficial to victims/survivors of CRSV because of the shame, stigma or bias often associated with these violations. OHCHR Togo provided support to the CVJR in the form of technical assistance, workshops and trainings for commissioners and staff, as well as arranging international consultations (Lanvin, 2014), although it is not clear whether this included any explicit work on CRSV.
While the commission did not extrapolate on the impact of these processes on its structure and its capacity to address CRSV, they indicate its intention to develop an inclusive approach that is responsive to various victim/survivor experiences during the conflict and the transition.
Truth Commission Final Report
The first volume of the CVJR final report covers Togo’s political evolution from independence to 2005; the strategies and activities employed by the CVJR in fulfilment of its mandate; and the presentation of results, recommendations and monitoring mechanisms. The second volume addresses investigations into causes of violence, the third volume includes details on victims/survivors and the reparations programme, and the fourth volume includes information on hearings and investigations.
The CVJR submitted the first volume to the president in 2012, which was made public. It submitted Volumes 2-4 in 2013, but they have not been made public. Some have speculated that this can be attributed to the inclusion of victims’/survivors’ names, which may have raised concerns regarding confidentiality, and the estimated cost of reparations in Volume 2 (Sarkin & Davi, 2017, p. 8). Based on the topics of these volumes, it is likely that they provide information on the subject of CRSV that could be used to develop a clearer picture of victim/survivor experiences.
In the first volume of its final report, the CVJR places rape under grave human rights violations, defining it as an attack on physical and psychological integrity. The definition of victims/survivors is in line with the United Nations Principles and Guidelines, qualifying any infringement of international human rights laws or standards. References to victims/survivors include immediate family members of direct victims/survivors and those who experienced individual or collective harm. The result of this classification was that perpetrators were not eligible for amnesty (CVJR, 2012, p. 73).
The only type of CRSV explicitly mentioned in the first volume is rape. However, within its categorisation of violence experienced during the main events of the conflict, the CVJR employs the category of ‘rape and sexual violence’ (pp. 98-102). The CVJR focuses on 113 main events that occurred in the period it covered, with mentions of rape and sexual violence scattered throughout the volume in varying degrees of detail. The commission’s vulnerability criteria enabled it to take into account the specific needs of women and children. As part of the reparations programme, the CVJR created a typology of victims/survivors, with assessments to determine the extent of damage and ensure that they could be accounted for (p. 128).
Describing the methodology of the CVJR, the report notes special consideration for cases around the most common human rights violations during the conflict, identifying rape as a category of interest (p. 145). The identification of this category of violence is the result of receiving a high proportion of statements on rape, although this did not necessarily translate to similar representation of cases of sexual violence (p. 145).
Although the CVJR does not provide an overview of sexual violence and has not released statements by victims/survivors or an analysis of specific experiences, by mapping the events which feature sexual violence, a narrative can be formed around the ways that CRSV features in the report. In none of the following events is CRSV the main focus, but rape is referenced as part of the sequence of events. While this format portrays CRSV events as discrete, it is possible that other occasions included various expressions of sexual violence that were not communicated to or by the CVJR.
After assassinating Kegbe Koffi Matthieu in 1998 in Sendomé, militia members turned on civilians. In Sendomé and nearby areas the militia organised gang rapes and forced witnessing of rapes by family members. Noting that there were reports that girls and women escaping to Benin were kidnapped, the CVJR does not provide further detail. The CVJR describes these events as a “rare cruelty” (p. 208).
The CVJR also documents instances of rape in the context of inter-community conflict. For example, the Moba and Tchokossi communities were fighting in the town of Mango in 1991. A confrontation in the market led to young Moba men attacking a woman, which prompted Tchokossi women to engage in the fight. Hours later, a group of Tchokossi people killed a man, set a village on fire and erected a barricade to rape Moba passengers traveling to and from Mango. The use of sexual violence in this case appears to be retaliation rooted in long-standing historical tensions between the two groups (p. 182).
In the case of Bodjé, which involved a rivalry between the Kabyé and Kpélé communities, tensions escalated into a violent conflict where many houses were burned and several people died, also in 1991. The CVJR final report states that cases of rape were included in the charges against the Kpélé community, indicating that sexual violence was recognised within the context of the inter-community conflict (p. 181).
In each of these cases, there is little proof that sexual violence was committed to intentionally attack specific individuals. Rather, it was used to assert dominance over an entire group and linked to other forms of violence. The way the CVJR presents CRSV frames other forms of violence and conflict as the main events, with mentions of sexual violence occurring briefly at the end of a description. With little in the way of detail, analysis, statistics or narrative accounts of these events, their full scale and impact remains hidden. The CVJR does not address CRSV committed against boys or men at any point in the first volume of the report.
The CVJR occasionally uses the phrase “attack on moral integrity” when describing the types of violence that occurred during these events (p. 181). Since it does not always specify that sexual violence occurred, it is possible that this phrase refers to rape. It is also possible that its references to “moral torture” similarly relate to sexual violence, although this is not specified by the CVJR (p. 168).
