Background
On 22 September 1960, Mali, formerly French Sudan, declared independence from France with Modibo Keïta as its first president. Since then, the country has experienced ongoing political unrest and armed conflict. In November 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré led a coup that overthrew Keïta, later establishing a military dictatorship under a single political party, the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM).
Traoré initially aimed to strengthen the armed forces and reform the economy but encountered significant challenges, including severe droughts, famine, student unrest, and opposition from political groups. In response, his regime implemented harsh measures to repress student protests and political opposition.[1] On 24 March 1991, Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré led a coup against Traoré’s government, setting the foundation for a transition to democratic governance.
On 12 January 1992, Mali adopted a new Constitution, legalising a multiparty system and political parties. In April 1992, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) won the country’s first democratic elections, and Alpha Oumar Konaré became president. Known as the ‘soldier of democracy,’ Konaré institutionalised democratic reforms by establishing a civilian government with regular elections, an independent Constitutional Court, decentralisation policies, and various participatory mechanisms.[2] His government also facilitated a National Conference and local, regional and national dialogues addressing educational, healthcare, judicial and electoral reforms.
During Konaré’s presidency, Mali experienced multiple rebellions led by the nomadic pastoralist Tuareg population in the north. The first major rebellion occurred between 1990 and 1995, following the 1980s famine and refugee crisis. Tuareg groups in both Niger and Mali demanded autonomy and sought to establish an independent state. The conflict concluded with the signing of the 1996 National Pact, which included provisions for integrating Tuareg fighters into the Malian army.
On 23 May 2006, Tuareg officers in the Malian army and members of the May 23, 2006, Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) launched another rebellion by looting army bases in Kidal and Ménaka. On 4 July 2006, the government and the ADC signed the Algiers Accord with provisions, including integrating rebels into the Malian government, patrolling Tuareg areas in the north, and increasing development in the Kidal region.[3]
In August 2007, a faction of the ADC led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga launched attacks in northern Mali, triggering the 2007 Tuareg insurgency. Combined military operations and internal diplomacy led to an unofficial ceasefire in December 2007. In April 2008, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi mediated an official ceasefire. Armed violence, however, continued sporadically. In late 2008, Ag Bahanga committed a series of attacks. In January 2009, the Malian army responded with a military offensive. By February 2009, Ag Bahanga had left for Libya, and Algeria and Libya agreed to support the end of hostilities and facilitate negotiations. ADC fighters resumed disarmament processes and reintegrated into the armed forces in Kidal.
On 17 January 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), composed of former insurgents and Tuareg fighters, attacked the military base in Ménaka. On 22 March 2012, Malian soldiers launched a coup in the capital city, Bamako, overthrowing Touré. Tensions between different groups of the Malian army led to continued violent clashes in Bamako, leaving several people dead, wounded or missing.
On 6 April 2012, under the influence of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), transitional authorities and the military junta signed a framework agreement. On the same day, MNLA unilaterally declared the Azawad region’s independence, highlighting the continuance of the northern rebellion.
On 18 June 2013, the government and the MNLA signed the Ouagadougou Peace Accord.[4] General elections followed, resulting in the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who was re-elected in 2018. In March 2015, the government signed the Algiers Peace Accords. Some groups, including the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), initially refused to sign, but on 15 May 2015, the main rebel alliances signed the agreement. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), civil society organisations, and 20 heads of state observed the negotiations.
Despite these agreements, violence persisted in several parts of the country. In January 2013, the conflict’s dynamics shifted with the increased activity of jihadist groups, including Ansar Al-Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO). These groups sought to impose sharia law across Mali and launched multiple attacks against army positions.[5] The Malian transitional authorities requested military support from France, which deployed forces to counter the jihadist insurgency.
In August 2020, disputed parliamentary election results triggered nationwide protests, leading to another military coup. In 2021, the country experienced successive insurgencies and another military coup. In May 2021, the Constitutional Court declared Colonel Assimi Goïta as head of state. Goïta established a transitional government and, in 2022, ended longstanding cooperation with France and expelled both French forces and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
In June 2023, a new Constitution was approved. The government scheduled national legislative elections for between October and November 2023, and presidential elections for February 2024. However, in September 2023, the government suspended both elections, citing technical challenges.
In January 2024, the Malian government terminated the Algiers Peace Accord. On 28 January 2024, the government announced its withdrawal from ECOWAS in a joint statement with Burkina Faso and Niger, to form the regional alliance of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).[6] It formally left ECOWAS on 29 January 2025.
