Securing peace in Tigray requires a return to the core promises of Ethiopia’s transitional justice policy, namely restoring displaced communities, ensuring accountability, ending foreign military presence, and fostering inclusive governance, writes Deborah Banketa.
Tensions are rising again in Tigray, just two years after the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) that ended the war between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The agreement, widely praised at the time as a breakthrough, promised more than just the end of violence – it aimed to lay the groundwork for justice and national healing.
The COHA required the creation of a national transitional justice policy to establish accountability mechanisms, address victims’ grievances, and promote national reconciliation. But these goals are unattainable while COHA provisions – especially the return of displaced people, withdrawal of foreign forces, and restoration of governance – remain unimplemented.
In fact, the erosion of the COHA has directly undermined the implementation a holistic transitional justice process and, with it, the prospect of lasting peace. If the federal government is serious about securing peace, it must return to the core promises of the national transitional justice policy: restoring displaced communities, ensuring accountability, ending foreign military presence, and fostering inclusive governance.
The Cost of Delay: Provisions Left Unfulfilled
A pillar of both the COHA and the transitional justice policy is the return and reintegration of over 2.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). By early 2025, however, only about half had returned home.
On 11 June 2025, IDPs organised mass protests at the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray, demanding a resolution to their status and their return home. Many IDPs hail from Western Tigray, a region still administered by Amhara forces despite the end of the war. Amhara officials refer to the area as Welkait, but it remains disputed territory, leaving many unable to return.
The policy also includes a commitment to ensuring security by ending impunity for perpetrators of war crimes. Yet, Eritrean troops, responsible for some of the most heinous crimes during the war, continue to occupy parts of Irob, Gulomakada and Sheraro, in stark violation not only of the COHA but also of Ethiopia’s sovereignty. Their ongoing presence, tolerated by federal authorities, undermines both the transitional justice policy and regional stability.
A key pillar of peace is the restoration of federal authority in Tigray and the region’s representation in federal institutions. However, in May 2025, the National Election Board of Ethiopia officially deregistered the TPLF, Tigray’s main political party, for failing to hold a general assembly. This effectively eliminated a key COHA signatory from Ethiopia’s political life and the implementation of the transitional justice process.
Fracturing of the TPLF: Reaping the Seeds of Ethnic Federalism
Since establishing the Tigray Interim Administration, the TPLF has become increasingly fractured. One faction continues to support longtime leader Debretsion Gebremichael, while the other supports his former deputy and current administration president Getachew Reda.
In August 2024, Debretsion won re-election as party leader and expelled Getachew, accusing him of undermining the party by running the administration independently. Debretsion responded by appointing a parallel administration and claiming control over parts of the Tigray Defence Forces, despite Getachew’s insistence that the forces remain under the administration’s authority.
Many view this internal fracture as the TPLF reaping the consequences of the ethnic federal system it once championed. As the dominant power within the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, the TPLF designed a system that granted wide autonomy to ethnically defined regions – encouraging competition and division.
During the TPLF’s years in power, Tigray was mostly shielded from the ethnic conflicts that impacted regions like Oromia, Gambella and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region. Without the centralised control of the TPLF, Tigray is facing similar impacts.
Port Politics and Rising Tensions with Eritrea
This internal disarray unfolds alongside growing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Although the two governments were allies during the Tigray war, their historical rivalry resurfaces with competition over port access.
Ethiopia, landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, has long sought access to the sea. In 2024, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland to use the Berbera port. This move sparked diplomatic tensions with Somalia and drew in regional powers like Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Eritrea, feeling increasingly surrounded, now sees Ethiopia’s actions as a threat. Its continued occupation of Tigrayan territory appears to be a deliberate strategy to destabilise Ethiopia and disrupt its regional ambitions.
In this context, the continued presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray is not just a breach of the COHA but a deliberate geopolitical strategy.
The Way Forward
The crisis in Tigray doesn’t simply represent a relapse into conflict; it reflects the shortcomings of Ethiopia’s transitional justice process. By prioritising short-term political convenience over genuine reconciliation, the federal government has blocked the path to peace.
If the goal is lasting peace, concrete steps must be taken. First, the federal government must resolve the status of the Welkait/Western Tigray region through a transparent, independent process. Second, it must enforce the complete withdrawal of Eritrean and non-federal forces. Third, it must recommit to a credible, inclusive transitional justice process designed to deliver justice, not deflect it.
The Ethiopian government must also pursue a renewed peace agreement with Eritrea, centred on long-term regional stability rather than short-term political gain. None of this is likely without sustained and coordinated pressure from international actors, based on tangible actions, not just statements of concern.
At this critical moment, Ethiopia faces a choice: embrace justice as the cornerstone of peace or continue down a path where conflict rebrands itself under new names and different actors. Once again, Tigray stands at the crossroads of that decision.
Deborah Banketa
Deborah Banketa is a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.