Background
Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has struggled with ongoing interethnic conflicts and political instability. On 20 January 1959, King Mwami Mwambutsa IV of Burundi requested the country’s independence from Belgium and the dissolution of the Ruanda-Urundi union.[1] The monarchy followed a Tutsi-aristocratic hierarchy of succession. Under the Belgian administration, it controlled the territory and its resources. Following the request, an upsurge of political parties in the Burundian territory advocated for the end of the Belgian colonial occupation and the separation of the territory. In November 1959, the Rwanda Revolution, also known as the Hutu Revolution, Social Revolution or Wind of Destruction, broke out with a series of riots and attacks on the Tutsi ethnic group. The political instability and ethnic conflict in Rwanda caused the displacement of many Rwandan Tutsi refugees, who fled to Burundi.
On 18 September 1961, Burundi held elections, and the Union for National Progress (Union pour le Progrés National, or UPRONA), a multi-ethnic nationalist party led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, won over 80 percent of the vote and entered parliament with 58 of the 64 MPs.[2] UPRONA was an anti-colonialist political group with ambitions for a transethnic united nation. Triumph was short-lived, as Rwagasore was assassinated on 13 October 1961. Despite the political instability, Burundi gained independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962 under King Mwambutsa, Rwagasore’s father. Burundi became a constitutional monarchy and joined the United Nations on 18 September 1962.
In 1963, King Mwambutsa appointed Pierre Ngendandumwe, of the Hutu ethnic group, as the first independent prime minister. On 15 January 1965, Ngendandumwe was assassinated by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee. In May 1965, Burundi held parliamentary elections, with the majority of the parliamentary composition being the Hutu ethnic group. King Mwambutsa continued as a leader and appointed Tutsi Prince Leopold Biha as prime minister. Following Biha’s appointment, ethnic tensions rose, with an attempted coup led by Hutu army officers in October 1965. As a result of ethnic tensions, an estimated 500 Tutsis and 2,000 Hutus were murdered.[3] In July 1966, King Mwambutsa was overthrown by his son Prince Ndizeye, also known as Ntare V. On 28 November 1966, Prime Minister Michel Micombero led a successful military coup, ending the country’s monarchy.
In 1966, Burundi was declared a republic, and Micombero served as a de facto military dictator until the successful 1976 military coup led by army officer Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. The republic was marked by 30 years of political instability, with a series of coups and various civil wars between the Tutsi military and Hutu uprisings, particularly in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993.[4] In 1965, Burundi experienced a Hutu rebellion with brutal resistance and retaliation. In 1972, an attempted coup led by Hutu military personnel against Micombero led to a civil war. An estimated 200,000 people were killed as a consequence of the conflict.[5] In September 1987, Major Pierre Buyoya, Bagaza’s cousin, led a military coup that suspended the country’s constitution, becoming president on 2 October 1987.[6] In 1988, a Hutu-led rebel group attacked northern Burundi, killing roughly 20,000 people.
In March 1992, a Constitution was adopted, laying the foundations for a new democratic order with principles including separation of powers, progressive human rights protections and multipartyism. In June 1993, the first democratic multi-party general elections took place, with the Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, or FRODEBU), a predominantly Hutu-led party, winning the election, and Melchior Ndadaye elected president, defeating the predominantly Tutsi party, UPRONA, under Buyoya. On 21 October 1993, Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi extremists in a failed military coup.[7] The aftermath of the assassination led to an ethnic civil war, characterised by a cycle of revenge killings with between 30,000 to 50,000 civilians murdered and others displaced. This conflict lasted until 2005.[8]
In 1996, Buyoya successfully conducted a coup and served as the president of Burundi. Amidst the conflict, 1998 marked the beginning of peaceful negotiations and calls for ceasefires. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 28 August 2000 began the official transitional justice processes in the country. Initially, not all prominent conflict actors, including the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence Democracy (Conseil Nationales pour la Défense de la Démocraties-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, or CNDD-FDD), the National Forces of Liberation (Forces Nationales de Libération, or FNL), and other Tutsi-dominated factions, signed the agreement. Despite their non-commitment, these warring actors signed successive ceasefire agreements (2003 and 2006), reducing some violence. In November 2001, a three-year transitional government was inaugurated under the leadership of Buyoya as the transitional president and Domitien Ndayizeye as the transitional vice president for the initial 18 months.[9]
On 18 March 2005, a post-transitional Constitution was adopted. On 26 August 2005, the country held its presidential elections, and Pierre Nkurunziza of CNDD-FDD was democratically elected president. He served his first term between 2005 and 2010 with the mission of reconstructing Burundi according to the Arusha Accords, implementing the partition of the state positions across the different ethnic groups, Tutsi, Hutu and the minority group Twa. In his first term, Nkurunziza was accused of corruption as well as committing crimes under international law and human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests and detention, torture and ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions.[10] Despite this, Nkurunziza was re-elected in 2010 until 2015, but faced political resistance. Opposition parties accused the government of electoral fraud in the communal elections and boycotted the presidential and legislative elections.
