Background
A former French colony, Chad gained independence in August 1960. François Tombalbaye, leader of the Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Tchadien, or PPT), became the first elected president of Chad. Shortly after, Tombalbaye dissolved all political parties, except the PPT, and by 1963 Chad was a one-party state. The PPT leadership, like the Chadian army, were predominantly from Tombalbaye’s ethnic group, the Sara. According to a parliamentary resolution of June 1964, all members of the National Assembly were mandated to be members of the PPT. Characterised as an authoritarian regime, the government engaged in widespread political repression, corruption, nepotism and stoking interethnic tension between predominantly Muslim northern Chad and predominantly Christian and Animist southern Chad. As a consequence of these conditions, a civil war erupted in 1965.[1]
The civil war was initiated by many rebel groups, including the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (Frente Nacional para la Liberación del Chad, or FROLINAT) and the Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Liberation du Tchad, or FLT). FROLINAT carried out frequent guerrilla attacks until 1969. Peasant rebellions were common throughout the conflict, including the 1965 Mangalmé rebellion, 1966 Ouaddai rebellion and the 1967 Salamat rebellion. The violence was often orchestrated by rebel groups that agitated local tensions. The civil war was marked by international interference from France and regional interference from Sudan and Libya. By 1971, France withdrew public support from the Chadian government.[2]
After attempted coups in the preceding two years, in August 1973, the PPT was replaced with the National Movement for the Cultural and Social Revolution (National Movement National pour la Revolution Culturelle et Sociale, or MNRCS), while Tombalbaye remained president. Violence persisted, with tension between the armed forces and the president. Tombalbaye accused the armed forces of corruption and committing unlawful violence against civilians. Senior officers were arrested, which left the military disgruntled. Amid economic decline as a consequence of the conflict and being severely impacted by the Sahelian droughts, 1975 saw a successful coup led by General Noël Milarew Odingar, which resulted in Tombalbaye’s killing by Chadian soldiers. Following the coup, General Felix Malloum took office, the National Assembly was dissolved, the 1962 Constitution was suspended, and Tombalbaye’s former aides were arrested.
Under military occupation, violence escalated, primarily because of rivalries between rebel group members. Many attempted coups occurred between 1976 and 1978. In 1979, Malloum stepped down and the Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition, or GUNT) was formed. The GUNT was a coalition of armed groups that led Chad from 1979 and 1982 until it was replaced by the Inter-African Force (IAF). Libya supported GUNT President Goukouni Ouddei in the conflict between him and former GUNT Defence Minister Hissène Habré, leader of the FROLINAT rebel army, the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord, or FAN).
Because of international pressure, in November 1981, the Libyan military were expelled. On 7 June 1982, Habré led a militia to defeat Ouddei and became his successor.[3] Habré remained in power until 1990. He received significant support from international actors, specifically the United States and France, including to Habré’s National Armed Forces (Forces Armee National du Tchad, or FANT).[4]
Gaining a reputation as one of Africa’s most brutal dictators, Habré led through terror, with many civilians tortured, displaced and murdered. He put down any suspected opposition, targeting not only rebels but also civilians and administrative officials suspected of supporting opposition actors. Habré also targeted ethnic group leaders he perceived as a threat. Under his one-party regime, Habré created the Documentation and Security Directorate (Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité, or DDS), an agency that functioned as political police force that spied on Chadians and reported directly to Habré. The DDS became a notorious tool of repression, using detention, torture and murder.
Habré was removed from power in 1990 by Idriss Déby and his rebel force, the Patriotic Salvation Movement (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut, or MPS). He fled to Senegal. Déby was a former ally and general under Habré, who in 1989 fled to Darfur and, having mobilised members of his Zaghawa ethnic group as well as support from Libya and Sudan, overthrew Habré. Déby’s presidency led to the release of many political prisoners but did little to ease ethnic tensions in the country, as he favoured members of the Zaghawa. This as well as accusations of corruption over his handling of oil revenues led to continuous rebellions throughout Déby’s presidency. Déby relied on state repression and ethnic divisions in order to maintain power.
As a consequence, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (Front pour la Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad, or FACT) was established in 2016. On 11 April 2021, the day of the national elections, FACT attacked Chad’s northern border post and violence ensued, spreading towards the south. On 20 April 2021, Déby was announced dead as a result of a clash with rebels from the north. His son Mahamat Déby succeeded him and is currently the Chadian president.
Chad’s transitional justice efforts have included a commission of inquiry, prosecutions, institutional reforms and amnesties, with mixed results.
Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Hissène Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories
On 29 December 1990, Idriss Déby issued Decree No. 014/P.CE/CJ/90 establishing the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Hissène Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories (Commission d’Enquête du Ministère Chadien de la Justice sur les Crimes du Régime de Hissène Habré). The commission’s mandate was to investigate illegal detentions, assassinations, disappearances, torture, mistreatment, other attacks on the physical and mental integrity of persons, and all other human rights violations, including illicit drug trafficking and the misappropriation of state funds, committed in Chad between 1982 and 1990.[5]
The commission encountered a number of difficulties, including limited finances. As a consequence, it operated from the old DDS headquarters. The commission heard an estimated 1,726 witnesses, who included 662 former political prisoners, 786 close relatives of victims who died in detention or were executed, 236 former prisoners of war, 30 former DDS agents, and 12 high-profile politicians from Habré’s regime.[6]
Following its investigations, the commission found evidence of systematic torture and determined that Habré was responsible for an estimated 40,000 deaths. The DDS was accused of being responsible for cruelty, contempt and terrorising the Chadian population. The commission’s final report implicated foreign governments for their role in the atrocities, including the United States for providing financial, military and technical aid to the DDS and France, Egypt, Iraq and Zaire for helping finance, train and equip the DDS.
Chad’s commission is one of the only truth commissions to publish the names and pictures of the worst offenders. Many of these offenders continue to hold positions in the military, police and government, despite the commission’s recommendation to remove all named offenders from these positions. Other recommendations included building a monument for victims, establishing a national day of remembrance, and turning the old DDS headquarters and prison into a museum. They also included the creation of an independent judiciary, reform of the security forces, establishment a National Human Rights Commission, prosecutions of perpetrators and the implementation of symbolic reparations.
Prosecutions
On 25 March 2015, a Chadian criminal court convicted 20 security agents from the Habré regime on charges of murder, torture, kidnapping and arbitrary detention. The court also ruled for financial reparations of about 140 million USD to 7,000 victims, ordering the government to pay half and the convicted agents to pay the other half. Despite the ruling, both the government and the perpetrators have yet to pay reparations.[7]
On 20 July of the same year, the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) put Habré on trial, prosecuting international crimes committed in Chad between June 1982 and December 1990. On 30 May 2016, the EAC convicted Habré to life in prison on charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, including sexual violence and rape. On 27 April 2017, an appeals court confirmed the verdict and ordered Habré to pay approximately 153 million USD in victim compensation to 7,396 victims. The appeals court also ordered the African Union to create a trust fund for victim compensation with funds from Habré’s assets. The African Union allocated 5 million USD to the trust fund, but the fund is not operational. Habré never paid any reparations.[8]
A Chadian court ordered the government to create a commission to oversee the payment of reparations, but that too is not operational. The court also ordered the creation of both a monument and a museum to honour those killed under Habré, which have yet to be created.
On 24 August 2021, Habré died in Senegal after contracting COVID-19, leaving many of his victims without justice and reparations.
National Transitional Council
Following the death of Idriss Déby, the Chadian army dissolved both the parliament and suspended the Constitution. Mahamat Déby became head of the Transitional Military Council (TMC). In April 2021, the TMC created a Charter to establish a National Transitional Council (NTC) consisting of 93 members from different social classes and backgrounds. The NTC was expected to function alongside the TMC and be responsible for drafting the new Constitution. The Charter also provided for a transitional government and set a time limit of 18 months to adopt a Constitution and organise elections. In spite of these efforts, violence ensued, with up to a dozen deaths at the hands of state forces.[9]
On 8 August 2022, an estimated 30 rebel and opposition factions called a ceasefire, agreeing to engage in talks with the government and participate in a national dialogue. FACT was one of eight rebel factions that rejected the pact.[10]
Amnesties
In November 2021, ahead of the national dialogue, Déby granted amnesty to 296 members of armed groups sentenced for offences including terrorism, to ensure their participation.[11]
On 20 October 2022, also known as ‘Black Thursday,’ security forces fired live ammunition at protestors, killing almost a dozen. They detained others, who experienced abuse. Following this, on 23 November 2023, the NTC passed new amnesty laws that removed the possibility of prosecution for security forces who committed these violations.[12]
Gender
According to EAC investigations, sexual violence was widely used by Habré and his accomplices as a tactic of torture and intimidation against women, men and children.[13] Sexual abuses committed by Habré’s DDS agents included rape and sexualised torture. Testimonies described sexual slavery, with victims detailing their experiences within military camps, where they were used as domestic servants and forced to perform sexual acts. Throughout these ordeals, specifically during captivity, women experienced sexual and reproductive violations including forced miscarriages.[14]
Besides the Habré regime, there are broader social, economic and political gendered imbalances in Chad that disproportionately expose women to violence and structural vulnerabilities, including economic and educational insecurity, poverty, and poor protections of their sexual and reproductive health rights. Chad is considered a patriarchal society that has many gendered inequalities and excludes women from the public sphere. Also, consistent conflict in the country has contributed to the social roles of women being as biological and social producers through the valuation of women by their reproductive functions. Most women are forced to remain in the private sphere, with an emphasis on domesticity.[15]
Within this social and cultural context, Chadian women continue to experience young and child marriage, female genital mutilation (despite it being illegal), and high levels of sexual and gender-based violence.[16]
International Actors
For much of Chad’s history, interference from the United States, France, Libya, Sudan and others has contributed to conflict, while also supporting its transitional processes. The United Nations Security Council, in consultation with Chadian and Central African Republic authorities, passed Resolutions 1861 (2009), 1834 (2008) and 1778 (2007) establishing the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). MINURCAT was a military and peacekeeping mission that ended in 2010. It was mandated to provide security and protection to citizens as well as train, advise and facilitate support to promote human rights, reconciliation and the rule of law in Chad. Also, it provided support to regional bodies and initiatives involved in advocacy against humanitarian threats in Chad.[17]
The International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have made efforts towards redress for human rights abuses in Chad. With Habré exiled in Senegal, there were many regional and international requests for Senegal to either prosecute or hand over Habré to Chadian or international authorities. However, Senegal refused. On 20 July 2012, in the Belgium v. Senegal case, the ICJ ruled that Senegal, according to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, was obligated to prosecute Habré or extradite him to a state willing and capable of prosecuting him. The ruling had no effect.[18]
At a regional level, the African Union (AU) has played a significant role in transitional justice in Chad. In January 2006, the AU established a Committee of Eminent African Jurists to begin work to acknowledge the crimes committed by Habré and provide justice to his victims. The committee requested that Senegal prosecute Habré, without effect. The AU was also key to the EAC’s prosecution of Habré.