On 30 April 2025, the transitional government passed legislation repealing all laws governing political parties and opposition groups, banning their activities. Protests followed but were swiftly suppressed by authorities and government supporters. On 13 May 2025, political parties were officially dissolved.[7] The country is experiencing an insurgency of political violence between armed fighters and the Malian army, with sporadic attacks occurring across different regions.[8]
Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission
In 2013, the transitional government established the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission to promote political dialogue between warring parties involved in the 2012 military coup and the armed conflict in northern Mali. The commission’s mandate included investigating human rights violations committed during the 2013 armed conflict, facilitating national talks between armed groups, and encouraging reconciliation between communities affected by violence.
In September 2013, the government dissolved the commission and replaced it with the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
On 15 January 2014, President Keïta enacted Ordinance No. 2014-003/P-RM to establish the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR). Decree No. 2014-0214/P-RM defined its mandate, which included investigating serious human rights violations committed between 1960 and 2013 and submitting recommendations to the government.[9] It also aimed to support national unity and democratic values, the reintegration of refugees and displaced people, and dialogue and conflict prevention.[10]
In late 2015, 24 commissioners were appointed, and the CVJR operated until 2020. The commission’s activities included staff workshops, several public hearings, and victim interviews. The commission lacked subpoena powers and did not publicly name individuals accused of abuses, which limited its capacity to ensure accountability. On 31 December 2021, the commission concluded its mandate after collecting 33,499 victim testimonies.
In December 2022, the CVJR submitted its final report to the government. The final report is not publicly available, but some of the commission’s findings included arbitrary arrest or detention, abduction and kidnapping, forced recruitment and attempted recruitment, rape and other sexual violence, looting and destruction of property, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, torture and other forms of abuse.[11]
In September 2021, the government introduced a reparations programme for victims with an estimated budget of 65 billion CFA francs ($117 million USD). In August 2023, the Authority for the Management of Reparations was created to implement the programme.[12]
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
In May and June 2015, the Malian government signed a peace agreement with the CMA and the Platform of Movements. A central provision of the agreement involved the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups. This initiative aimed to integrate ex-combatants into the national defence and security forces or facilitate their return to civilian life.
Although the DDR was scheduled to begin 60 days after the agreement, in September 2015 it was delayed until its official launch on 6 November 2018. The government established the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), which included a national coordinator, deputy coordinators from the armed groups, regional offices, trained personnel, and a strategic framework. The programme constructed eight cantonment sites in northern Mali to accommodate ex-combatants.[13]
The DDR process faced many challenges, including political mistrust, delays in vetting and integration, and the absence of a clear operational timeline. MINUSMA contributed approximately US$21 million through a trust fund to support implementation.
National Integration Commission
On 14 April 2023, the government established the National Integration Commission (CNI) through Decree No. 2023-0243/PT-RM. The CNI oversees the Integration and Reintegration Programme, part of the government’s post-conflict recovery efforts. Its mandate involves formally integrating eligible ex-combatants into public institutions, including the defence and security forces, public administration, and local government bodies.[14]
The CNI operates under the Ministry of Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion. It coordinates with the NCDDR and has established regional offices, trained staff, and developed screening procedures to assess and absorb former fighters. Through these efforts, the commission aims to encourage trust in state institutions and promote national stability following years of unrest.
Inter-Malian Dialogue for Peace and National Reconciliation
Between 13 April 2024 and 10 May 2024, transitional authorities organised the Inter-Malian Dialogue for Peace and National Reconciliation. This initiative provided a national framework for the population to participate in open dialogues and propose solutions to social, economic and sustainable development challenges within a conflict-affected context.
The Dialogue occurred throughout Mali and at diplomatic missions and consular offices abroad. It included approximately 3,000 participants, including 160 delegates, 26 delegates from the Malian diaspora, three refugee representatives, and eight university delegates. Most Malian political parties boycotted the Dialogue.[15]
Participants contributed to developing 300 recommendations focused on six themes: peace, national reconciliation and social cohesion; political and institutional issues; economic and sustainable development; security and defence; geopolitics; and Mali’s international partnerships. The government drafted a 2024–2028 action plan to implement these recommendations.[16]
Gender
During the successive armed conflicts, women and girls experienced widespread gender-based violence, including rape, kidnapping, forced marriage (often polygamous) and public humiliation. Radical armed groups such as Ansar Dine, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and AQIM carried out many of these abuses.[17]
Besides direct violence, women faced displacement, loss of livelihoods, and trauma. Armed groups imposed restrictive dress codes and behavioural rules on women, particularly in areas under their control. These conditions disrupted traditional social structures and economic activity. Many women were unable to engage in trade or market activity, limiting their ability to earn income and contributing to broader poverty and instability.
