Background
From 1884 to 1914, Togo was a German Protectorate. Following the outbreak of World War I, Togo was under Anglo-French administration, with Western Togo captured by British Ghana and the rest of Togo under the French colonial administration.[1] On 27 April 1960, Togo gained its independence. Even after its independence, the country maintained a close relationship with France, with France providing substantial military and economic support to the government.
On 9 April 1961, the first general elections were held, and Sylvanus Olympio of the Parti de l’Unité Togolaise (PUT) became the country’s president. The elections were accompanied by an outbreak of violence between different political factions, leaving many civilians displaced, injured and killed. In 1963, Togo became a member of the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union, or AU). On 13 January 1963, Olympio was assassinated by a group of Togolese veterans of the former French colonial army led by Sergeant Etienne Gnassingbé, popularly known as Gnassingbé Eyadéma.[2]
An interim government led by Lieutenant Colonel Nicolas Grunitzki was established. In 1967, Eyadéma led a successful military coup and became president. He declared a state of emergency, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and took control of all state civil and political apparatuses. Eyadéma abolished the multi-party system, banning all political parties and making his party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT), the sole one. Eyadéma and his government were publicly supported by the French and other Western powers.
Eyadéma was an authoritarian leader who carried out human rights violations, including political repression and suppression of political freedom, harassment of the media and academics, violent targeting civilians, forced arrests and detention, and politically motivated murders. Many Togolese civilians protested against Eyadéma’s regime. In response, the Togolese army was used as a repressive instrument, killing hundreds of civilians during public demonstrations.[3] Continual political violence led to a mass Togolese exodus, with political figures and their families living in exile and others seeking asylum in neighbouring countries.
With the end of the Cold War, 1990 marked an international shift towards democratisation, influencing Togo’s politics. In July 1991, a Sovereign National Conference was organised to decide on the country’s constitutional and political steps towards democratisation. The conference recommended a semi-presidential system and an interim prime minister to replace Eyadéma. In November 1991, Eyadéma ordered the army to attack the interim government, re-establishing his dictatorial power.
The 1993, 1998 and 2003, presidential elections were not organised democratically, prompting most opposition groups to boycott them. This resulted in overwhelming victories for Eyadéma. Opposition groups and civil society organisations challenged the government through demonstrations and general strikes, but they were brutally crushed by security forces. The political persecution of opponents triggered an unprecedented wave of migration, with an estimated 350,000 people fleeing to neighbouring Benin and Ghana, as well as to Europe.
On 20 November 1998, the Togolese government and opposition groups attended the Inter-Togolese Dialogue to discuss efforts towards national reconciliation, with a “commitment to democracy, the rule of law, respect for Human Rights, development and security for all.”[4] On 24 December 1998, all actors from the Dialogue signed the Lomé Framework Agreement.
On 5 February 2005, after nearly four decades of autocratic leadership, Eyadéma unexpectedly died. Against the principles of the Constitution, the army instated Faure Gnassingbé, son of the late president, as the new head of state until the end of a mandate in 2008. Local and international actors rejected Gnassingbé’s appointment. Widespread political unrest and threats of international sanctions followed. The military brutally attacked and harassed protestors. An estimated 700 people were killed during the protests, and 40,000 citizens migrated to neighbouring countries.
On 25 February 2005, Gnassingbé resigned as head of state, and deputy speaker of the parliament Abass Bonfoh was elected interim president. With RPT members and parliament supporting the continuation of a Gnassingbé regime, early presidential elections were set for April 2005. On 24 April, Gnassingbé won the presidential elections. He was re-elected for a second term in 2010, a third in 2015 and a fourth in 2020. On 9 May 2024, Gnassingbé signed a new Constitution, eliminating presidential elections and declaring parliament to have the authority to choose future presidents of the country.[5]
International Commission of Inquiry
On 7 June 2000, the United Nations and the OAU established the International Commission of Inquiry at the request of the government of Togo.[6] Chairman Mahamat Hassan Abakar led the commission alongside Issaka Souna from Niger and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro from Brazil. The commission’s mandate was to investigate the allegations of extrajudicial killings/execution that occurred during the 1998 presidential elections.[7] The mandate was influenced by Amnesty International’s allegations of human rights violations in the country after the discovery of dead bodies on the beaches of Togo and Benin.[8]
The commission submitted its report to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OAU.