In April 2015, CNDD-FDD announced Nkurunziza as their candidate for the 2015 presidential elections. Many criticised this announcement as unconstitutional; however, the Constitutional Court approved Nkurunziza’s right to run for office, ushering him into a third term. The announcement of Nkurunziza’s third term sparked mass protests involving civilians and political party opposition members. The protests continued for several weeks and were met with violent force by security forces. The 2015 elections were delayed by ten days and were held on 21 July 2015, when Nkurunziza was elected president for the third time.
Nkurunziza’s third term was characterised by violent acts of repression, including extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, and sexual violence, particularly rape. All opposition actors were threatened and harassed. On 12 December 2017, Nkurunziza announced a constitutional referendum that would allow him to run for two seven-year terms with the potential to stay in power until 2034.[11] On 17 May 2018, a constitutional referendum allowing additional terms for the president was approved by over 70 percent of voters. Despite the referendum, CNDD-FDD nominated Secretary General Evariste Ndayishimiye as the ruling party’s candidate. He was elected president of Burundi in the May 2020 elections. Ndayishimiye’s presidency has been marked by continued waves of repression, with the particular stifling of civil society and critics of the government.
International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi
On 28 August 1995, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1012 to establish the International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi (Commission d’Enquête Internationale sur les violations des droits de l’homme au Burundi depuis le 21 Octobre 1993).[12] The commission consisted of five international commissioners, including Chair Edilbert Razafinderalambo from Madagascar, elected by the UN secretary-general. The commission was mandated to investigate the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye on 21 October 1993, as well as the massacres and other related serious acts of violence committed after 21 October 1993.[13] It was also expected to provide recommendations to pursue justice, end impunity and promote national reconciliation.
On 7 June 2002, the commission submitted its final report to the secretary-general. The commission heard 667 witnesses and concluded that acts of genocide were perpetrated against the Tutsi minority on the same day as Ndadaye’s assassination. Members of FRODEBU, as well as community leaders, were identified as the primary instigators and perpetrators of violence. The commission also identified members of the Burundian army and gendarmerie and Tutsi civilians as perpetrators of indiscriminate killings of Hutus. Despite its findings, the commission did not identify perpetrators by name.
The commission recommended ethnic group balance, particularly increased representation of the Hutu majority in the judiciary, the police and high-ranking government positions. Also, the commission recommended the implementation of international jurisdiction for acts of genocide and other international crimes in Burundi and the establishment of additional commissions of inquiry to investigate other human rights violations committed before and after October 1993.
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
On 28 August 2000, 16 armed groups and political parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. However, not all prominent conflict actors, specifically the main armed factions, CNDD-FDD and FNL, and other Tutsi-dominated factions, signed the agreement until 2003.[14] The Accords are credited for ending the 1993-2005 civil war between the two dominant ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi. The agreement addressed cycles of ethnic conflict and violence in Burundi and neighbouring countries, including Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The peace agreement consisted of five protocols agreed upon by all actors of the Great Lakes region. These included: i) nature of the conflict, problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions; ii) democracy and good governance; iii) peace and security for all; iv) reconstruction and development; and v) guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.[15]
The agreement included a few positive outcomes, including a ceasefire, a commitment to establish transitional justice mechanisms, particularly a truth commission that would examine ethnically based violence from 1963 to 2003, and a special tribunal for prosecutions of crimes against humanity.[16] The transitional government implemented ceasefire protocols and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme detailed in the Arusha Agreement; however, a series of failed coups acted out by Tutsi groups prevented the fulfilment of the Arusha Agreement. The truth commission was established, but not the tribunal.[17]
Military operations ceased throughout the country, but because FNL refused the agreement, violence continued sporadically. On 15 May 2005, FNL leader Agathon Rwasa and Burundi president Domitien Ndayizeye signed a ceasefire agreement, although FNL never became a signatory of the Arusha Agreement.[18] Law No. 100/92 of 7 November 2005 implemented the Arusha Agreement within the Burundian legal system, granting provisional immunities for a broad category of crimes. It is uncertain which crimes were covered.