Following the massacre on 20 October 2022, Prime Minister Saleh Kebzabo announced the creation of a commission of inquiry into security forces involvement in the killing of protestors. The commission of inquiry was expected to be under the patronage of the Economic Community of Central African States, the AU and the United Nations.[19] Despite this announcement, the commission was not established. Instead, in November 2023, the government passed an amnesty bill exempting security forces from punishment for their actions in October 2022.
Sources
[1] Stanley Eke Orobator, ‘Civil strife and international involvement: The case of Chad (1964-1983),’ Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1984).
[2] R.A. May, ‘The state of Chad: Political factions and political decay/factions politiques et decadence de d’état tchadien,’ Civilisations, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1983).
[3] Ketil Hansen, ‘Chad: Armed residents and politics,’ Department of Education and Sports Science, October 27, 2020, https://www.academia.edu/44424294/Chad_Armed_Presidents_and_Politics
[4] Mansour O. El-Kikhea, ‘Chad: The same old story,’ Journal of African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1983).
[5] ‘Truth Commission: Chad,’ United States Institute of Peace, December 29, 1990, https://www.usip.org/publications/1990/12/truth-commission-chad
[6] Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories, May 7, 1992, https://atjhub.csvr.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/1992-Final-Report.pdf
[7] ‘No redress for ex-dictator’s victims in Chad: African Commission should press for Habré-era reparations,’ Redress, September 29, 2019, https://redress.org/news/no-redress-for-ex-dictators-victims-in-chad-african-commission-should-press-for-habre-era-reparations/
[8] ‘Hissène Habré Case,’ ACCORD, December 23, 2015, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-hissene-habre-case/; ‘The trial of Hissène Habré,’ Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/tag/hissene-habre
[9] ‘Chad study on opportunities for reparations for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence: Breaking the silence,’ Redress, Global Survivors Fund, May 30, 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/chad-study-opportunities-reparations-survivors-conflictrelated-sexual-violence-breaking-silence
[10] Andrew Mills, ‘Chad signs peace pact with rebels, but main insurgent stay out,’ Reuters, August 8, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chad-rebels-sign-peace-deal-2022-08-08/
[11] ‘Chad gives amnesty to hundreds of rebels and dissidents, meeting opposition demand,’ News Wires, November 29, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211129-chad-gives-amnesty-to-hundreds-of-rebels-and-dissidents
[12] ‘Chad: Amnesty law cheats victims,’ Human Rights Watch, December 14, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/14/chad-amnesty-law-cheats-victims
[13] Ruth Maclean, ‘’I Told My Story Face to Face with Habré”: Courageous Rape Survivors Make History,’ The Guardian, September 18, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/sep/18/hissene-habre-chad-dictator-couragous-rape-survivors-make-history#:.
[14] K.T. Seelinger, N. Fenwick and K. Alrabe, ‘Sexual violence, the principle of legality, and the trial of Hissène Habré,’ Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2020).
[15] Achta Djibrine Sy, ‘Conflict and the women of Chad,’ Gender and Development, Vol 1, No. 2 (1993).
[16] ‘The power of women’s voices in Chad,’ FHI360, April 25, 2023, https://www.fhi360.org/news/power-womens-voices-chad
[17] ‘MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad,’ United Nations, https://minurcat.unmissions.org/mandate
[18] ‘ICJ delivers judgement in Belgium v. Senegal case (Hissène Habré case),’ United Nations, 2012, https://dam.media.un.org/archive/ICJ-Delivers-Judgment-in-Belgium-v–Senegal-Case–Hissene-Habre-Case–2AM9LO5T9XGY.html
[19] ‘Chad to try 400 people over deadly anti-government protests ahead of international inquiry,’ RFI, November 28, 2022, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20221128-chad-to-try-400-people-over-deadly-anti-government-protests-ahead-of-inquiry