National Independent Special Commission Inquiry
In 2005, Prime Minister Joseph Koffigoh established a commission to examine that year’s political violence and make recommendations specific to dealing with perpetrators. In November 2005, the commission submitted its final report, which states that only 154 people were killed and 654 injured. A list of alleged perpetrators was handed to the government, but their names and all identifying features were never made public.[9]
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
On 25 February 2009, Gnassingbé signed a presidential decree, the Republique Togolaise Décret Présidential, establishing the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Commission de Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation, or CVJR). The commission was mandated to investigate political violence committed in the country from 1958 until Gnassingbé was elected president in 2005. The commission was not authorised to investigate political violence committed by the government of the time despite allegations of human rights violations. The commission was also tasked with establishing an institution for distributing reparations to victims and promoting reconciliation between victims/survivors and perpetrators.
The commission was composed of 11 commissioners elected during a national consultation process. The commissioners represented a cross-section of Togolese society and consisted of religious leaders, legal practitioners, medical figures, and members of civil society organisations and other groups, including women’s groups. The commissioners were granted full immunity from prosecution if accused of crimes committed during the period under investigation.
The CVJR operated from 25 February 2009 until 3 April 2012. It held over 400 hearings and registered 22,415 victims throughout its proceedings. The commission developed measures to protect the anonymity of victims and witnesses.[10] During hearings, 523 individuals testified publicly, with some hearings broadcast live on radio and television. At the end of the commission’s mandate, a film about its processes was broadcast.
In 2012, the commission submitted the first volume of its final report, detailing Togo’s political evolution from independence to 2005; the strategies and activities employed by the CVJR in fulfilment of its mandate; and its findings, recommendations and monitoring mechanisms. The president, upon receiving the final report, apologised to victims. In May 2013, the commission submitted three more volumes of the final report to parliament, including a recommendations report, but they were not made available to the public.
The CVJR submitted 68 recommendations to parliament. One of the commission’s recommendations included organising “purification” days in the country to “help bring rest to the souls of the victims, deceased or disappeared; appease wounded hearts; and provide spiritual support to reconciliation.”[11] The commission recommended granting scholarships of annual school assistance payable for five years to children who were direct victims of violence. There final report included recommendations addressing sexual violence, including the dismantling and full investigation of militias that committed gang rapes, psycho-medical care for direct victims of sexual violence, the creation of psychological care units within regional hospitals for the population and free for direct victims of sexual violence, and payment of all health insurance and medical expenses of sexual violence victims for at least 10 years, with the potential of lifetime support depending on sustained injuries.[12]
In 2014, the CVJR named the High Commission for Reconciliation and the Strengthening of National Unity responsible for implementing the recommendations. This commission was supported by the Plateforme Citoyenne Justice et Vérité, a civil society organisation. The government experienced several setbacks in fulfilling the commission’s commitments, including a lack of material resources, officials’ unwillingness to cooperate, abuse of power and impunity for both past and ongoing violence. Despite these setbacks, the High Commission for Reconciliation has investigated claims for reparations and compiled a public register of eligible victims.
In 2014, Togo’s Council of Ministers submitted a draft white paper to the president insisting on the implementation of 64 key recommendations. In 2022, scholarship and aid programmes were established for orphaned children and those directly impacted by violence.[13]
The High Commission for Reconciliation experienced limited material resources; therefore, the scale of human rights violations exceeded its capacity to address them. The commission recommended that the state consider prosecuting alleged perpetrators and that reparations should not be limited to those who testified before the commission or were listed in the mandate.