The agreement continues to be the foundation for transitional justice in Burundi, particularly in the operations of the truth commission.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In 2014, Nkurunziza signed a presidential decree authorising the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Vérité et Reconciliation, or CVR). The commission’s mandate was first outlined in Article 8 of the Arusha Agreement and included investigating violence and conflict affecting Burundi from 1962, proposing reconciliation and reparations measures, and establishing an impartial record of the country’s history.
On 15 May 2014, the government passed Law No. 1/18, establishing the truth commission and its formal mandate to investigate human rights violations committed between 1972 and 1973 and other events, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, assassinations and unlawful trials from 1960 to 1971.[19] On 10 December 2014, the national assembly selected 11 commissioners.[20] In 2018, government recommended an extension of the mandate by four years and an amendment to the mandate to include investigations into human rights violations, including war crimes, committed between 26 February 1885 and 4 December 2008, to acknowledge colonial violence.[21]
The commission’s operations stalled with the 2015 political crisis and only formally began in 2016. Between 2018 and 2020, the commission conducted hearings of eyewitnesses, perpetrators and survivors of human rights violations from 1972. Between 2018 and 2022, the commission uncovered thousands of mass gravesites dating to the killings committed in 1972, opening a public discourse on the country’s history of political violence. The commission reports that state agents and paramilitary actors systematically massacred over 150,000 people in 1972. So far, the commission has uncovered 68 graves, exhuming only 11. Afterward, 1,455 victims were identified from the exhumed graves.[22] The commission also uncovered and made public hidden records of stolen property from 1972.
The CVR continued its investigations throughout 2021 and 2022 but was interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Testimonies continued via the Zoom online platform. However, due to poor infrastructure, only a few participants were interviewed because of poor internet connections.
In 2019, CVR began issuing reports providing updates on its activities and discoveries. The commission’s 2020 progress report centres on investigations into the 1972 massacres and its operations concerning physical excavations of remains and hearings on the subject.[23] In December 2022, the commission presented its most recent report to the government, consisting of 52 volumes and addressing the previous two years of operation. This has not been released to the public. The commission continues its investigations, hearings and exhumations of victims of the 1972 ethnic crisis.
Gender
Traditional Burundian society is considered patrilinear and patriarchal, privileging men or others relating to or based on their relationship to the father or descent through the male line.[24] Societal norms encourage the public persona of Burundian men as leaders and decision makers, whereas women are private figures and acclaim their status through their association with male figures. With these disproportional gender norms, Burundian women have few political, economic and social rights, exposing them to precarious and violent circumstances. These structural circumstances are drivers of gender-based violence, with nearly half of Burundian women reporting that they experienced physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence in their lifetime.[25]
The conditions of conflict have worsened these deep-rooted political, socioeconomic, environmental and institutional drivers of gender-based violence. Widespread and particularly violent sexual violence featured throughout Burundi’s waves of conflict. The acts of sexual violence included rape, sexual slavery, mutilation, coerced incest, forced impregnation, forced prostitution and sexual humiliation. Women and girls are disproportionately impacted by conflict-related sexual violence, but men and boys are also identified as victims of sexual violence. The persistent conflict has led to a breakdown in the rule of order and social norms prohibiting these crimes. This results in sexual crimes, particularly rape, being committed by government soldiers, members of armed groups and civilians, with impunity.[26]
Despite widespread sexual violence, rape and other sexual violations are significantly underreported.[27] Despite the endemic nature of sexual violence, it still holds severe stigma and fear for victims. Within Burundian society, sex is still taboo, which also impacts the discourse on sexual violence. As a consequence, there is silence around the subject of sexual violence, which makes it difficult for victims/survivors to report their violent experiences. Also, there is a lack of access to medical care that impacts the systematic reporting of rape and other sexual abuse. Therefore, pursuing judicial redress is rare and expensive, with many survivors relying on informal methods to resolve cases of sexual violence.[28]
Beyond conflict-related sexual violence, women experienced an increase in maternal mortality during conflict.[29] A large majority of women were displaced, with very few owning land or property because of the patrilineal culture of society, making them vulnerable to violence and exploitation. Also, the increase in rape has demonstrated a concomitant rise in HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, disproportionately affecting women.