Despite these challenges, women actively participate in peace processes and advocate for their rights. They formed networks like the ECOWAS Women’s Peace and Security Network (REPSFECO/Mali) to support their involvement in post-conflict processes.[18]
In 2013, the Malian government adopted the National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda and to boost women’s participation in national and local decision-making processes. The plan provided a framework for increasing women’s participation in local and national decision-making and addressing their protection needs during and after conflict. It focused on five areas: conflict prevention and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence; protection and rehabilitation of survivors; participation and representation; promotion of gender equality and women’s autonomy; and monitoring and evaluation.[19]
Unfortunately, women’s involvement in formal peace negotiations and implementation processes remains inconsistent and limited. Women continue to face marginalisation in decision-making and national dialogue efforts. Traditional power structures continue to resist institutional changes promoting gender equality.
Men and boys also endured sexual violence during the conflict, including those as young as 15 years old.[20] The use of sexual violence by armed groups against men and boys often served as a tool of humiliation and control. Male sexual victimisation remains significantly under-reported due to shame, fear of reprisal, and limited access to survivor services.
International Actors
In January 2013, the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened investigations into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Mali since January 2012. The investigations focused primarily on the northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, with additional interests in Bamako and Sévaré, in the south.[21]
Following the renewed occupation of northern regions on 9 January 2013, the Ministry of Defence partnered with UN Women, four other United Nations agencies (UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS and UNHCR), and the government of the Netherlands to launch a training and capacity-building programme. The initiative aimed to train up to 4,000 members of the defence and security forces and raise awareness among 20,000 personnel about preventing sexual and gender-based violence and promoting human rights and women’s rights. The training covered topics such as gender issues and international resolutions on women, peace and security, international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilian populations, especially women and children; gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence in conflict situations; and HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases in conflict environments.[22]
On 25 April 2014, the UN Security Council established MINUSMA. The mission’s mandate included supporting Mali’s political transition process, protecting civilians, promoting human rights, facilitating regional humanitarian aid, and helping re-establish state authority and the security sector.[23] Countries contributing military and police included Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Germany, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. In December 2023, the mission ended at the request of the transitional government.
On 19 January 2018, the UN Secretary General established the International Commission of Inquiry for Mali. The commission’s mandate involved investigating allegations of abuses and serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, with a focus on conflict-related sexual violence committed between 1 January 2012 and 19 January 2018. It aimed to document facts, determine the circumstances of the violations, and identify individuals allegedly responsible. The UN extended the mandate to 19 June 2020. The final report was submitted to the UN secretary-general but not made public.[24]
In early 2024, the Africa Transitional Justice Legacy Fund (ATJLF) conducted a scoping mission to Mali to assess future grant-making opportunities and reaffirm its commitment to advancing truth, accountability and reconciliation. ATJLF has prioritised civil society-led advocacy around publishing and implementing the CVJR’s final report, although shrinking civic space has made such efforts increasingly risky.[25]
In July 2024, the African Union and ATJLF signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation on transitional justice, reparatory justice and racial healing in Mali. The agreement supports member states, including Mali, in implementing the African Union Transitional Justice Policy through technical assistance, seconded experts and funding for local initiatives.[26]
In 2025, the International Organization for Migration launched its 2025–2026 Mali Crisis Response Plan. The plan intends to target over 270,000 people and allocate over US$4 million to protection-related programming, including support for survivors of conflict-related violence, such as mental health and community stabilisation components.[27]
Notes
[1] Jean-Paul Azam, Christian Morrisson, Sophie Chauvin and Sandrine Rospabé, ‘Conflict and growth in Africa: Vol. 1 The Sahel,’ Development Centre Studies, (1999).
[2] Susanna D. Wing, ‘Briefing Mali: Politics of a crisis,’ African Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2013).