Gender
According to the 1992 Constitution, all Togolese citizens are equal before the law, without distinction based on origin, race, sex, social condition or religion. The Constitution further articulates that Togolese men and women are equal before the law, and no one will suffer disadvantage because of their family background, ethnic or regional origin, economic or social situation, or convictions. Also, discrimination against Togolese women based on sex and marital status is prohibited.
After the 1993 elections, the National Assembly adopted a series of laws and policies related to gender, including the declaration of a national policy on the advancement of women. In 1997, the government proposed gender mainstreaming measures into development programmes and projects guaranteeing girls and women access to education, training and information, providing technical and financial support for income-generating activities, and ensuring access to land, credit, technology and other means of production.
Despite the country’s progressive statutes and regulations, gender inequality is a significant issue. Local gender norms hold that Togolese men are decision makers and heads of the household. Women and girls are limited to the private sphere, with their expected priorities being domestic duties.[14] These norms and practices are an accepted way of life for many who believe that men are the “incarnation of authority” in Togo.[15] In 2006, traditional customs, including early (child) marriage, prohibited Togolese women and girls from accessing education, with an estimated 60 percent rate of female illiteracy. Also, women and girls have little access to sexual and reproductive health rights, with genital mutilation a common custom.
Sexual violence was used as a tactic in the political violence committed by security forces, militias, armed groups and civilians to intimidate, punish and control. Women and girls were primarily victims of sexual abuse and targeted based on allegations of political affiliations. Sexual violence was also pervasive and happened indiscriminately.
Until 2012, the Persons and Family Code of 1980 restricted women’s bargaining power and rights in the private space by not granting a woman an equal right to choose where to live, decision over property, decision of employment without the permission of her husband, and to be named head of the husband. Togolese socio-cultural norms and practices position men as superior to women economically, socially and politically, as women “owe him [man] obedience and submission.”[16]
In 2012 and 2014, Gnassingbé abolished the Persons and Family Code. Reforms of the law meant that women could no longer be prevented from getting a job and could share responsibility for financial decisions in the household. Togolese women are not limited by marital constraints, including access to contraceptives, which they can obtain without authorisation from a husband or guardian, or access to credit to start or strengthen their income-generating activities.[17] Togo has made significant progress in advocating women’s protection, particularly towards closing the gender-based gaps in economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.[18]
International actors
In 1993, the European Union and other international donors, including Germany, suspended their financial aid and development cooperation with Togo because of alleged human rights abuses.[19] Between June and July 1999, the League for Human Rights Defence of Benin investigated electoral violence and the deaths of civilians. They published reports of human rights violations, including torture. Throughout the accusations of human rights violations against Togo, France supported Eyadéma and continued to provide the Togolese government with aid.
Following Gnassingbé’s rise to power, international civil society organisations and governments protested against electoral irregularities. The Economic Community of West African States and the AU imposed economic sanctions on Togo, and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo threatened military intervention.[20] In the same year, the Office of the High Commissions for Human Rights (OHCHR) deployed a fact-finding mission after allegations of massive human rights violations during the 2005 elections.
In 2006, after pressure from the EU and AU to address human rights violations, the Togolese government, opposition parties and civil society groups participated in a national dialogue and signed the Global Political Agreement. The agreement recommended establishing a National Unity Government to restore peace, harmony, revision of electoral rolls to organise free and fair legislative elections, and ensure equitable access to public media and educational programmes during electoral campaigns.[21] The reforms were not fully supported and never took off ground.
In 2008, OHCHR supported national consultations to raise public awareness on transitional justice and mobilise stakeholders to establish national reconciliation mechanisms. The national consultations were conducted over four months across five different regions of the country, attracting an estimated 2,000 participants.[22] In July 2008, OHCHR produced a report summarising the findings of the national consultations and outlining recommendations, including establishing a truth and reconciliation commission.
OHCHR supported the CVJR by providing technical support, hiring staff, holding workshops for commissioners and staff of the commission, arranging exchanges between commissioners and members of other countries’ truth commissions, providing investigative training for staff members, and facilitating workshops for staff on witness protection and reparations. Former South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission commissioner Yasmin Sooka provided technical support, including training and capacity building for staff on operations, definitions of victims and management of expectations.