With the conflict’s disproportional impact on women and girls, women are active in civil society, advocating for women’s participation in transitional justice. Women’s groups played a significant role in mainstreaming women’s voices and experiences in the Arusha Agreement. Parallel to the Arusha negotiations, the All-Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference took place, where women’s rights and gender equality were mandated to be included as fundamental rights in all peace processes, including ceasefire agreements. Also, following the conference, sexual violence was lobbied and later included in peacebuilding processes and agreements as acts included in the definition of genocide.[30]
International Actors
In August 1994, the UN Security Council established a fact-finding mission to strengthen the national judicial system alongside the international judicial mandate. According to UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1012 (1995), the International Commission of Inquiry in Burundi was set up.[31]
In 1998, former president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere facilitated peace negotiations, particularly Arusha II that involved the government, the national assembly and 17 political parties, including UPRONA and FRODEBU. The former president of South Africa Nelson Mandela took over the talks in November 1999 following the death of Nyerere. On 28 August 2000, Mandela successfully negotiated the Arusha Agreement among the warring parties, besides CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL.
In October 2001, the South African Protection Support Detachment deployed 700 soldiers as a protection force to stabilise the country during the continuing peace negotiations.[32] Between October 2002 and December 2002, the African Union sent missions to facilitate ceasefire agreements. On 2 April 2003, the AU deployed the armed peace operation African Mission in Africa after the signing of individual ceasefire agreements between the government and different rebel groups. The mission was positioned to stabilise the country and the Great Lakes region amidst continued conflict.
From March 2002 until 2006, USAID/OTI introduced initiatives and programmes to support the transition to peace and promote the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. These included small grants to local civil society to encourage popular support for agreement and the transitional government.[33] USAID/OTI also assisted the transitional government with efforts to return refugees and internally displaced persons to their communities and property; reintegrate ex-combatants into their communities; provide technical support for conflict resolution in communities; support local and national election processes; and conduct outreach initiatives to increase public dialogue and participation in transitional processes.
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1650 (2005) supported Burundi’s transitional justice efforts, insisting on developing reforms established in the Arusha Agreement. In response to the transitional government’s request to establish an international judicial body, the UN deployed an assessment mission to establish an international judicial commission of inquiry for Burundi.[34] Following the mission’s report and UN Security Council Resolution 1606, the UN initiated negotiations with the Burundi government on establishing twin judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, both of mixed national-international composition. The talks in 2006 and 2007 failed, and the recommended institutions were never established.
Between 2009 and 2010, the UN Integrated Office in Burundi organised national consultations to establish a framework for future transitional justice processes and develop a draft law for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that complies with international law standards. International civil society and transitional justice experts were involved in drafting the law. In cooperation with UNESCO House for Peace Burundi and governmental organisations, including Africare and Company of the Apostles, the Burundian government coordinated peace education, public information and sensitisation programmes to encourage peaceful dialogues across ethnic groups.[35]
Ahead of the 2015 presidential elections, the UN established the UN Office in Burundi (first in the country in 2004) and the UN Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi to conduct fact-finding missions to document political tensions and violence across the country. Both missions also provided insights and technical support in preparation for the 2015 election.
On 17 December 2015, the Peace and Security Council, the decision-making organ of the African Union for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, authorised the deployment of 5,000 soldiers under the Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi. The mission was mandated for six months to “prevent any deterioration of the security situation, [to] monitor its evolution and report development on the ground [and] to contribute, within its capacity and in its areas of deployment, to the protection of civilians populations under imminent threat.”[36] In January 2016, African member states withdrew their support for the deployment of the mission, and it ended.[37]
[1] International Labour Organization, ‘Jobs and livelihoods for a peaceful and resilient Burundi,’ July 2017, https://www.ilo.org/media/423671/download
[2] Gerard Prunier, ‘Burundi: Descent into chaos or a manageable crisis,’ Refworld, March 1, 1995, https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/writenet/1995/en/19081
[3] Ibid.
[4] Juvenal Hatungimana, ‘The cause of conflict in Burundi,’ 2011, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:519100/fulltext01.pdf
[5] Patricia Daley, ‘Ethnicity and political violence in Africa: The challenge to the Burundi state,’ Political Geography, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2006).
[6] Stef Vandeginste, ‘Power-sharing, conflict and transition in Burundi: Twenty years of trial and error,’ Africa Spectrum, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2009).
[7] Ibid., 64.
[8] Hermenegilde Rwantabagu, ‘Explaining intra-state conflicts in Africa: The case of Burundi,’ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2001).