Truth Commission Recommendations
The CVJR made 68 recommendations that seek to address the diversity of experiences and needs of victims/survivors. Within its methodology, the commission acknowledges the “vulnerable category of women” (p. 229). The CVJR states that the testimonies of women and their experiences of rape and sexual violence were particularly taken into account to ensure they could be dealt with in an appropriate manner in the recommendations (p. 225).
Guarantees of non-repetition are an important part of the CVJR recommendations, particularly considering how violence and conflict had become commonplace for decades (pp. 244-245). In light of this, the CVJR made specific recommendations regarding certain events, in addition to the more general list of recommendations. For example, in reference to the gang rapes by militia in Sendomé, the CVJR recommended that there be a full investigation and that the group be dismantled (p. 208).
One recommendation that includes specific consideration of CRSV is psycho-medical care for direct victims/survivors. The CVJR specifies that there is to be special care allotted for female victims/survivors of rape and other inhumane and degrading treatment for a period of 15 years (p. 232). To facilitate this recommendation, the CVJR promotes the creation of psychological care units within regional hospitals that are open to the population and free for direct victims/survivors. Additionally, all health insurance or medical expenses of direct victims/survivors are to be paid for 10 years, with the potential of lifetime support depending on the injuries sustained (p. 282). Another recommendation is that children and spouses of direct victims/survivors be eligible for psychological care for at least five years (p. 233).
Although these recommendations do not all explicitly reference CRSV, they do apply to victims/survivors of CRSV and account for the range of psychological and physical injuries that result from it. The commission’s acknowledgement of the needs of family members of victims/survivors is important for CRSV given the often public or communal nature of the violence.
In addition to specifically accounting for the experiences of women, the commission recommended that reparations not be limited to those who testified or were listed in the mandate (p. 229). By employing a broader scope in its reparations programme, the CVJR increased its capacity to account for the variety of victims and the multifaceted harms committed. The CVJR recognised that the number and scale of violations surpassed its capacity to address them, and therefore recommended that the state proceed with prosecutions after the CVJR’s closure (p. 212).
Implementation of the Truth Commission Recommendations
Since the CVJR, there has been relative peace in Togo, although several incidents of conflict demonstrate a continuation of political tension in some regions. Between 2017 and 2019, there were many allegations of human rights abuses by the Togolese government aimed to suppress protests, several of which resulted in lawsuits and calls by international bodies for remedy. The government was forced to pay reparations to victims/survivors of that violence (OMCT, 2021).
The judicial system, public administration and security forces have created obstacles to the implementation of the CVJR’s recommendations. Some issues include a lack of resources, government unwillingness to cooperate, abuse of power and impunity for both past and ongoing violence (Kohnert, 2018).
In 2015, the government established the High Commissioner for Reconciliation and Reinforcement of National Unity (Haut Commissariat pour la Réconciliation et le Renforcement de l’Unité Nationale, or HCRRUN) to aid in the implementation of the CVJR’s recommendations. The HCRRUN was supported by the Plateforme Citoyenne Justice et Vérité, a civil society organisation (Kohnert, 2018). For several years, the HCRRUN has been investigating claims for reparations and compiling a register of victims/survivors, published on its website, in order to provide people with the compensation and psycho-medical care recommended by the CVJR. This has included provisions for “vulnerable victims,” a category that includes victims/survivors of CRSV (HCRRUN, n.d.).
Togo has enacted legislation on women’s rights, implemented various protocols and officially adopted international standards, although it is unclear whether this is related to the CVJR’s findings or recommendations. The constitution of 1992 already included an article establishing the equality of men and women before the law, although this protection was not reflected in the government’s policies for many years (Affoum & Dry, 2022). In 2010, the government created a ministry whose remit includes the ‘advancement of women.’ It also launched a campaign to reduce female genital mutilation that resulted in a decrease of reported practices from 12% in 1996 to 2% in 2012 (REFELA-UCLG, 2018, p. 72).
In October 2012, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) held a meeting on the subject of Togo, shedding light on ongoing challenges in relation to sexual violence, despite some progress. CEDAW identified concerns about the delay in implementing the CVJR’s recommendations, specifically those addressing violence against women. Other concerns included the persistence of sexual violence against women, the absence of data on cases of gender-based violence, low rates of prosecution and conviction for sexual violence, and the limited availability of resources for victims/survivors. In addition, CEDAW noted a need to investigate allegations of sexual violence committed against female opposition activists by the police in relation to upcoming elections (CEDAW, 2012).
Since then, Togo has passed several laws that protect the rights of women, including a 2016 law protecting women against harassment (Assemblée Nationale, 2022). In 2021, the World Economic Forum recognised Togo as one of the most-improved countries in its Global Gender Gap Report (Affoum & Dry, 2022). Yet, legislation and government services to prevent and repair CRSV and sexual and gender-based violence more broadly are still lacking.
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