Amnesty International, among other international civil society organisations, continues to conduct fact-finding missions to hold the government and its institutions accountable for alleged human rights violations.[23] The AU, the Economic Community of West African States, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, and other international actors are tracking socio-political developments and conformity with democratic principles in Togo.
Notes
[1] Jeremy J. Sarkin and Tetevi Davi, “The Togolese Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission: Lessons for Transitional Justice Processes Everywhere,” Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2017).
[2] Dirk Kohnert, “Togo: Political and Socio-economic Development (2015–2017),” in Transformation Index – BTI 2018: Political Management in International Comparison (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2017), 1–43.
[3] Sarkin and Davi, 7.
[4] Inter-Togolese Dialogue: Lome Framework Agreement, 29 July 1999, https://www.peaceagreements.org/masterdocument/1256
[5] “Togo’s President Signs Law Expected to Extend His Decades-long Rule,” Rédaction Africanews, 13 August 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2024/05/07/togos-presidents-signs-a-law-expected-to-extend-his-decades-long-rule//
[6] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Togo Inquiry into Allegations of Extrajudicial Executions Releases Findings,” 22 February 2001, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/togo-inquiry-allegations-extrajudicial-executions-releases-findings
[7] Sarkin and Davi.
[8] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, press release, 15 September 2000, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/default-title-1036
[9] Dirk Kohnert, “Togo: Failed Election and Misguided Aid at the Roots of Economic Misery,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive Working Paper, 8 October 2007, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5207/1/MPRA_paper_5207.pdf
[10] Commission Verite, Justice et Reconciliation, Final Report Volume 1: Activités, rapport d’investigations et recommendations (2012), https://hcrrun-tg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Rapport-Final-CVJR-TOGO-.pdf
[11] Maxime Domegni, “Togo ‘Purification’ Leaves Bitter Taste for Many,” Justice Info, 11 July 2017, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/33832-togo-purification-leaves-bitter-taste-for-many.html
[12] Commission Verite, Justice et Reconciliation, 232–233, 282.
[13] High Commission for Reconciliation and the Strengthening of National Unity, “UNHCRRUN Conducted a Mid-term Evaluation of the Results of Orphaned Children Benefiting from the Scholarship and Assistance Program,’ 13 September 2024, https://hcrrun–tg-org.translate.goog/le-hcrrun-a-procede-a-levaluation-a-mi-parcours-des-resultats-des-enfants-orphelins-beneficiaires-du-programme-de-bourses-et-daides/
[14] Nelsy Affoum and Marie Dry, “Reforming Discriminatory Laws to Empower Women in Togo,” World Bank, 17 September 2022, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099527109292258758/pdf/IDU0294c15ca02d3a04a8f08846021668035ffc8.pdf
[15] United Nations, “Women’s Anti-discrimination Committee Takes Up Report of Togo; Experts Say Traditional Practices, Sexual Stereotypes Remain Challenges,” 18 January 2006, https://press.un.org/en/2006/wom1529.doc.htm
[16] Dianova, “Gender Roles: Changing Mindsets in Togo,’ 14 February 2023, https://www.dianova.org/news/gender-roles-changing-mindsets-in-togo/
[17] Affoum and Dry, 4.
[18] World Economic Forum, “Global Gender Gap 2021,” March 2021, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf
[19] Kohnert, 2017, 2.
[20] Dirk Kohnert, “Togo: Politics, Economy and Society in 2005,” in Africa Yearbook Vol. 2: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara 2005, eds. Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van Walraven (Brill: 2006), 169–176.
[21] Inter-Togolese Dialogue: Global Political Agreement, 20 August 2004, https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1264
[22] Nekane Lavin, “A Human Rights-based Approach to Truth and Reconciliation,” 1 March 2013, https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8XP7F61/download
[23] Sarkin and Davi, 18.