[3] ‘A timeline of northern conflict,’ The New Humanitarian, April 5, 2012, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/95252/mali-timeline-northern-conflict
[4] United Nations, ‘Security Council press statement on Mali,’ June 20, 2013, https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc11040.doc.htm
[5] Andrew Lebovich, ‘AQIM and its allies in Mali,’ February 5, 2013, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/aqim-and-its-allies-mali
[6] Anael Kingue, ‘Transitional justice in Mali: An increasingly complex endeavour,’ March 25, 2024, https://atjlf.org/transitional-justice-in-mali-an-increasingly-complex-endeavour/
[7] Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné and Fodé Maciré Dramé, ‘Mali’s transition is at risk as political parties are dissolved,’ May 19, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mali-s-transition-is-at-risk-as-political-parties-are-dissolved
[8] David Dembele, ‘’No one is safe’: Civilians, foreigners caught in escalating Mali violence,’ July 10, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/10/no-one-is-safe-civilians-foreigners-caught-in-escalating-mali-violence
[9] ‘Transitional justice in Mali: Opportunities and challenges,’ Relief Web, May 25, 2015, https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/transitional-justice-mali-opportunities-and-challenges#:~:text=Opportunities%20for%20transitional%20justice%20in,the%20truth%20and%20combat%20impunity.
[10] Aniglo Kossivi, ‘Mission: To strengthen the capacities of the members of the various commissions resulting from the Agreement for Peace in Mali,’ January 24, 2018, https://asfcanada.ca/medias/mission-renforcer-les-capacites-des-membres-des-differentes-commissions-issues-de-laccord-pour-la-paix-au-mali/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[11] Lawyers Without Borders, ‘Public hearing of the TRC: Mali listens to victims,’ August 12, 2020, https://asfcanada.ca/en/medias/public-hearing-of-the-trc-mali-listens-to-victims/
[12] Soukaina Sghir, ‘Mali: Reparations for victims- progress and uncertainties,’ August 18, 2023, https://weafrica24.com/2023/08/18/mali-reparations-for-victims-progress-and-uncertainties/
[13] Anne Savey and Marc-André Boisvert, ‘The process of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Mali: A journey full of pitfalls,’ December 21, 2018, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/process-disarmament-demobilization-reintegration-ddr-mali-journey-full-pitfalls-2018
[14] Adama Bagayoko, ‘Mali strengthens the National Integration Commission to consolidate the peace agreement,’ December 17, 2023, https://maliactu.net/le-mali-renforce-la-commission-nationale-dintegration-pour-consolider-laccord-de-paix/
[15] Fahiraman Rodrigie Koné and Fodé Maciré Dramé, ‘Stability in Mali requires more inclusive national dialogue,’ July 15, 2024, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/stability-in-mali-requires-more-inclusive-national-dialogue
[16] International Organization for Peace, ‘Mali,’ n.d., https://www.interpeace.org/programme/mali/#:~:text=Mali%20has%20been%20experiencing%20instability,in%20a%20conflict%2Daffected%20context.
[17] United Nations Women, ‘Malian women make their voices heard: Emergency aid, participation in the peace process, and justice for all,’ January 25, 2013, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/1/malian-women-make-their-voices-heard
[18] Jenny Lorentzen, ‘Women and the peace process in Mali,’ February, 2017, https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/5f393d00-1d2a-4f8e-ab08-e50c6fc4cfff/Lorentzen%20-%20Women%20and%20the%20Peace%20Process%20in%20Mali%20GPS%20Policy%20Brief%202-2017.pdf?inline=true
[19] Grégory Chauzal and Zoë Gorman, ‘’Hand in hand’: A study of insecurity and gender in Mali,’ SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, (2019).
[20] Centre for African Justice, Peace and Human Rights, ‘Report on sexual violence against the male gender: The Republic of Mali,’ 2024, https://centreforafricanjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Mali-Report.pdf
[21] International Criminal Court, ‘Mali: Situation in the Republic of Mali ICC-01/12,’ n.d., https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali
[22] United Nations Women, ‘Malian armed and security forces gear up to better protect women and children in conflict situations,’ March 19, 2013, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/3/malian-armed-and-security-forces-gear-up-to-better-protect-women-and-children-in-conflict-situations
[23] United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘MINUSMA Fact Sheet,’ n.d., https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma
[24] United Nations, ‘International Commission of Inquiry for Mali,’ n.d., https://www.un.org/en/our-work/commission-of-inquiry-for-mali
[25] Kingue.
[26] African Union, ‘The African Union and Africa Transitional Justice Legacy Fund sign historic MOU on Reparatory, Justice and Racial Healing,’ July 4, 2024, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240704/african-union-and-africa-transitional-justice-legacy-fund-sign-historic-mou
[27] International Organization for Migration, ‘Mali Crisis Response Plan 2025-2026,’ April 17, 2025, https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/pdf/Mali_Crisis_Response_Plan_2025__2026.pdf