[9] ‘Burundi (06/09),’ US Department of State, January 20, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/burundi/125402.htm
[10] Amnesty International, ‘Burundi: Pierre Nkurunziza’s death marks the end of an era,’ June 17, 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-death-marks-the-end-of-an-era/
[11] Human Rights Watch, ‘Burundi: Killings, abuse ahead of referendum,’ May 18, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/18/burundi-killings-abuse-ahead-referendum
[12] International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi, ‘Final Report,’ https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf
[13] United States Institute of Peace, ‘Commission of Inquiry: Burundi,’ September 1, 1995, https://www.usip.org/publications/1995/09/commission-inquiry-burundi
[14] Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, ‘Peace Accords Matrix: Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi,’ https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-for-burundi
[15] ‘Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of Burundi,’ 2000, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf
[16] Concile Nibigira and Helen Scanlon, ‘Gender, peace and security: The challenges facing transitional justice processes in Burundi,’ Initiative for Peacebuilding, August 2010, https://www.academia.edu/7689453/C_Nibigira_and_H_Scanlon_Gender_Peace_and_Security_The_Challenges_Facing_Transitional_Justice_Processes_in_Burundi_Brussels_IFP_2010_
[17] Stef Vandeginste, ‘Museveni, Burundi and the perversity of immunité provisoire,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2016).
[18] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch.
[19] Isidore Nsengiyumva, ‘Pursuing peace and reconciliation in a post-atrocity society: A case study of transitional justice in Burundi,’ November 15, 2023, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/pursuing-peace-and-reconciliation-in-a-post-atrocity-society-a-case-study-of-transitional-justice-in-burundi/
[20] Impunity Watch, ‘Burundi’s TRC officially launched but will victims participate?’ March 2016, https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/oldcontent/container2673/files/Burundi%20DPP/justice%20transitionnelle/CVR%20et%20TS/analyses/IW0316E.pdf
[21] Ephrem Rugiririza, ‘Burundi: A truth commission as political division,’ November 1, 2018, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/39395-burundi-a-truth-commission-as-political-diversion.html
[22] ‘Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission presents new findings,’ Africanews, August 13, 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2021/03/20/burindi-s-truth-and-reconcilliation-commission-presents-new-findings//
[23] Assemblée Nationale du Burundi, ‘Parliament in Congress: Presentation of the progress report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2020, financial year,’ June 11, 2021, https://assemblee.bi/2021/06/11/le-parlement-en-congres-presentation-du-rapport-detapes-de-la-commission-verite-et-reconciliation-exercice-2020/
[24] Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, ‘Women in peace and transition processes: Case study series on Burundi,’ December 2018, https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/case-study-women-burundi-1996-2014-en.pdf
[25] Kenny B. Irakoze, ‘One woman’s story of resilience and overcoming gender-based violence amidst climate disasters in Burundi,’ IOM, December 22, 2023, https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/stories/one-womans-story-resilience-and-overcoming-gender-based-violence-amidst-climate-disasters-burundi#
[26] Nona Zicherman, ‘Addressing sexual violence in post-conflict Burundi,’ Forced Migration Review, Vol 1, No. 27 (2007).
[27] Nibigira and Scanlon, 9.
[28] Françoise Nduwimana, ‘The right to survive: Women, sexual violence and HIV/AIDS,’ Rights and Democracy, 2004, http://www.dd-rd.ca/francais/commdoc/publications/femmes/vihSIDA.pdf
[29] Ibid.; Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative.
[30] Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Legislating gender-based violence in post-conflict Africa,’ Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2010).
[31] Veronika Vimberg, ‘Transitional justice and national reconciliation in Burundi: Implementation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (signed in 2000),’ Faculty of Law University of Oslo, May 15, 2015, https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/46869/M_Thesis_Veronika_Vimberg_2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[32] Isiaka A. Badmus, ‘The African mission in Burundi (AMIB): A study of the African Union’s peacekeeping success and triangular area of tension in African peacekeeping,’ India Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2017).
[33] ‘Burundi: Stabilization and transitions,’ USAID, n.d., https://www.usaid.gov/stabilization-and-transitions/closed-programs/burundi
[34] Stef Vandeginste, ‘Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to shed light on the past while standing in the dark shadow of politics?’ International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012).
[35] Rwantabagu, 51.
[36] African Union, ‘Communique of the 565th meeting of the PSC on the situation in Burundi,’ December 28, 2015, https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-565th-meeting-of-the-psc-on-the-situation-in-burundi
[37] ‘In hindsight: Policy lessons from the PSC’s efforts in Burundi,’ ISS Africa, March 7, 2016, https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/in-hindsight-policy-lessons-from-the-pscs-efforts-in-burundi